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In the 1950s, the Republic of China (ROC) on the island of Taiwan was a Cold
War ally of the United States. Led by President Chiang Kai-shek and his ruling
Kuomintang Party, the ROC received military, financial, and humanitarian assistance
from the U.S., and enjoyed support in the White House, from the Departments of State
and Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Democratic and Republican
Parties. President Chiang even employed public relations firms and political pressure
groups to help generate public support and to sway American policymakers to favor his
cause. By the end of the 1970s, however, the ROC had lost its seat in the United Nations
and no longer maintained formal diplomatic relations with the United States. Why would
the United States abandon a long-standing World War II ally, recipient of American aid,
and fellow anti-communist?

The 1960s proved to be a pivotal decade in the diplomatic and military
relationship between the United States and the ROC. Presidents John F. Kennedy and
Lyndon B. Johnson, both Democrats, publicly promised support for Chiang and the
Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan. Chiang hoped to secure continued military aid and
diplomatic support by relying upon allies in the State Department, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and in the U.S. Congress, and even occasionally making threats to take actions
detrimental to American policy. Throughout the 1960s, the U.S.-ROC relationship was
tested by events in the United Nations, the Taiwan Strait, and Southeast Asia. By the end
of the decade, the ROC had lost millions in American aid and the United States had
publicly started to consider normalizing relations with the People’s Republic of China.
This dissertation will show that U.S.-ROC relations in the 1960s deteriorated due
to a combination of factors. The Vietnam War was one of several factors that helped
bring an end to formal American relations with the Republic of China. The Vietnam War
caused a conflict of interest, whereby American containment of communism in Southeast
Asia clashed with ROC plans to maintain its international legitimacy and to restore its
rule over all China. Additionally, bureaucratic changes within the State Department, the
demise and ineffectiveness of the China Lobby, and the changing make-up of the United
Nations resulting from decolonization also contributed to the decline of U.S.-ROC
relations.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In the late 1990s, actors Robert DeNiro and Dustin Hoffman starred in a major
motion picture entitled Wag the Dog. In this fictional account of Washington
policymaking and advising, a political advisor and a Hollywood producer conspired and
manufactured a war in Southeastern Europe to generate public support for an unpopular
President of the United States. Despite the film’s sensationalized tone, this account of
policy manipulation incidentally questioned whether or not foreign policy is driven by
elected officials or special interests. In other words, does the “dog wag the tail” or does
the “tail wag the dog?” These questions can similarly be applied to an analysis of
relations between the United States and the Republic of China during the most
confrontational years of the Cold War Era.

The Setting
The Republic of China (ROC) was an ally of the United States within the free
world coalition during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. After the Kuomintang
(KMT) government, led by President Chiang Kai-shek, fled Mainland China in 1949 and
established its governing authority on the island of Taiwan, ROC officials sought and
received military, financial and humanitarian assistance from the United States to
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-2strengthen their island bastion. As an American client state in the 1950s, the ROC
received moral, political, military and economic support from the White House, from the
Departments of State and Defense, the Democratic and Republican Parties, and both
houses of Congress.
Chiang Kai-shek had long-standing credentials as a world leader, having been a
military commander and President of the Republic of China since the late 1920s. Under
his leadership, the Chinese Nationalists had fought Japanese invaders during World War
II and had fought, and lost, a civil war with Mao Zedong and the Chinese Communist
Party. After the Korean War broke out in 1950 both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower
considered Chiang and the Nationalist regime on Taiwan vital to American security as
part of the free world coalition. The United States relied on Taiwan as a Cold War
partner against international communism. Chiang could also count on numerous personal
connections inside the United States, in particular members of Nationalist China’s
politically and financially powerful Soong family, former missionaries, and rabid anticommunists, to lobby on behalf of the Nationalist cause to swing American policy and
American public opinion to the advantage of his government and island nation. By the
end of the 1950s, Chiang Kai-shek had become an enormously powerful leader with near
dictatorial power on Taiwan with influential supporters and family members overseas
willing to do his bidding.
In the 1960s, however, the American presidency passed to two former United
States Senators, John F. Kennedy and then Lyndon B. Johnson. Kennedy and Johnson
were outspoken anti-communists who supported rigorous American measures to contain

-3communism’s spread. While both were knowledgeable about American policy in the Far
East, neither brought to the White House much experience in creating foreign policy.
Consequently, Chiang probably believed that he could exploit their lack of executive
experience to manipulate American policy in his favor. In other words, it seemed that the
Taiwanese tail might wag the American dog.
Despite Chiang’s apparent reasons for optimism, in 1971 the United Nations
removed the Republic of China from membership and, in 1979, the ROC lost its formal
diplomatic status with the United States and other countries. Why would the United
States abandon a long-standing World War II ally, recipient of American aid, and fellow
anti-communist?

Thesis
Although Kennedy and Johnson publicly promised support for Chiang and the
Chinese Nationalists on Taiwan, by the 1960s some career diplomats and policymakers
doubted that the American relationship with the ROC could continue as it was. Some
feared that Chiang would manipulate American policy and draw the United States into a
war with Communist China. Chiang certainly did have allies within the White House, the
State and Defense Departments, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and in the public
relations profession that he could count on to lobby for his interests. Nonetheless, U.S.ROC relations declined in the 1960s due to a combination of factors. These included the
Vietnam War, Chiang’s incessant requests for American assistance to invade and
recapture Mainland China to overthrow Mao Zedong and the Communists, the rivalry

-4within, and reorganization of, the United States diplomatic, military and intelligence
bureaucracy, the declining effectiveness of the China Lobby, and the changing make-up
of the United Nations (UN) due to decolonization.
The Vietnam War was an important factor that helped bring an end to formal
American relations with the ROC. Between 1961 and 1969, it dominated United States
diplomatic and military relations with the Republic of China and highlighted a conflict of
interest between the two Cold War allies. American containment of communism in
Southeast Asia clashed with ROC plans to maintain international diplomatic legitimacy
and to retake the Mainland. Chiang repeatedly requested assistance from Kennedy and
Johnson to help overthrow Communism on the Mainland, and hoped the war in Vietnam
would provide the impetus for change. The United States, though, feared that an
expanded Southeast Asian war would further destabilize the region and make an already
bad situation worse in Vietnam. The Vietnam War, likewise, undercut American public
and congressional support for the ROC. Due to wartime price inflation, pro-Nationalist
pressure groups, such as the Committee of One Million, could not raise sufficient funds
to get their message across and lobby members of Congress.
Rivalries within the executive branch bureaucracy, especially within the White
House and State Department, also contributed to the end of formal relations between the
United States and the ROC. Between 1961 and 1969, both Kennedy and Johnson
publicly promised to continue support for Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. But behind the
public veneer of the presidency, there existed a cadre of State Department and White
House officials who believed that China policy was unrealistic. They proposed measures

-5that sought to avoid war and create a diplomatic rapprochement with the Communist
Chinese, and promote a “two Chinas” policy. Their proposals conflicted with Defense
Department and CIA interests, who believed Taiwan’s strategic location was essential to
containing communism’s spread. As a result, the Johnson administration established a
dual policy of containment in Southeast Asia – containing communism in Southeast Asia
militarily while containing the ROC’s desire to overthrow and replace the PRC
diplomatically.
Meanwhile, the China Lobby failed to keep the Republic of China high on
Kennedy and Johnson’s priority list. This informal group of American diplomats,
legislators, businessmen, former missionaries, and powerful members of Chiang’s
extended family sought to influence American policymakers to support increased military
and economic aid for the ROC. The China Lobby also pressed for the continued
isolation, and eventual overthrow, of the communist People’s Republic of China (PRC), a
government they believed was illegitimate. Through its fund raising and public
awareness arm, the Committee of One Million, the China Lobby had succeeded in the
1950s in maintaining public support for the ROC. But by the 1960s, as the China
Lobby’s chief legislative supporters left Congress and as policy priorities shifted in
Southeast Asia to the war in Vietnam, and as the China Lobby failed to change its
strategies as it “preached to the converted,” American interest in the Republic of China
had begun to decline.
The changing make-up of the United Nations throughout the 1960s also
contributed to the decline in U.S.-ROC relations. In the 1950s, the United States

-6successfully blocked numerous attempts from the eastern bloc to allow the PRC into the
United Nations. The Kennedy and Johnson administrations, though, found it increasingly
difficult to keep the ROC in the UN and to keep the PRC out and isolated. A large
number of newly independent nations from Africa, which had benefitted from PRC
humanitarian aid, joined the United Nations during the 1960s and refused to support
American and ROC interests. By mid-decade, as support for PRC membership increased,
the United States found itself at odds with some of its own Cold War allies over the
Chinese representation issue. In 1966, both the Canadian and Italian delegations
proposed that the PRC enter the UN. As a result, Chiang threatened to leave the UN if
the PRC were granted membership. Although the United States thwarted this and later
attempts to bring the PRC into the UN, by the end of the 1960s, support for the ROC had
dropped off so substantially that the ROC lost its seat in 1971 and the PRC subsequently
joined the UN.

Historiography
This dissertation fills a significant gap in the historiography of United StatesRepublic of China relations. Although there exist several significant works concerning
American foreign relations with Taiwan, few analyze the bureaucratic dimensions of
United States China policy and none seriously address the important roles the Vietnam
War, decolonization, and pressure groups played in weakening relations with the ROC.
Works written in the last twenty years have analyzed United States-ROC relations in
terms of the adversarial American-Soviet-Communist Chinese great power framework.

-7Such projects have considered American relations with the ROC as a side show, with the
much more tangible and obvious conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union
on center stage.
One of the first works written by an American historian on United States-China
relations was The United States and China by John King Fairbank (1948). Originally
published in 1948, and subsequently revised in 1958, 1971, and 1980, Fairbank’s book
reveals more about the West’s effect on China, and Chinese immigration to the American
West, than on diplomatic relations. After describing how the Nationalist regime was
pushed off the Mainland to Taiwan, Fairbank proceeds to a consideration of relations
between the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the United States. He ignores
American relations with the Republic of China after 1949, mentioning only that Taiwan
had “two faces” during the Cold War – one looking backward and one looking forward.
While ROC officials continually pressed their claim as the legitimate government of
China, American and Japanese technology, trade, and investment created a skilled
leadership class and raised living standards above those of the Mainland.1 Fairbank,
though, provides little data to support these claims.
It was not until 1990 that the first serious analysis of United States-China relations
in the Cold War era was published. Gordon H. Chang, in Friends and Enemies: The
United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (1990), places the American
relationship with China within the Cold War “great power” framework. Chang

1

John K. Fairbank, The United States and China, Fourth Edition (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1980), 357.

-8concentrates on the Sino-Soviet split and the triangular relationship between the United
States, the Soviet Union and the PRC. According to Chang, American diplomats in the
1950s sought to create barriers to decelerate and control any developing friendship
between the USSR and the PRC, with the ultimate goal of American recognition and
friendship with Mainland China.2 As with Fairbank, Chang only considers Taiwan
peripherally. Chang regards the U.S.-ROC relationship as a Cold War sideshow. He
does not consider how the Vietnam War affected the American relationship with the PRC
and only discusses the Vietnam War in the context of the adversarial relationship among
the three regional powers.3
Michael Schaller, in The United States and China in the Twentieth Century
(1990), also provides an excellent survey of United States-China relations. Like Fairbank
and Chang, however, Schaller concentrates on U.S.-PRC relations and gives little
attention to Taiwan. Although the book includes an excellent chapter on the Vietnam
War, little is mentioned about Chiang Kai-shek and the ROC’s reaction to the war.
Schaller, instead, contends that Kennedy and Johnson were more concerned with the PRC
and its potential for creating havoc.4
Fairbank, Chang and Schaller make no mention of Taiwan’s role in the Cold War.
But according to Warren I. Cohen, in America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-

2

Gordon H. Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the
Soviet Union, 1948-1972 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), 3-4.
3

4

Ibid., 262-69.

Michael Schaller, The United States and China in the Twentieth Century (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 162.

-9American Relations (Fourth Edition, 2000), Taiwan played a significant role in the Cold
War. Spanning the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Cohen’s book presents a cogent
survey of American-Chinese relations. He suggests that, beginning with President
Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration, Taiwan played a key role in the Cold War as an
economically and militarily powerful counter to the Mainland regime. John F. Kennedy,
like Eisenhower, considered Mainland China more of a threat to American interests than
the Soviet Union. A strong Taiwan, therefore, became a strategic necessity to contain the
Mainland Communists.5 Nonetheless, Cohen’s survey is heavily centered on the U.S.PRC conflict, makes no mention of the Taiwanese role in the Vietnam War, and presents
little analysis as to why the United States abandoned formal relations with the ROC in the
1970s.
The work of Nancy Bernkopf Tucker has been among the first to highlight
American relations with the ROC on Taiwan. In Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong
Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 (1994), Tucker analyzes U.S.-ROC relations in
the Cold War era. Ultimately, however, Tucker also views U.S.-ROC relations in terms
of the American-Soviet-Communist Chinese competition. Taiwan’s geographical
location and significance not only determined its role in the Cold War, but also
influenced how American policymakers believed the ROC should be used in the struggle
against the PRC and the Soviet Union. According to Tucker, “shifts in relations between
China and the Soviet Union and between China and the United States would, by 1972,

5

Warren I. Cohen, America’s Response to China: A History of Sino-American
Relations, 4th Edition (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), 188-89.

-10undermine the close collaboration with Washington that had sustained Taiwan for two
decades.”6 Although Tucker discusses the ROC’s role in the Vietnam War, she only does
so in relation to the larger Cold War picture. The Vietnam War’s role relative to
American relations with the Republic of China is mostly ignored.
Tucker has also edited a compilation of oral histories in the history of AmericanChinese relations in China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American
Relations, 1945-1996 (2001). Freely admitting that her book is unbalanced and lacks a
“Chinese voice,” China Confidential spans the nearly fifty years of the Cold War.7 Like
its predecessor, though, Tucker’s compilation of oral histories sees U.S.-ROC relations as
a small part of the overall picture. Very little is mentioned about the Vietnam War’s
influence on American-Taiwanese relations.
John Garver’s The Sino-American Alliance: Nationalist China and American
Cold War Strategy in Asia (1997), like Tucker’s work, attempts a synthesis of AmericanNationalist Chinese relations in the Cold War era. Limiting his scope to the years
between 1950 and 1971, Garver argues that “Nationalist China played a central role in the
political war waged by the United States” in East Asia.8 This is certainly true, given the
abundant evidence the author presents about the obvious. Garver, though, based his work
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-11mostly on secondary sources and failed to analyze seriously diplomatic dispatches and
evidence of public opinion concerning United States relations with the Republic of China.
In his recent book on United States-China policy, A Conflict Perpetuated: China
Policy During the Kennedy Years (2002), Noam Kochavi argues that actions of the
Kennedy administration and the Communist Chinese government caused the continuance
of their antagonistic relationship through the early 1960s. Blaming the China Lobby and
Cold War hardliners, such as Walt W. Rostow, Ray Cline, and Curtis E. LeMay, for poor
American relations with the PRC, Kochavi writes that “the opportunity for SinoAmerican reconciliation did not exist during the Kennedy years.”9 Very little mention is
made of Chiang Kai-shek and the ROC’s relationship with the United States outside of
the U.S.-PRC impasse.
Chiao Chiao Hsieh’s 1985 work, Strategy for Survival: The Foreign Policy and
External Relations of the Republic of China on Taiwan, 1949-79, analyzes the U.S.-ROC
relationship from the Taiwanese perspective. Using mostly interviews and Chinese
Nationalist government document, Chiao argues that the ROC leadership utilized
diplomatic and economic strategies “that were essential for the political survival of the
ROC.” The Nationalists, in order to survive as a separate governing entity from the
communists on the Mainland, banked on worldwide anti-communist sentiment in the
1950s to obtain widespread support for attacking and overthrowing the Mainland
communist regime. After the United States refused to commit itself directly to Chiang’s
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-12plan to attack and overthrow the Mainland regime, the ROC shifted to a less aggressive
“political counter-attack” strategy through the 1960s.10 Hsieh makes little mention of the
Vietnam War and its effect on Taiwan.
In sum, the most recent works on American-Chinese relations have emphasized
the adversarial relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of
China. In highlighting United States relations with Communist China, these authors have
effectively rendered Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese secondary historical
actors. While this dissertation does not reject the Cold War great power framework, it
seeks to use this framework as a backdrop, allowing the reader to focus on the U.S.-ROC
relationship for itself, not as a small part of something larger. The Soviets and the
Communist Chinese are not ignored here – they can not be ignored. Rather, the roles of
these communist Cold War powers are of secondary concern.
This study also places heavy emphasis on the alliance relationship between the
United States and the Republic of China. While both countries mutually agreed to
contain communism, U.S. and ROC interests and their divergent needs for security
collided in Southeast Asia. Similar relationships between countries have occurred in
modern history. Historians and political scientists have written widely on relationships
between nations within alliances. Historian Paul W. Schroeder and political scientists
Marc Trachtenberg and G. John Ikenberry demonstrate how member nations operate out
of self-interest despite joining alliances for reasons of collective security. Austria, for
10
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-13example, used the balance of power created after the Napoleonic wars in 1814 at the
Congress of Vienna to secure its own interests, despite its wish to maintain order in
Europe with the British, French, Russians and Prussians. In his 1962 work entitled
Metternich’s Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820-1823, Schroeder states that Austria had to use
skillful diplomacy to keep its dominant position in Central Europe and maintain its
interests in Italy.11 Schroeder further explores Austrian diplomacy in terms of balance of
power in Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The Destruction of the European
Concert (1972). In this work, Schroeder argues that Austria hampered Britain’s efforts to
block the Russians’ drive for access to the Mediterranean Sea. Britain and France, to
maintain their concept of balance of power, sought Austria’s help against Russian
expansion. But Austria refused to fight and tried to maintain their control over Central
Europe, checking Russian interests in the Balkans, checking growing Prussian influence
in the Germanic Confederation, and thereby maintaining its concept of balance of
power.12
Like Schroeder, Trachtenberg and Ikenberry also argue that relations between
junior and senior partners in an alliance can be problematic. Trachtenberg and Ikenberry,
though, explain how junior partners have caused senior partners to act outside of their
immediate interests. In A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement,
1945-1963 (1999), Trachtenberg claims that Britain and France used their fears of Soviet

11

Paul W. Schroeder, Metternich’s Diplomacy at Its Zenith, 1820-1823 (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1962), 12, 240.
12

Paul W. Schroeder, Austria, Great Britain, and the Crimean War: The
Destruction of the European Concert (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972), 416-18.

-14aggression and a unified Germany as leverage on the United States to provide for their
general security against the Communist Bloc. As a result, by 1948, the United States
changed its policy to support a militarily strengthened and politically organized West
Germany and, by 1949, initiated an anti-Soviet security alliance of western nations called
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.13 On the other hand, Ikenberry, in After Victory:
Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (2001),
contends that since 1815, major powers have engaged in “strategic restraint” with lesser
powers within alliances. “Strategic restraint” allowed for Britain and the United States,
after the Napoleonic wars and World Wars I and II, respectively, to create alliances that
bound nations together and “institutionalized their relations after the war.” These
formalized alliances, though, “allowed the leading state [at least to some extent] to lock
other states into a favorable set of postwar relations and establish some measure of
restraint on its exercise of power, thereby mitigating the fears of domination and
abandonment.”14 In other words, both Britain and the United States established
international coalitions, such as the Congress System and the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization, to reassure junior partners of their friendship and support. At the same
time, the senior partner in the coalition limited the activities of junior partners so they did
not instigate large conflicts and disrupt the peace.
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-15Ikenberry’s definition of “strategic restraint” certainly applies to the United
States’ relationship with the Republic of China in the post-World War II years. The
ROC, a junior partner in the free world coalition, wished to become more active in the
larger conflict against communism in East Asia. The United States, as the senior power,
held the Nationalists back from instigating a larger war against the People’s Republic of
China, but continued to reassure Chiang of its friendship through ensuring its seat in the
United Nations and through increased military and economic aid.
According to Ikenberry, the United States is much different from any other nation
in world history that has had any type of hegemonic power. At the height of their world
power, tradition and law constrained the establishment of British and French foreign
policy as their political institutions were closed to outside influence on foreign
policymaking. As per tradition, debate ended when their governments adopted, and rival
factions united, over foreign policy.15 Since the end of World War II, American foreign
policy has been created in a much different way. Unlike Britain and France, the United
States has an open political system based on the rule of law.16 In debating American
foreign policy, members of Congress faced pressure from constituents and political action
committees reflecting economic, political or ethnic concerns.17 Additionally, the open
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-16political system has allowed opportunities for allies to lobby and engage elected officials
and influence the political process.18
But while the open nature of American politics provides for discussion, stability,
and influence for some, the American political system also has a bureaucratic nature that
highlights divisions and agendas among executive policymaking departments. Political
scientists Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, in Essence of Decision: Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd Edition (1999), explore the influence of bureaucracy on foreign
policy development. Because policymakers’ “preferences and beliefs are related to the
different organizations they represent, their analyses yield conflicting
recommendations.”19 Organizations within the executive branch compete and advance
their own agendas and influence decision-making from within. Final decisions on foreign
policy were the result of compromise, conflict and confusion among officials with
differing interests.20
This dissertation will also analyze the competing interests within executive branch
departments, namely the Departments of State and Defense and the Central Intelligence
Agency, and show how these competing organizations within the bureaucracy attempted
to shape U.S.-ROC relations and, thereby, “wag the dog.” Each of these bureaucratic
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-17organizations perform opposing executive tasks and attempt to influence policy. With
this in mind, each of these organizations acts to justify their large budgets and requests
for budget increases. While State is responsible for keeping relations with other nations
in the world in a state of peace, Defense operates in a state of perpetual planning for
military action. On the other hand, the Central Intelligence Agency subtly works to create
instability and opportunities for the United States to act in its own security interests, as
well as to obtain information vital to maintaining international peace and stability. These
factors come up repeatedly in discussions within the executive branch over U.S. relations
with Taiwan in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.

Primary Sources
In addition to shifting the focus on U.S.-China relations toward U.S. relations
with the ROC and the influence of different groups on policymaking, this dissertation
also exploits many primary sources that were unavailable to the previously-mentioned
authors. For example, the China volumes of Foreign Relations of the United States
(FRUS) for the Kennedy and Johnson administrations were only published in 1996 and
1998, respectively. The FRUS series made available the most important declassified
diplomatic dispatches and reports concerning American-Chinese relations in the 1960s.
Likewise, the National Security Files at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library in
Boston, Massachusetts, and at the Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library and Museum
in Austin, Texas, are of tremendous value and contain documents declassified after the
1990s. These repositories are replete with data that have not been sufficiently utilized in

-18this type of study. Although Tucker made some use of these collections in Uncertain
Friendships, she relied mostly on secondary sources. Both Kochavi and Garver failed to
utilize Kennedy’s and Johnson’s National Security Files. Similarly, the Department of
State Records (Record Group 59) at National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, has
also been under-utilized by scholars of United States-China relations.
Other little-used manuscript collections were also utilized for this study. George
H. W. Bush’s collection at his presidential library in College Station, Texas, provided
documents from his term as United States Ambassador to the United Nations. Likewise,
this study uses the collections of a number of significant legislators of the 1960s,
especially those of John C. Stennis, Albert Gore, Sr., Richard B. Russell, Jr., John G.
Tower, J. William Fulbright, and Allen J. Ellender, to gauge congressional and public
opinion regarding U.S. policy toward the ROC. The manuscript collection of Marvin
Liebman at Stanford University provided insight into the ineffectiveness of the China
Lobby in the 1960s.

CHAPTER II
PROLOGUE: U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ROC, 1949-61
In the years immediately following World War II, the United States became more
heavily involved in East Asia than ever before in its history. Before helping Japan rebuild
from its wartime destruction, the U.S. worked to establish China as a center for peace and
stability in Asia. But a civil war in China after World War II resulted in two governments
that claimed to represent all Chinese – the People’s Republic of China (PRC) headed by
Mao Zedong on the Mainland and the Republic of China (ROC) headed by Chiang Kaishek on the island of Taiwan. In 1950, warfare on the Korean Peninsula brought the
United States face-to-face with communist expansion in Asia; later that year, American
and Communist Chinese forces clashed in the former Japanese colony. In the meantime,
the growing conflict in Vietnam highlighted both Chiang and Mao’s security
vulnerabilities. By the end of the 1950s, the Korean War and the Vietnam War had
tremendously influenced American policy in Asia. Believing Mao would forcibly attempt
to unify Taiwan with the Mainland, the administrations of Harry S. Truman and Dwight
D. Eisenhower made the ROC a significant American client state and delivered to Chiang
large amounts of military and economic aid.

-19-

-20The Coming of the ROC in Taiwan and the Role of the U.S. During The Transition
By 1931, Japan, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and the Republic of China
government dominated by Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang (KMT) Party sought
control of China. In September 1931, the Japanese invaded and captured Manchuria,
China’s richest region in the Northeast, and turned it into a Japanese protectorate. Rather
than resist the Japanese, Chiang hoped the League of Nations would intervene.1 On the
other hand, some CCP leaders believed that fighting the Japanese was paramount to
Chinese independence. One CCP leader, Zhou Enlai, contended that his party should
create volunteer armies of workers and peasants not only to oppose the Japanese, but also
to oppose the Nationalists, who were also creating their own volunteer armies. Zhou
argued that Chiang and the Nationalists would sell out the peasants to the capitalists.2 By
November 1931, the CCP declared the Chinese Soviet Republic in Jiangxi Province in
southeastern China and had gathered tremendous strength.3 Chiang, though, decided that
the CCP was far more dangerous a threat to his leadership than the Japanese.4 As a result,
the KMT military entered Jiangxi in October 1934, destroyed the Chinese Soviet
Republic, and forced the CCP 6,000 miles to Shaanxi in the Northwest. There, the CCP
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-21reorganized and advocated a national united front against Japanese aggression in China.5
Even with the CCP nearly destroyed, Chiang still believed that he could work out
a deal with the Japanese and stop them from an all-out assault on the Chinese Mainland.
In fact, by mid-year of 1935, Chiang had approved a plan whereby Japan would cancel all
its unequal treaties with China in return for Chinese recognition of Japan’s position in
Manchuria.6 Chiang, though, faced tremendous pressure from his subordinates to change
his policy toward the Japanese. In December 1936, two of Chiang’s military advisors
kidnaped the Nationalist leader at Xi’an and convinced him to end his war against the
CCP and to fight the Japanese. In 1937, the CCP and the KMT created a United Front
against the Japanese invasion.7
The United Front, though, was short lived. In addition to numerous clashes
between KMT and CCP units,8 Nationalist forces destroyed Mao’s New Fourth Army in
January 1941. While the Nationalists claimed that the New Fourth Army had expanded
CCP influence at the expense of the war with Japan, Communists claimed that Chiang
had formally broken the United Front and resumed his policy of destroying communism.9

5

Mark Selden, China in Revolution: The Yenan Way Revisited (London: M. E.
Sharpe, 1995), 65.
6

John W. Garver, “The Origins of the Second United Front: The Comintern and
the Chinese Communist Party,” The China Quarterly 113 (1988): 44.
7

Chen, 20-21.

8

Selden, 132.

9

Chalmers Johnson, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power: The
Emergence of Revolutionary China, 1937-1945 (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
1962), 123.

-22By 1942, CCP forces lost nearly half their strength due to Japan’s Three-All Policy (burn
all, kill all, destroy all). Meanwhile, the Nationalists blockaded CCP supply lines.10
Although the United States and the Soviet Union intervened to ensure that war did not
break out within the United Front, Nationalists and Communists strengthened their
respective positions.11
The United States had a vested interest in a peaceful and stable post-war China.
President Franklin D. Roosevelt hoped that China could become a center for stability in
East Asia in the years after World War II – this meant ensuring that the CCP and the
KMT would work together. In November 1944, President Roosevelt sent Patrick Hurley
to China to negotiate a post-war government. Mao agreed to a coalition government with
the KMT, but Chiang convinced Hurley to accept a proposal whereby the Chinese
Communists would have to turn over command of their military to Chiang.12 Then at the
Yalta Conference in February 1945, President Roosevelt encouraged the Soviet leader
Joseph Stalin to enter the war against Japan and to sign a friendship treaty with Chiang
Kai-shek in exchange for a concession in northeast China.13 After President Roosevelt’s
death, the administration of Harry S. Truman vocally supported the Nationalists over the
CCP. Mao and the CCP felt betrayed by the United States, especially after the failure of
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-23George C. Marshall’s mission to stave off civil war with the Nationalists. As a result,
Mao came to see the U.S. as his chief threat.14 By 1947, the Nationalists and Communists
were at war.
American policymakers watched anxiously as Chiang’s military suffered
numerous defeats. With the Soviet army increasing its support to the CCP in the
Northeast, American military officials proposed, and Truman agreed, to send U.S. forces
to transport KMT troops to the Northeast.15 Mao saw the U.S. maneuver as active
support for the KMT.16 In 1948, Truman approved $450 million in economic aid to the
KMT.17 Chiang may have believed this aid had set a precedent and probably explains
why Chiang’s government adamantly pursued further American aid in the 1950s and
1960s. But believing Chiang could not survive, the Truman administration slowly
withdrew support.18
As Mao Zedong and his Communists rapidly spread their control over the
Mainland from the Northeast, Chiang and the Nationalists began a slow retreat to the
island of Taiwan, where they established their authority over the island with an
administration of Nationalist mainlanders. Taiwan’s economy, though, had been
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-24“Japanized” during the first half of the twentieth century. A colony of Japan between
1895 and the end of World War II, Taiwanese agriculture had been developed by the
Japanese into a major source of food. As a result, Taiwan’s economy expanded and its
market for goods widened.19 Japanese technicians and bureaucrats created on Taiwan a
stable and ordered society favorable to business as levels of education and life expectancy
increased.20 Additionally, improved transportation and communication made it easier for
Taiwan’s economy to industrialize in the post-World War II years.21
Some native Taiwanese, however, did not welcome the Nationalists.22 Some
complained that the Nationalists had confiscated land from the Japanese for their own
personal use.23 On February 27, 1947, native islanders rose against Nationalist rule over
Taiwan and demanded greater governing authority over their own island. Within a week,
Nationalist troops from the Mainland arrived on Taiwan, killed thousands, and reestablished their authority. But by the end of 1948, Chiang gradually lost control of the
Mainland and resigned the ROC Presidency while the Nationalist regime continued its
retreat to Taiwan. The Soviets then broke their treaty with the ROC, openly assisted
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-25Mao’s army in the Northeast, and in October 1949, the CCP entered Beijing and declared
the People’s Republic of China (PRC).24
The Kuomintang formalized its rule in Taiwan and planned to turn the island into
an anti-communist bastion. On February 25, 1950, the Legislative Yuan formally asked
Chiang Kai-shek to resume the presidency. Chiang and the KMT monopolized political
power on Taiwan. To ensure that Taiwan remained secure from alleged communist
subversion, Chiang established a police state where political criticism was equated with
subversive, pro-communist behavior.25 Chiang later announced that his government
would create a redoubt on Taiwan and form a regional anti-communist alliance with
neighboring democratic countries.26 Chiang had already met with the leaders of the
Philippines and South Korea in the summer of 1949 and won their support for an East
Asian anti-communist alliance. The proposal failed, though, because the countries were
militarily weak and the United States dominated their foreign policies and was in no
mood for any anti-communist alliance.27
Taiwan was not the only place to which retreating Nationalist troops fled. Some
1,500 Nationalist troops escaped into Burma in late 1949 and early 1950 and made their
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-26base fifteen miles from the Thai border. The Burmese army was too weak to move
against them. Meanwhile, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) planned to make this
group of refugees a border army for the ROC and supplied them via air drops made by
China Air Transport (CAT). The officers of this CIA-supplied army commuted between
Taiwan and Burma via a secluded landing strip across the border in Thailand. This new
army recruited more troops from the surrounding hills, financed themselves by
controlling the local opium trade, and forced local residents to pay taxes and ferry fees.28
Throughout the 1950s, the Burmese government asked the United States to
pressure the ROC to remove their troops. China Air Transport planned to fly them to
Taiwan from the Thai border, but the soldiers refused to surrender themselves and their
weapons. When the United States pressured Chiang to urge his soldiers to bring out their
weapons, Chiang threatened to expose CIA involvement in supporting his troops in
Burma. By the mid-1950s, only half the group had been evacuated, mostly women,
children and other non-combatants.29

The China Lobby and the “Who Lost China” Debate
Meanwhile, in the United States, an informal group originally labeled by
journalists and conspiracy theorists as the China Lobby attempted to sway congressional
and public opinion in favor of the ROC. Beginning in the early 1940s, the China Lobby
originated when members of Chiang Kai-shek’s family, specifically T. V. Soong and H.
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-27H. Kung, publicly sought financial and military assistance from the United States. Even
May-lin Soong (Madame Chiang Kai-shek) on her frequent visits to Soong’s and Kung’s
homes in New York, reportedly held “strategy meetings” with wealthy Chinese and
former Nationalist officials living in the United States, as well as American businessmen
and former missionaries.30 The China Lobby included a number of American political
figures, former missionaries, prominent anti-communists, businessmen and journalists
interested in ensuring and promoting the Republic of China’s survival.31
Among the most prominent Americans identified with this China Lobby in the
1940s were businessman Alfred Kohlberg and publisher Henry Luce. Kohlberg, an
importer of Chinese textiles and director of a pressure group named the American China
Policy Association (ACPA), had been the China Lobby’s chief financial agent.
Throughout the 1940s and 1950s, Kohlberg both fought and embraced charges that he
had received millions of dollars from Chiang Kai-shek with which to fund his lobbying
efforts on Capitol Hill. While denying these charges before Congress, Kohlberg
repeatedly told the press that “he was the China Lobby.” In 1951, Senator Wayne Morse
(R-Oregon) accused Kohlberg of accepting nearly $654,000,000 from Chiang for
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-28distribution to congressmen for their support. Kohlberg responded to Morse’s charges by
stating that he had never bribed anyone in Washington.32
Meanwhile, publisher Henry Luce, the son of Presbyterian missionaries stationed
in China in the 1890s, promoted pro-Nationalist and anti-Communist Chinese sentiment
through his magazines. Time and Life magazines printed articles that highlighted
Chiang’s plight and the Nationalists’ need for American aid. In the late 1940s and early
1950s, many Republican congressmen depended on Luce for news on the most recent
international developments, in particular news on China.33 Republicans, having grown
suspicious about intelligence gathered by the Truman administration, believed they had a
good reason rely on Henry Luce for their general news and foreign intelligence.
Comprising a majority in both houses of Congress between 1947 and 1949, Republicans
also believed rumors of Soviet intelligence activity in the United States. The House UnAmerican Activities Committee launched an investigation into Soviet espionage activity
in the federal government in the late 1940s. Former communist and Time journalist
Whittaker Chambers testified that former State Department official Alger Hiss had
provided the Soviets with various sensitive documents. Although Hiss denied the
charges, Chambers produced documents from his farm with Hiss’s handwriting. Later, a
federal court convicted Hiss of perjury.34 The Venona Project, which decoded Soviet
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-29cables during and immediately after World War II, proved that the Soviets had recruited a
network of spies within every important military and diplomatic agency of the federal
government. At least twenty people had acted as sources of information for the Soviets in
various U.S. foreign affairs agencies.35
Subsequently, Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) parlayed a growing
national anti-communist hysteria into a bureaucratic “witch hunt” for communists
operating within the federal government. Senator McCarthy claimed there was a vast
conspiracy within the State Department to allow the communists to take Mainland China.
He accused high-ranking State Department diplomats of communist leanings and of
“losing” China.36 McCarthy’s hearings essentially gutted the State Department, in
particular the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, of China experts and career diplomats.37 The
“loss of China” became a rallying cry for grass-roots conservative lobbying groups, the
press, and the radio media. As the Truman administration changed course on China
policy by 1951 because of the Korean War, grass-roots conservative activists may have
come to believe they could manipulate American foreign policy.38
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-30Other conservative Republican legislators also openly criticized the Truman
administration for a weak foreign policy that had lost China to the communists. By the
beginning of the 1950s, these representatives and senators, some of whom had been
associated with the China Lobby, created an informal China Bloc on Capitol Hill. In the
wake of the Korean War, this China Bloc banded together to support pro-Nationalist
Chinese legislation and to investigate State Department activities and policy prior to the
“loss of China” to the communists in 1949. Among those originally associated with the
China Bloc were Representatives Walter F. Judd (R-Minnesota) and John M. Vorys (ROhio) and Senators Styles H. Bridges (R-New Hampshire), Alexander Smith (R-New
Jersey) and William F. Knowland (R-California).39 Throughout the 1950s, these
legislators kept the Taiwan issue alive on Capitol Hill by frequently speaking out for
increased American support, and ensured passage of pro-Nationalist legislation, such as
the United States-China Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 and the Formosa Resolution of
1955.
Chiang also tried to use the “who lost China” debate as leverage to garner
increased American support for his cause. In September 1957, the ROC government
entered into a contract with Hamilton Wright Organization, a public relations firm, for the
purpose of leading a pro-Nationalist media campaign in the United States. According to
the contract, the Hamilton Wright Organization, for the calendar year October 1, 1957 to
39
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-31September 30, 1958, would “publicize the natural resources, industrial opportunities,
agricultural development, tourist attractions, public works projects, cultural advancement,
and the work of Government to help build a vigorous, healthy economy in Taiwan”40 and
to “bring to the attention of the people of the United States and the free world the
tremendous difficulties under which the people of Free China are working toward the
ultimate goal of returning to the mainland of Asia.”41 This campaign was planned to
“inform and enlighten American public opinion as to the efforts made by Free China to
establish and uphold democratic processes and the democratic way of life.”42

The ROC and the Truman Administration
In the years immediately following World War II, the United States provided
financial assistance to save China’s economy from collapse. The Truman administration
hoped this aid would protect American interests in China and turn China into force for
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-32peace and stability in East Asia.43 American businessmen believed this influx of aid
would develop and balance China’s trade with the world, but Chiang used this aid for
rapid industrialization.44 According to C. X. George Wei, American economic liberalism
clashed with the Nationalists’ planned economy.45 But when Chiang’s government fled
to Taiwan, American policymakers might have had second thoughts about supporting a
government they thought would not support American interests.
The re-establishment of the Nationalist government on Taiwan with Chiang as its
head, therefore, placed the Truman administration in a quandary. Despite their public
pledges to support the KMT, American military assistance had failed to preserve KMT
rule on the Mainland and economic assistance had failed to prevent China’s economy
from collapse. By December 1949, neither President Truman, Secretary of State Dean
Acheson, nor Deputy Undersecretary of State Dean Rusk believed that Chiang could be
saved. Acheson’s “White Paper,” a collection of diplomatic dispatches and reports,
sought to prove that the Nationalists’ collapse was not the fault of American policy.46
Rather, the ROC’s “leaders had proved incapable of meeting the crisis confronting them,
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-33its troops had lost the will to fight, and its [g]overnment had lost popular support.”47 On
December 23, 1949, the State Department issued a policy paper regarding American
relations with the ROC government on Taiwan. The policy paper stipulated that
“politically and militarily,” Taiwan was “a strictly Chinese responsibility,”48 that Taiwan
had no military significance, and that the Chinese would not benefit from the U.S.
sending American troops to help defend the Nationalists.
Unlike the State Department, officials in the Department of Defense pushed for
greater American intervention to keep Taiwan safe from the Communist Chinese. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) contended that Taiwan was of great strategic value because
Taiwan, the JCS claimed, guarded western Pacific sea lanes necessary to Japan’s postwar
reconstruction. While the chiefs argued that Taiwan was essential to halting communist
expansion into Southeast Asia, Acheson contended that the biggest threat to the ROC
came from within and that it would eventually collapse upon itself.49
By early 1950, even some State Department officials began to back away from the
White Paper. Although Dean Rusk publicly consented to Acheson’s neutral policy
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-34toward the ROC, the Deputy Undersecretary did not believe that the U.S. should
withdraw from East Asia.50 Nonetheless, both Rusk and John Foster Dulles, a State
Department consultant, knew that Chiang had been a difficult partner in the past and
would probably be a roadblock to any peace efforts in the future. In May 1950, Rusk and
Dulles proposed that Taiwan be placed under a United Nations trusteeship.51 Rusk even
went so far as to support covert operations to strengthen ROC defenses and to help plan a
coup d’état against Chiang Kai-shek. In June 1950, according to Bruce Cummings’
interview with Dean Rusk, the Deputy Secretary of State met with several key Chinese
figures in the Plaza Hotel in New York City and discussed toppling Chiang and forming a
new government on Taiwan.52 In fact, the Nationalist military had prepared to overthrow
Chiang in June 1950, but the Korean War halted any plans to end Chiang’s rule.53
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-35The Korean War: Korea, China, Taiwan, and the United States
The Korean War (1950-53) played a significant role in the development of U.S.ROC relations. A colony of Japan from 1905 to the end of World War II, the Korean
Peninsula had been partitioned at the Thirty-Eighth Parallel in 1945. Soon after the
partition, the Soviets and the Communist Chinese encouraged creation of a communistbacked government in North Korea and provided their ally copious support. On June 25,
1950, the North Korean military invaded the southern half of the peninsula. While the
PRC shored up support for its Communist North Korean ally, the United States, under the
aegis of the United Nations, sent troops to defend the South Korean government.
It became clear to American policymakers that Taiwan was also vulnerable to
attack from the Mainland and required defense from Communist encroachment. After the
outbreak of war in Korea, Secretary of State Acheson accepted a policy of militarily
protecting Taiwan. If the island succumbed to the Mainland regime, Acheson contended
that the communists would then be able to interfere with American assistance to South
Korea and would allow the Soviets to establish a base. American support of the
Nationalists, therefore, provided a possible alternative to communist rule should Mao’s
regime lose support on the Mainland.54 Interestingly, this was the very view that Acheson
previously opposed.55 Truman ordered the U.S. Seventh Fleet to patrol the Taiwan Strait
to deter the Chinese Communists from using American involvement in Korea as an
excuse to attack the Nationalists. On the other hand, the American naval presence
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-36between the ROC and the PRC also prevented Chiang from seizing the opportunity to
attack the Mainland.56 The United States also resumed economic aid to the Republic of
China through the newly-created U.S. Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG).
Between 1951 and 1964, the United States delivered $1.5 billion in non-military aid to
the ROC at a rate of roughly $100 million per year.57 In addition, the United States
assisted Chinese farmers through the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR),
an effort by the ROC and the United States to monitor rural farming projects, increase
China’s food supply, and raise farmers’ standard of living.58 The Korean War, therefore,
provided the context for the U.S. to defend and support Taiwan actively.
Meanwhile, Mao Zedong grew increasingly concerned about American
involvement in Korea. He believed that the United States would invade the Chinese
Mainland from South Korea, but did not think his military could successfully stop the
Americans. On the other hand, if Mao did nothing, opposition to CCP rule in regions he
did not fully control would gain the upper hand and threaten his control over the
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-37Mainland.59 In November 1950, PRC forces crossed the Yalu River and entered the
Korean War.60
As the Chinese Communists entered the fray in Korea, Chiang Kai-shek also
sought an active role in the Korean War. When United Nations Secretary General Trygve
Lie asked the United Nations to volunteer troops to assist the South Koreans in fending
off the North Koreans, Chiang Kai-shek offered 33,000 Nationalist troops. Both Acheson
and Rusk opposed Nationalist involvement because they feared Chiang would use the
conflict in Korea as an excuse to attack China and that Mao could use the ROC’s
involvement in the Korean War as a pretext to attack Taiwan.61 Truman, on the other
hand, did not believe the United States could spend money to defend an island while its
own military was elsewhere.62 In fact, the remnants of the Nationalist army did not
amount to much. According to Ralph Kartosh, who was part of the U.S. Military
Assistance Advisory Group, Chiang:
couldn’t put together two divisions that would go anywhere. They had no
uniforms, a minimum amount of ammunition, no artillery, no transport. They just
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-38had rifles, and some of the troops didn’t even have that.63
Truman also feared that the Mainland regime would use the conflict in Korea as
an excuse to attack and invade Taiwan. Truman, therefore, refused to base American
fighter squadrons on Taiwan and would not deploy American ground forces on Taiwan.
He also declined to extend the United States’ commitment to the Nationalist-held
offshore islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Nonetheless, between July 1950 and January
1951, the Truman administration sent to the ROC some $29 million in military
hardware.64 By January 1951, Taiwan had received so much assistance that General
Douglas MacArthur referred to Taiwan as “an unsinkable aircraft carrier.”65

The ROC and the Eisenhower Administration
By 1952, the Korean War stalemated and became increasingly unpopular. As a
result, President Truman declined to run for re-election. In November 1952, General
Dwight D. Eisenhower won the presidential election. Eisenhower publicly pledged to
take a more effective stance against communism’s spread. He even appointed vehement
anti-communists to high-ranking positions in the government and military, like Admiral
Arthur Radford as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Charles E. Wilson as Secretary
of Defense, and John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State.
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-39Eisenhower’s plan to contain communism, nicknamed the “New Look,” called for
“massive retaliation,” which emphasized nuclear deterrence and a broad system of
alliances. Meanwhile, he hoped to reduce the size of conventional military forces and
provide peace and security at a minimum cost.66 On February 2, 1953, Eisenhower
announced that the Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait would no longer shield the PRC
from Chiang Kai-shek. Western allies of the United States viewed this change of policy
with trepidation, fearing this might start a war between the United States and Communist
China.67
Meanwhile, Chiang used American military assistance to enlarge and strengthen
his armed forces on Taiwan. Over the next couple of years, Chiang moved to secure the
islands of Quemoy and Matsu. Located off the coast of the Mainland, Quemoy and
Matsu were mere stepping stones from which Chiang could launch an invasion; by 1954,
Chiang had 50,000 troops stationed on these islands.68 Mao came to believe that the
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-40United States would launch an attack on the Mainland from bases on Taiwan.69 In
September 1954, the Communist Chinese shelled Quemoy. Mao Zedong wanted to test
the American pledge to defend Taiwan and cause the United States to have second
thoughts about bringing Taiwan into any defense arrangement on a regional level.70
There was great debate within the Eisenhower administration whether or not to
send troops to support the Nationalist defense of Quemoy and Matsu.71 Ultimately, the
administration utilized what Dulles called a “fuzzy policy,” in which the U.S. would not
publicly support Chiang’s defense or discuss the administration’s decision. This policy
would keep the Mainland regime guessing as to whether or not the United States would
enter the conflict.72 On Taiwan, though, Chiang insisted that Quemoy could not be
abandoned and that Everett F. Drumright, U.S. Consul General in Hong Kong, cable
Eisenhower for American weapons and assistance. Chiang had to convince Eisenhower
that the ROC was a strong regional ally, but that it would collapse if Quemoy were to
fall.73
Taiwan, therefore, needed the United States as a protector. The 1954 Taiwan
Strait crisis led indirectly to the United States-China Mutual Defense Treaty. Signed in
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-41December 1954, the treaty stated that the United States and the ROC government on
Taiwan, “by self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack and communist subversive activities directed
from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.”74 The treaty also
gave the right to the United States to place “land, air and sea forces in and about Taiwan
and the Pescadores as may be required for their defense.”75 As the United States
increased its commitment to helping defend the island from the Chinese Communists,
there emerged a difference in interpretation of the treaty. While the Eisenhower
administration concerned itself with the defense of Taiwan island, Chiang and the ROC
government concerned itself with returning to the Mainland and overthrowing the
Communist regime.76 The United States, though, would not commit to such a move.
Congress also passed the Formosa Resolution in January 1955, which authorized
Eisenhower to use the U.S. military to protect Taiwan, the Pescadores, and “related
positions and territories in that area.” Invoking the resolution, though, was left up to the
President.77

74

United States-China Mutual Defense Treaty, December 2, 1954, in The
Dynamics of World Power: A Documentary History of United States Foreign Policy,
1945-1973, Volume IV, ed. Russell Buhite (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), 208-10.
75

Ibid.

76

Leonard H. D. Gordon, “United States Opposition to Use of Force in the Taiwan
Strait, 1954-1962,” Journal of American History 72 (1985): 659.
77

Garver, 130; Interview with Ralph N. Clough, in China Confidential, 126;
Marshall Green, “Part II: Averting Wider War,” in War and Peace with China: FirstHand Experiences in the Foreign Service of the United States, by Marshall Green, John
H. Holdridge, and William N. Stokes (Bethesda, MD: Dacor-Bacon House, 1994), 46.

-42Nonetheless, the White House publicly pleaded for caution in the Taiwan Strait.
Eisenhower urged Chiang to leave only 5,000 of his soldiers on Quemoy, which would
conserve Nationalist troop strength for the defense of Taiwan and make the Offshore
Islands expendable outposts.78 Chiang, however, did not agree. As long as a large
number of Nationalist troops remained on Quemoy and Matzu, Chiang believed he held
the initiative over the American president. A month later, Chiang increased the total
military personnel deployed to Quemoy to 60,000 troops as Mao continued to withdraw
military divisions from North Korea.79 In October 1955, Eisenhower once again pleaded
with Taipei to remove their troops, stating that the United States was under no treaty
obligation to defend the offshore islands, but once again Chiang demurred.80
Meanwhile, Mao Zedong had become increasingly concerned about U.S.
involvement in the Taiwan Strait. Mao feared that the Mutual Defense Treaty was part of
a U.S. plan to separate Taiwan from the Mainland.81 Almost simultaneously, the Soviets
terminated loans to the PRC used for industrialization. As a result, Mao initiated the
Great Leap Forward and urged Mainland Chinese to make their country self-sufficient
through increasing industrial and agricultural production.82 Probably fearing that the
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-43Great Leap would also involve stepped up military activity, Chiang expected the PRC to
assault his positions on the Offshore Islands and shored up his defenses. By the end of
1957, Chiang increased the number of troops on the islands to nearly 100,000 men and
refused to take American advice and withdraw.83
In August 1958, the PRC once again bombarded the Offshore Islands, which
caused great concern in Washington. Chiang had so many of his troops exposed that
American policymakers feared that if the Chinese Communists overran Quemoy,
Chiang’s regime on Taiwan would be in danger of collapse.84 Admiral Arthur Radford
argued that the West desperately needed a victory in Asia in the wake of the stalemate in
Korea and the French loss at Dien Bien Phu in Indochina. Quemoy and Matsu, in reality,
were of no military or strategic value, but their loss to the Communist Chinese would
send a message to American allies that the United States did not stand by its friends.85
Eisenhower and Dulles, though, did not believe Chiang could back down, and the United
States had to offer support. They believed that any retreat would show weakness to other
countries around China, and lead them to believe that the United States would not protect
them.
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-44Unlike 1954, the United States made a clear commitment to Chiang’s government
and his island redoubts.86 Assisting Chiang in the resupply of his garrisons on Quemoy
and Matsu, the U.S. Navy escorted Nationalist vessels to a point just outside Quemoy and
Matsu’s territorial waters.87 But in October 1958, the PRC announced a cease fire.
Eisenhower again attempted to convince Chiang to reduce his troops on the islands.88
Eisenhower also refused to give in to notions from the Pentagon to use nuclear weapons.
Chiang wanted his Nationalist air force to attack Mainland artillery units, but American
commanders worried that American planes would have to be called in for assistance. If
American planes bombed the Chinese Mainland, then the United States would effectively
be at war with the Communist regime.89
Meanwhile, high-ranking American policymakers in the Departments of State and
Defense worried that Chiang was luring the United States into a war against the PRC to
“retake the mainland.” Eisenhower, growing increasingly frustrated with Chiang’s
stubbornness, remarked to Undersecretary of State Christian Herter that he was about
ready to tell Chiang where to get off.90 Even Secretary of Defense Neil McElroy
wondered whether there might be someone the U.S. could work with to replace Chiang
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-45Kai-shek as leader of the ROC and then remove Nationalist troops from the islands.
Eisenhower, though, was not receptive to a coup attempt.91 Even Secretary of State
Dulles came to believe that Chiang was using the crisis as a means to draw Washington
into a larger war with the PRC. Dulles privately considered that the United States would,
in the future, have to contend with two Chinas; but as both the Nationalists and the
Communists disdained the idea of “two Chinas,” it would not openly be made American
policy.92 But neither the PRC nor the ROC were willing to accept “two Chinas.” Both
Chiang and Mao claimed to govern each other’s territory, and both the PRC and the ROC
sought to liberate the other by force as a matter of policy.
Some members of the U.S. Congress also considered a “two Chinas” solution. In
the 1950s, there was a growing sentiment in Congress that a “two Chinas” policy was
necessary because the PRC had established control over the Mainland while Chiang and
his ROC government ruled Taiwan. Even the chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Theodore F. Green (D-Rhode Island) stated in February 1957 that the PRC
would soon have to be recognized by the United States, despite the fact that the
Eisenhower administration did not like its form of government.93 But two vocal
supporters of Chiang’s regime on Capitol Hill in the 1950s, Senator William F.
Knowland (R-California) and Representative Walter F. Judd (R-Minnesota), expressed
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-46their disagreement. Known as the “Senator from Formosa,” Knowland led a bipartisan
amendment to the 1954 Mutual Security Act which opposed the seating of the PRC in the
United Nations. It passed by a vote of 91-0 in July 1954.94 Judd, a physician and former
Congregationalist missionary stationed in China, spent most of his legislative career
speaking out on behalf of Chiang Kai-shek and the Nationalist government and had
developed ties to those, like businessman Alfred Kohlberg, who were reputed to be
associated with the China Lobby. 95
Knowland and Judd’s support for the Taipei regime by the mid-1950s reflects the
Republican Party’s long-standing interest in China policy. Since the administration of
President William McKinley, Republicans had taken a strong interest in East Asian
affairs as a potential market of trade and as a Christian frontier for missionary work.
Business and religious organizations had traditionally been powerful interest groups
within the Grand Old Party. Senator Knowland represented a district including Oakland,
California, one of the largest ports on the west coast. Judd represented a rural Republican
district in Minnesota. It should come as no surprise that both Knowland and Judd would
become two of the most vocal supporters of American foreign policy supporting Chiang
Kai-shek and the ROC.96
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-47Vietnam and U.S.-ROC Relations
Meanwhile, another Cold War conflict broke out in French Indochina and
likewise affected U.S. Asian policy. France had restored its colonial dominion over
Indochina after World War II, but a recently returned and popularly supported
Vietnamese anti-colonial leader, Ho Chi Minh, declared the colony’s independence from
France. This led to a war between the Chinese Communist-supported Viet Minh and the
French army from 1945 until 1954, when the Viet Minh surrounded and defeated the
French in a valley called Dien Bien Phu. The United States provided France with over $2
million in aid in its war against Ho Chi Minh and the Viet Minh because it would not
tolerate another defeat by communist expansion in Southeast Asia.97
In addition to the Korean War, the fall of Dien Bien Phu to the Viet Minh might
have prompted the United States to forge a stronger military alliance with the Republic of
China. President Eisenhower saw some connection between the ROC and the growing
conflict in Vietnam. In a February 1955 letter to British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, Eisenhower argued that because the French had been driven out of Indochina,
the free world “can not afford the loss of Chiang unless all of us are to get completely out
of that corner of the globe.”98 As a result of the Geneva Peace Accords of 1954, Vietnam
was divided at the Seventeenth Parallel and the United States took a vested interest in the
development of South Vietnam. South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, like
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-48Chiang, was a Christian ruling a majority non-Christian country. Like Chiang, Diem
ruled autocratically and placed family members, especially his brother, in high governing
places. Unlike Chiang, Diem’s authority did not stretch past his capital’s city limits.99
Eisenhower, though, did not initially pay much attention to events in Vietnam.
The president’s advisors did not believe Vietnam to be a serious problem, but agreed that
the United States could help build a democratic nation in South Vietnam. It would cost
less to send aid to South Vietnam than to have a large direct American military and
governing presence there. But by 1959, as Diem began to lose control, the U.S. was
involved so deeply in South Vietnam that Eisenhower could not withdraw advisors, end
aid, or seek alternative leaders without jeopardizing South Vietnam’s supposedly
democratic government. Throughout January 1960, popular uprisings against Diem’s
government in former Viet Minh strongholds led to numerous assassinations of local
political leaders by the National Liberation Front (NLF), or Viet Cong. The NLF also led
military assaults on government and military establishments to generate chaos and
pressure the Diem regime to the point of collapse.100 Meanwhile, the PRC provided
substantial military assistance to the North Vietnamese.101 These events reflecting
instability in South Vietnam and PRC support for Ho Chi Minh may have influenced
Chiang Kai-shek in the 1960s to become more interested and involved in events taking
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-49place in Southeast Asia.
Meanwhile, Mao Zedong had become very interested in assisting North Vietnam.
Mao had contended throughout the 1950s that Korea, Taiwan, and Vietnam were points
from which the United States could possibly launch invasions of China. Mao also saw
opportunity to press his own foreign policies of spreading China’s revolution worldwide
and national liberation.102 The North Vietnamese were willing to accept aid and advisors
from the PRC, despite the cultural friction between the Vietnamese and Han Chinese.103

The Committee of One Million
While incidents in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and Vietnam highlighted the urgency
for American support of the ROC and created concerns for policymakers and legislators,
lobbyists and pressure groups created various “grass-roots” organizations to generate
public anti-communist sentiment. Established in 1953, the Committee of One Million
Against the Admission of Red China to the United Nations (the Committee, or COOM)
had been associated with the China Lobby and members of the China Bloc. Represented
by Marvin Liebman, a New York City public relations agent, the COOM rallied public
and legislative support against the admission of the PRC into the United Nations (UN). It
also put pressure on the White House not to extend diplomatic recognition to the
mainland Communist regime. Liebman tried to obtain support from influential
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-50politicians and financial donations to fund the Committee’s anti-communist activities.104
The Committee of One Million grew out of a 1953 petition to President
Eisenhower by Marvin Liebman, Walter Judd, and others. They listed eight reasons for
opposing the admission of the PRC into the United Nations and circulated the petition to
other key anti-communist representatives and senators. The Committee argued that the
mainland regime was not qualified to join the United Nations because it claimed to be a
dictatorship and disregarded human rights and freedom.105 Also, the Committee
contended that PRC admission would mean expelling Nationalist China from the UN,
which it considered an “unthinkable outrage against human decency and international
justice”106 and would “destroy the prestige and the position of the United States and of the
Free World in Asia.”107 The Committee also claimed that the PRC was unqualified for
membership because its leadership took orders directly from the Kremlin. Liebman
requested that President Eisenhower “defend the freedom and decency of the Free World
by continuing to oppose the admission” of the PRC into the United Nations.108
Liebman had been involved in the conservative movement as a fund-raiser and
public relations agent for Harold L. Oram, Inc., of New York City. Through his firm,
Liebman planned to deliver his 1953 petition to as many Americans as possible through
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-51its congressional sponsors and other supporters. This process generated a list of over one
million names and addresses from whom Liebman could solicit more signatures for his
petition and expand the Committee’s mailing list. Liebman also exchanged mailing lists
with other conservative and anti-communist organizations to get the Committee’s
message to as large a cross-section of the American public as possible and to cover the
COOM’s initial expenses. Liebman hoped his organization would build a bipartisan
consensus to pressure the White House into isolating the PRC from world affairs.109
Despite his public association with the China Lobby, there was little direct
connection between Marvin Liebman and the China Lobby apparatus. Although an
examination of Committee of One Million financial statements in Liebman’s personal
papers at Stanford University uncovered no direct funding from the ROC government, his
papers revealed indirect connections to Chiang Kai-shek and a few personal meetings.
Liebman visited Taipei on at least two occasions. One visit in early 1961 resulted in an
interview with Chiang for the National Review, published in June 1961.110 He visited
Taipei a second time in the fall of 1967, where he attended a birthday party for Walter
Judd, hosted by Madame Chiang at her home.111
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-52Although the Committee claimed to possess the signatures of over one million
Americans, it actually operated through only a handful of individuals. Under the
direction of a Steering Committee, the COOM was a relatively informal organization that
attempted to mobilize Americans “to take citizens’ action in opposing American
concessions to Communist China.”112 The Steering Committee included a bipartisan
collection of six to twelve U.S. representatives, senators and China “watchers,” who met
to hear reports from Executive Secretary Liebman and Treasurer B. A. Garside, who
actually minded the COOM’s day-to-day operations.113 Liebman also acted as fundraising and public relations counsel to “manage, staff and execute the Committee’s
program in consultation with the Steering Committee.”114
In 1958, Liebman and the Committee experienced problems with Harold L. Oram,
Inc., which prompted the executive secretary to go out on his own and take the
Committee with him. In that year, a pro-UN group pressured Oram to suspend its
representation of the COOM. In protest, Liebman resigned from Oram’s firm and
established Marvin Liebman, Associates.115 Until 1969, Liebman’s new firm represented
the Committee of One Million as well as twenty-four other anti-communist organizations,
such as the Student Committee for a Free China, the American Conservative Union, the
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-53Businessman’s Committee on China, Young Americans for Freedom, and the Draft
Goldwater Movement, among others.116
Liebman and his cause initially won important political allies. Senators Paul
Douglas (D-Illinois), Thomas Dodd (D-Connecticut) and Jacob K. Javits (R-New York)
were among the Committee’s earliest supporters. Each of these senators represented
states that were rural, suburban and staunchly anti-communist. Walter Judd and William
Knowland promised to push the Committee’s agenda in the form of bills and resolutions
in Congress. Each of these men, at one time or another, served on the COOM’s Steering
Committee. These political allies found no difficulty organizing anti-communist support
against the PRC in the 1950s. The Korean War and the Taiwan Strait crises of 1954-55
and 1958 left a bitter legacy of conflict between the United States and the People’s
Republic of China. Investigations of communist infiltration into American society by
Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) and the House Un-American Activities
Committee also whipped up anti-communist sentiment across the United States.
Americans reacted by organizing and joining local and national anti-communist
organizations. Depending heavily on membership dues, these organizations published
newsletters, recruited membership and support, and pressured legislators to support anticommunist measures.117
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-54The Committee of One Million operated within a larger national milieu of
conservative “grass-roots” activism. The 1950s proved fertile ground for such activism,
as professionals and managers and their families, the heart of middle class America,
moved to the suburbs just outside the large cities. They benefitted from new
technological industries, were religious and church-going, well-read, and knowledgeable
about foreign policy. Equating communism to slavery, these suburban residents saw the
world in terms of good and evil, and blamed liberal Democrats for allowing the Soviet
Union to establish communism in as much of the world as they did. Within their
businesses, churches and homes, these new conservative activists circulated anticommunist books, films, pamphlets and petitions. These new activists also worked hard
to elect like-minded officials to school boards, to state legislatures, and to Congress.118

U.S. Presidential Election of 1960 and the Future of U.S.-ROC Relations
In early 1960, United States Senator John F. Kennedy (D-Massachusetts)
announced his candidacy for President of the United States. Kennedy believed that he
was well prepared for the foreign policy challenges that were to come if he were
elected.119 In particular, the senator had grown increasingly concerned about American
policy toward East Asia. In a 1957 Foreign Affairs article, Kennedy argued that
American policy toward China had become too rigid and “exaggeratedly military,”
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-55especially the strict travel restrictions to the Mainland.120 Kennedy stated that American
policy could not be allowed to become strait-jacketed “as a result of ignorance and fail to
detect a change in the objective situation when it comes.”121 It was important, therefore,
to relax the travel regulations so that journalists and scholars, who had been forbidden to
travel to the Mainland, could bring back useful intelligence that could allow for American
policymakers to work with the Communist Chinese.122
Chiang vehemently disagreed with Kennedy’s view on China policy. In his book,
Soviet Russia in China (1957), Chiang argued that peaceful coexistence with communism
would amount to handing the Soviet and Chinese Communists a weapon, because their
aggression would only end when they achieved world conquest. Therefore, the only
effective strategy against the spread of communism, according to Chiang, was total
war.123 With the advent of nuclear weapons, however, no statesman in the free world
would want to lead his country to certain destruction. The question, according to Chiang,
was whether or not avoiding such a war meant surrendering freedom. Chiang answered
that the United States, as the world leader in the global struggle against communism,
should play an indirect role by supplying arms and aid to those at war against the
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-56Communists. “So long as the Russian Communists abstain from active war,” according
to Chiang, “it will not be advantageous to have the United States participate in direct
warfare, nor will it be advantageous for the free nations to engage in war outside the Iron
Curtain.”124 The war against communism, stated Chiang, should begin against Mainland
China.
In the summer of 1960, Kennedy won the Democratic Party’s nomination for
president and chose U.S. Senate Majority Leader Lyndon B. Johnson (D-Texas) as his
vice presidential running mate.125 Johnson, like Kennedy, had taken an interest in
American relations with East Asia while in the U.S. Senate. As a senator, he had opposed
American air strikes to support the French at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. Like his friend and
mentor, Senator Richard B. Russell, Jr. (D-Georgia), he believed that the United States
needed the support of its European allies before risking military action against the Viet
Minh.126
Like Kennedy, Johnson had learned a most important lesson from the World War
II years – the United States had to stand up to aggression. Both Kennedy and Johnson
arrived at their political maturity amid the international chaos of the late 1930s and early
1940s, when Adolf Hitler and his armies set out to conquer Europe. Several months after
Hitler promised British and French delegates at the Munich Conference in 1938 that he
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-57would take no more territory if he were given the Sudetenland, the Germans devoured the
remainder of Czechoslovakia, signed a non-aggression pact with the Soviets, and invaded
Poland in 1939, effectively beginning World War II. Kennedy and Johnson learned, as
most of their generation did, that aggression had to be challenged with force.127
The Taiwan issue came up toward the end of the campaign through press
questions directed at Senator Kennedy. During the second televised debate on October 7,
1960, Senator Kennedy, commenting on the Eisenhower administration’s handling of the
Quemoy-Matsu crisis, stated that if Chiang and the Nationalists were to draw their line of
defense solely around Taiwan and the Pescadores, the chances of the United States being
drawn into an unnecessary war would decrease. Quemoy and Matsu were indefensible.
Nixon, in response, declared he would not give up “one inch of free territory,”
specifically meaning the Offshore Islands. If the Nationalists were to give up the
Offshore Islands, according to Nixon, it would start a chain reaction that would lead to
war. Both Vice President Nixon and Chiang Kai-shek publicly declared Kennedy “soft”
on the Offshore Islands and on communism in general.128
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-58Kennedy won the presidential election in 1960 by the narrowest of margins, less
than two-thirds of one percent of the popular vote.129 Almost at that same time, presidentelect Kennedy received a report from Adlai E. Stevenson III, former Governor of Illinois
and Kennedy’s nominee as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations. Stevenson warned
Kennedy about Chiang Kai-shek. According to Stevenson, Chiang was “an ethnocentric
patriot” who maintains “personal power by manipulating his followers and enemies
alike.”130 Stevenson further contended that the Chinese Nationalists’ “pride is intensified
by a modern century of humiliation, which leads to resentment of the United States’
helping hand.” As a result, Chiang and the Nationalists would be difficult to handle.131

Conclusion
The Korean War and the Vietnam War tremendously affected U.S. relations with
the Republic of China in the 1950s. American policymakers had believed that the
Communists were actively expanding their sphere of influence in East Asia at the expense
of regional instability. It was vital, therefore, that the U.S. during the Truman and
Eisenhower administrations support the ROC as a bulwark against Soviet and Chinese
Communist aggression. With Taiwan located between Korea and Vietnam, Chiang might
have felt vulnerable to attack from the PRC, which perhaps became his impetus for
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-59requesting American aid in defending his island bastion. Likewise, Mao Zedong also felt
vulnerable to attack from the U.S. and the Nationalists. The Offshore Islands crises in
1954 and 1958 only exacerbated Chiang’s fears, Washington’s hesitations, and Mao’s
actions. In the meantime, the China Lobby helped convince legislators that it was
essential to secure the ROC as part of the free world coalition.

CHAPTER III
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
AND CHINA POLICY IN 1961
On January 20, 1961, John F. Kennedy became the thirty-fifth President of the
United States. Having won the election by an extremely slim margin, he hesitated to
make drastic changes in foreign and domestic policy. Nonetheless, Kennedy appointed a
number of political allies to the National Security Council staff and to the State
Department. These appointees initiated a series of changes that would begin to modify
U.S. policy toward China. Arguing that the United States should abandon the
Eisenhower-Dulles policy of containment and isolation of the People’s Republic of
China, these appointees left the future of U.S. relations with the Republic of China in
doubt. In 1961, while Kennedy’s appointees tested their ideas, Chiang Kai-shek used his
contacts within the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Department to maintain
the status quo.

Kennedy Administration Bureaucracy and China Policy
In 1961, President Kennedy initiated a series of appointments, office
reassignments and bureaucratic reorganizations within the White House and the
Department of State that would affect China policy. Among the first of these
-60-

-61appointments was that of Robert W. Komer, whom Kennedy appointed to the National
Security Council Staff early in 1961. After graduating from Harvard University magna
cum laude in 1942 and earning a Masters of Business Administration in 1947, Komer
joined the Central Intelligence Agency. In the CIA, Komer worked in the Office of
National Estimates until 1956, when he was reassigned to the Directorate of Intelligence.
Between 1961 and 1967, operating in various capacities in the White House, Komer
played an important role in the development of policy toward the Republic of China in
both the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.1
Only a month after beginning his new job, Komer recommended to National
Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy that the State Department reconsider its China policy.
He suggested that the United States “disengage, as skillfully as we can, from
unproductive aspects of our China policy, e.g., UN membership . . . .”2 In his report
titled “Strategic Framework for Rethinking China Policy,” Komer argued that the “sole
determinant of our FE [Far Eastern] policy cannot be that of keeping Chiang happy or
even of preserving Taiwan. There are bigger issues at stake.” Komer did not accept the
idea that the American position in the Far East “hinged” on Taiwan because relationships
with Japan, India, and South Vietnam were far more important. Chiang, however, could
not be allowed to lose power. Komer, therefore, proposed that policy toward the ROC
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-62allow for greater flexibility to show Chiang Kai-shek that the ROC would remain an
important ally of the United States (even as the United States softened its attitude toward
the PRC). The Kennedy administration had to convince Chiang that the U.S. would
continue to defend Taiwan and to maintain its international presence in the UN. Such a
program would be expensive, but much less expensive than a war with the PRC. Komer,
therefore, suggested that the U.S. delegation to the UN agree to a debate on the ROC’s
membership, rather than maintaining the moratorium on discussing it. This plan would
keep the ROC in the United Nations for several more years, rather than allow it to be
removed on a straight credentials vote.3
Kennedy also appointed a group of foreign policy experts and scholars, including
Adlai E. Stevenson III, W. Averell Harriman, and Chester Bowles, who had each been
vocal critics of Eisenhower’s containment and isolation of the PRC. They all shared the
idea that the United States should work toward a policy of accommodation with the
PRC.4 As a reward for their support, Kennedy appointed Stevenson as Ambassador to the
United Nations, Harriman (originally) as a “roving” ambassador, and Bowles as Assistant
Secretary of State. In effect, those who had criticized Republican policy now had been
rewarded with top diplomatic posts with a chance to change policy.
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-63Although Kennedy appointed these critics of Eisenhower’s China policy to
positions in the National Security Council and the State Department, he did not espouse
significant changes in China policy upon becoming president. In May 1961, Secretary of
State Dean Rusk met privately with President Kennedy, to explore possible changes in
China policy and to discuss the ramifications. Rusk stated that the United States could
recognize both the PRC and the ROC, could work privately to bring reconciliation
between the two Chinas, or could sit tight and do nothing. Kennedy, though, refused to
initiate changes in China policy because he believed he had no such mandate for change
due to his narrow electoral victory. In addition, the PRC did not seem enthused about
improving relations with the United States. Any changes in China policy, Kennedy
warned, would divide Congress and the American people and would hand the
Republicans a political weapon to use in 1964. Rusk agreed with Kennedy, and as the
Secretary left the Oval Office, Kennedy warned, “And what’s more, Mr. Secretary, I don’t
want to read in the Washington Post or the New York Times that the State Department is
thinking about a change in our China policy!”5
Rusk, though, had long been a supporter of a “two Chinas” policy. While he had
no general plan for China policy upon becoming Secretary of State in 1961, Rusk
believed that U.S. policy toward Taiwan had been “unavoidably locked in . . . for both
historical and policy reasons.” According to Rusk, the United States recognized the
government of the Republic of China on Taiwan, not as the government of all China. By
default, the ROC’s government was “the only Chinese government we [the U.S.]
5
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-64recognized.” Rusk, therefore, submerged his views about China policy with Kennedy’s
and did not directly initiate any new studies of China policy.6
Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration inherited a foreign policy apparatus that
did not encourage innovation. The State Department, especially the Bureau of Far
Eastern Affairs, had been emptied of experts after investigations by Senator Joseph
McCarthy (R-Wisconsin) targeted suspected communists. By 1961, the bureau had been
staffed with stern anti-communists who favored containment and isolation of the PRC. In
November 1961, Kennedy reassigned Harriman as Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern
Affairs. Harriman then appointed Edward Rice to the bureau from his position on the
Policy Planning Council. Rice, a long-serving State Department analyst who had
survived the McCarthy “witch-hunt,” had long championed abandoning the containment
policy toward the PRC in favor of accommodation.7
While on the Policy Planning Council, Rice had authored a paper that included a
list of possible U.S. initiatives toward the Beijing regime. These included lifting the
passport ban, opening arms control and disarmament talks, possible PRC representation
in the United Nations, and ROC evacuation of the Offshore Islands. In short, Rice’s
paper proposed a policy that was flexible, moderate and accommodating toward the
Communist Chinese. Apparently, he greatly influenced several young staffers at the Far
East office, such as James C. Thomson, Jr., and Roger Hilsman, to advocate a more
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-65relaxed policy toward the PRC.8
Like Komer and Rice, Undersecretary of State Chester Bowles also questioned the
direction of China policy. In July 1961, he circulated a confidential report entitled “Some
Requirements of American Foreign Policy,” recommending various changes in American
foreign policy toward Europe, Africa and Asia. Some of Bowles’s most significant
comments concerned China policy. Bowles argued that the central focus of American
foreign policy in Asia was Communist China. Attributing its aggression to the famine
and the government’s failure to meet food requirements, Bowles claimed that the PRC
was a “paramount threat to all the nations on its periphery” and had to be excluded from
the United Nations. But, he argued, Nationalist China represented just as much of a
problem in East Asia as the PRC. If the United States intended to remove itself from its
responsibilities toward Taiwan, as Komer suggested, “explosive pressures will be
generated in Taipei which [may] take any one of several forms.” Instability could cause a
war between the ROC and the PRC, or a coup d’état that could result in Chiang’s
overthrow and an attempt to turn Taiwan over to the Communist Chinese. Bowles
concluded that any future China policy would have to consider and balance these
potentially dangerous possibilities.9
While some of Kennedy’s State Department and White House appointees
privately considered a more accommodationist China policy, Eisenhower administration
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-66stalwarts, like Everett F. Drumright and Ray Cline, opposed any such changes. President
Eisenhower had appointed Everett F. Drumright as U.S. Ambassador to the ROC in 1958
after nearly thirty years of government service in China and in the State Department’s
Office of Chinese Affairs. A career U.S. diplomat, he had been associated with the
Nationalist Chinese government in various capacities between 1931 and 1946. Drumright
returned to the Foreign Service in the Office of Chinese Affairs when Eisenhower became
President in 1953. As ambassador, Drumright met often with Chiang and members of the
ROC government. He firmly believed that the security of Nationalist China was of vital
importance to the United States.10 His hardline anti-communist opinions concerning
China policy angered many of his colleagues in the Taipei embassy.11
Ray Cline similarly opposed significant changes in China policy. Since the
Eisenhower administration, Cline had been CIA Station Chief in Taipei. Taking
advantage of his position, Cline had become close friends with General Chiang Chingkuo, President Chiang’s son and Director of the Political Department of the Ministry of
National Defense.12 He also enjoyed easy access to high-ranking ROC officials. In this
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-67capacity, Cline regularly conveyed Chiang’s personal messages to the State Department
and the White House. Cline believed that Chiang was fearful of the Democrats. Only the
United States stood between the ROC and disaster. For Chiang, Cline stated, “the faintest
indication of a change in U.S. attitudes can seem like a matter of life and death.”13
By the end of 1961, divisions on China policy existed between White House
advisors, State Department experts, American diplomats, and intelligence agents
stationed in the ROC. White House and State Department officials, such as Komer, Rice
and Bowles, focused on the creation of a policy that would allow the United States to
contain the PRC while keeping the ROC in the United Nations. But neither Komer,
Bowles, nor Rice had first-hand experience with the government of the Republic of
China. Reports by Everett F. Drumright and Ray Cline reflected concerns that the Chiang
government, fearing that the United States was about to abandon them in favor of the
PRC, might attempt to subvert American policy and take matters into their own hands.

ROC Irregulars in Burma
One of the first China policy crises the Kennedy administration faced concerned
irregular ROC forces which had been operating in the Burma-Thailand-Laos border
region since the 1950s. In 1949, 11,000 to 15,000 Chinese Nationalist troops had fled
China into this border region as the Nationalist government and most of the military
retreated to the island of Taiwan. By 1961, despite two previous attempts to evacuate
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-68these irregular soldiers, some 10,000, including women and children, remained.14 While
the Burmese government demanded that these irregulars be evacuated, Chiang continued
to supply these troops.
In February, 1961, the Burmese shot down two ROC aircraft: a B-24 supply plane
bound for northern Burma and a PB-4Y, supplied to the Nationalists through the U.S.
Military Assistance Program (MAP). The Burmese government justified their actions on
the grounds that irregular ROC troops, armed with American equipment supplied through
such airdrops, had instigated trouble within their borders. Understanding Burma’s
problem, President Kennedy wanted these irregular troops to be withdrawn from Burma
to Taiwan or broken into small groups for resettlement in Thailand and Laos.15
Secretary of State Dean Rusk subsequently requested that Ambassador Drumright
meet with President Chiang at the earliest opportunity to discuss American policy
regarding ROC irregulars in Burma and Laos. He urged Drumright to convince Chiang to
evacuate all ROC military personnel who wished to return to Taiwan. Any irregulars
who did not wish to return to Taiwan should be disarmed and resettled as civilians in any
country other than Burma or Laos. Rusk further instructed Drumright to remind Chiang
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-69that further support to these irregular troops using American supplies would exceed
American obligations to the ROC and would strain relations.16
Chiang, during a February 25, 1961, meeting with Drumright, denied harming
American interests. When asked to evacuate the irregulars, Chiang stated that while
doing so would meet with great resistance because of their deep hatred for the Chinese
Communists, he also recognized the inconvenience and embarrassment the situation
caused to the United States. Chiang promised to end the airdrops and to evacuate those
irregulars who wanted to be evacuated. In the case of those irregulars who were no
longer responsive to his orders, the ROC President promised to disassociate himself from
them and terminate their resupply.17
Meanwhile, Secretary Rusk ordered staffers in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
write a report on these ROC irregulars for President Kennedy. The report concluded that
since the 1950s President Chiang had disregarded American requests to evacuate his
irregular troops from Burma. The irregulars, moreover, threatened the internal stability of
Thailand, Burma and Laos, and their positions along the border with Mainland China
jeopardized peace in the region. Some were also suspected of trafficking in narcotics.
Hence, in the view of the State Department, the irregulars had to be evacuated or
dispersed. Fearing that President Chiang would not cooperate voluntarily, the report
suggested that Chiang could be manipulated by the United States selectively limiting or
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-70ceasing military aid, refusing to train Taiwanese special forces, and not participating in
planning operations against the Mainland.18
Some evidence suggests that Chiang feared such repercussions and ordered ROC
irregular troops to disarm and return to Taiwan or settle as civilians. Nationalist Chinese
General Lai Ming-tang, after meeting with Ambassador Drumright in April 1961,
reported that some of the six hundred to seven hundred irregulars living near the BurmaLaos-Thailand border and nearly one thousand in Thailand “appear to have gone into
civilian life.” Drumright believed that the ROC had honestly and diligently carried out
the American request. By the end of the month, he regarded the evacuation as complete.19

Chinese Representation in the United Nations
Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration also worked to keep the ROC in the
United Nations. Throughout the 1950s, there had been little challenge to Taiwan’s status
in the United Nations, but opposition increased in the sixties. Despite the Albanian
delegation’s recurring resolution to have the ROC removed and replaced with
representatives of Communist China, between 1951 and 1961, a majority of UN members
in the General Assembly supported an American resolution “not to support” or discuss
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-71any changes in Chinese representation.20 President Kennedy, after his inauguration in
January 1961, also pledged his opposition to membership for the People’s Republic of
China in the United Nations.21 Meanwhile, support for Taiwan slowly eroded as newly
independent nations from Africa, some of whom were sympathetic to the PRC, joined the
United Nations.22 Given this development, several members of Kennedy’s foreign policy
staff believed it was necessary to derive new ideas and tactics to ensure the ROC’s
continued presence in the UN. Throughout the early part of 1961, Secretary of State
Dean Rusk and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy received several reports
concerning possible changes in American tactics at the UN. These reports proposed both
flexible strategies and fundamental changes in Sino-American relations.
In July 1961, Roger Hilsman of the State Department’s Office of Intelligence and
Research addressed the Chinese representation crisis. He warned that, in the near future,
the UN representation issue might be settled in a way that damaged American and
Taiwanese interests. It was important that the United States firmly establish the ROC’s
claim on the China seat for the sake of American-Taiwanese relations and American
relations with the United Nations General Assembly. According to Hilsman, Taiwanese
membership in the UN symbolized that the ROC was the only legitimate government of
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-72China. If the UN admitted or offered admission to the PRC, ROC membership and
influence in the UN would wane. While the Nationalist Chinese wished to maintain their
membership, the United States wanted not only to keep them in but also to keep the PRC
out. But while other UN members interpreted the Chinese representation issue as merely
procedural, the U.S. delegation interpreted the issue as a security matter. If the United
States lost control of the issue, “then doubts and tensions over United States relations to
the United Nations will probably increase in the public attitude and in the legislative
attitude.” Hilsman concluded that the most prudent course of action for the Kennedy
administration would be to set up a commission “of highly respected individuals to
review and report on all relevant facets – including what is to be expected henceforth of
our relations with the UN and what lies ahead in China policy.”23
Meanwhile, Drumright and Cline argued that the United States should ensure the
ROC’s seat in the United Nations. Ambassador Drumright expressed his concern that
high-ranking ROC officials believed that the Kennedy administration was “looking for
some way out of [the] China impasse at their [ROC] expense.” Chiang, according to
Drumright, believed that since Kennedy and his foreign policy advisors had not openly
stated their support to preserve the ROC’s seat, that “. . . USG [United States
Government] is prepared to plump for ‘two Chinas.’” The ROC, though, would not favor
any “two Chinas” solution or discuss any other alternatives. If a “two Chinas” solution
were adopted, concluded Drumright, “other pressures would be applied by powers intent
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-73on ChiCom [Chinese Communist] admission which would force GRC [Government of
the Republic of China] to leave UN.”24
Cline also worried that Taiwanese officials might not accept changes in American
policy toward the ROC. He recommended that in order to show Chiang and his
government exactly how strong an ally the U.S. was, the United States should open the
debate on Taiwan’s membership in the United Nations. Even if the debate were lost, the
Taiwanese might consider the loss an honest defeat based on principle. But Cline also
concluded that the Nationalists, fearful of the new Democratic administration and the
possible loss of their seat in the UN, planned to take their future into their own hands by
invading the Mainland.25 Cline argued that it was important, therefore, that Kennedy
keep promises made to Taiwan by previous administrations to preserve the ROC’s United
Nations seat.
In summary, each of these reports agreed that Taiwanese government officials had
to be convinced that the Kennedy administration would continue to protect Taiwan’s
interests. On the other hand, the U.S. could not allow the ROC to take action to
guarantee their own interests independently of the United States. President Kennedy
echoed these sentiments during a July White House meeting concerning Chinese
representation. He stated that the United States and the ROC should have one common
objective – to keep the PRC out of the United Nations. Taiwan needed to realize if its
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-74seat were lost in the United Nations, it would be as bad for the U.S. as it would be for the
Republic of China. In keeping Taiwan in the UN, Kennedy hoped that the ROC would
not have to give up very much.26
The Chinese representation issue became more complicated when the Sovietdominated government of Outer Mongolia became independent and applied for admission
into the UN. The ROC insisted that Outer Mongolia was part of China and so could not
be admitted to the UN. Kennedy feared that a ROC veto of Outer Mongolia’s
membership could warrant a Communist Bloc push for Taiwan’s ouster from the UN. He
therefore contended that the Taiwanese should not veto Outer Mongolia’s application for
admission into the UN, but the U.S. should not extend diplomatic relations to Outer
Mongolia.27
At the end of July 1961, Secretary of State Rusk proposed a parliamentary ploy
that would ensure the continued membership of the ROC in, and the exclusion of the
PRC from, the United Nations. He suggested appointing a representative group from the
General Assembly to study the “desirability and feasibility of developing a majority
around the proposition that the question of Chinese representation in the United Nations
is an ‘important question’ under the [United Nations] Charter, thereby requiring a twothirds vote.” Rusk also stated that this study group would “examine the broader problems
of criteria for United Nations membership and the composition of the Security
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-75Council . . . of which the question of Chinese representation is only one though an
extremely important aspect,” and thereby delay any credentials vote regarding the ROC’s
membership.28
Meanwhile, the Soviets threatened to veto Mauritania’s proposed UN membership
if Outer Mongolia’s application were vetoed. Mauritania, a former French African
colony, had also recently become independent. Kennedy and Rusk had to convince the
ROC not to veto Outer Mongolia’s application and to go along with the “important
question” proposal. The Taiwanese had recently initiated an aid program called
“Operation Vanguard” to assist newly independent African countries. This aid program
had the ulterior motive of securing future support from newly independent African
nations for Taiwan’s China seat in the UN. A Soviet veto of Mauritania’s UN
membership, therefore, would threaten both Taiwan’s aid program and its ability to
secure future support among newly independent African countries to maintain its China
seat.29
Kennedy and Rusk discussed the “important question” proposal and the Soviet’s
reaction with ROC Vice President Ch’en Ch’eng, ROC Ambassador to the United States
George K. C. Yeh, and Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations T. F.
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-76Tsiang in a meeting on August 1, 1961. Kennedy and Rusk pleaded with the ROC
officials not to veto Outer Mongolia’s application and to go along with the “important
question” proposal. But Outer Mongolia, insisted Vice President Ch’en, was a creation of
the Soviet Union. Ch’en warned that any American move toward recognition of Outer
Mongolia would threaten Taiwan and “would greatly add to Soviet and Communist world
prestige.” Ambassador Yeh added that the ROC should use all means at its disposal to
block Outer Mongolia’s entry into the United Nations. As an alternative to using their
veto, Rusk suggested that the ROC step up its attempts to generate close relations with
new African states to strengthen its position in the United Nations. Vice President Ch’en
replied that the ROC, in fighting communism, did not want to help the Communist Bloc
by accepting Outer Mongolia. Kennedy then pledged to the ROC delegation that his
administration would try to keep the ROC in the UN and Outer Mongolia out, but warned
Yeh, Tsiang and Ch’en that they would probably not be able to get everything they
wanted.30
Later that day, several of Kennedy’s closest advisors warned that Chiang had to be
restrained if the ROC was to retain the China seat in the UN. Kennedy met with UN
Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson III, Special Assistant to the President Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., and Assistant Secretary of State Harlan Cleveland, and expressed his
concern that Chiang Kai-shek was “ready to pull the house down on himself – and on us
in the process.” Kennedy believed that the State Department had to keep trying to
30
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-77persuade Chiang that “some tactical adjustments would be required” to keep the ROC in
the UN. Chiang could not be allowed to use the ROC’s veto to keep Outer Mongolia out
of the United Nations.31
Kennedy tried to convince Chiang not to become too involved in the UN
representation issue. On August 15, 1961, Kennedy warned Chiang that he might not be
able to rally majority support for continued ROC representation in the UN if the ROC
vetoed Outer Mongolia’s admission to the UN. “If Mauritania is denied entry into the
UN” as a result of the ROC’s veto of Outer Mongolia’s application for membership,
“most if not all of the French African states will, however illogically and unjustly,
retaliate by voting against the [ROC] on the Chinese representation issue.” As a result,
the Nationalists would be unseated and replaced by the Chinese Communists. Kennedy
claimed that the U.S. and the ROC had to choose “the lesser of two evils” to prevent
Communist China’s admission to the UN. It was necessary to “exercise tactical
flexibility” on Outer Mongolia’s application and allow them in. Kennedy warned that if
the ROC lost its seat in the UN, the U.S. would not be able to generate support for
military action to defend the ROC if the Mainland regime chose to attack Taiwan.32
In his August 26, 1961, response, Chiang declared that Outer Mongolia’s
application for membership in the UN was clearly an example of “Soviet blackmail.”
Thus, the United States “should lead the free nations to reject it resolutely under the
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-78clarion call of justice.” Taiwan, according to Chiang, could not support Outer
Mongolia’s admission to the UN. If the United States would take a firm stand against
recognition of Outer Mongolia and its application for UN membership, the U.S. would
earn the goodwill and support of these African states. According to Chiang, a much
stronger statement had to be made by the U.S.33 Arguing from the perspective of his
regional security, rather than the global security interests of the United States, Chiang
essentially refused to change his plans to veto Outer Mongolia’s application.
By late August 1961, Kennedy became quite worried about the Chinese
representation issue at the UN. In a memorandum to McGeorge Bundy, Kennedy asked:
“What is the latest word from Stevenson? Do we have a strategy? Is it going to be
successful? We can’t permit ourselves to get beaten. If we are not going to be able to
win on this basis[,] we better think of another one.”34 The next day, Bundy settled
Kennedy’s anxiety by assuring him that the U.S. would “seek a majority for the
‘important question’ position and then expect to have a blocking one-third against any
resolution that would admit representation” for Communist China. Additionally, Bundy
proposed that a commission examine UN membership criteria and the composition of
both the Security Council and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).35
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-79On September 2, Ambassador Drumright also learned that the ROC would not
change its position. Ambassador Yeh had told Drumright that the ROC “cannot and will
not change position on Outer Mongolia set forth in President Chiang’s last letter to
President Kennedy.” Drumright later commented to Secretary Rusk that the ROC had
“burned bridges” with its supporters in the UN on the Outer Mongolian issue and any
further appeals to modify their position would not be productive, but he also privately
relayed Ambassador Yeh’s suggestion that the United States try to defeat Outer
Mongolian membership by the abstention method.36
Kennedy, though, did not receive news of Yeh’s private suggestion through
Drumright to Rusk. Kennedy expressed his disappointment to Chiang that the ROC
would utilize its veto to prevent the admission of Outer Mongolia and Mauritania to the
United Nations. The President also warned Chiang that, because this issue was of such
vital importance to American security interests, “I am sure you will understand that we
must reserve our freedom to pursue whichever avenue we consider best calculated to
advance the objective which we both seek,” namely, keeping the ROC in the UN.37
With only a month to go before the beginning of the seventeenth UN General
Assembly, Secretary of State Rusk instructed Ambassador Stevenson to “attempt to get
the General Assembly to declare that any change in the representation of China is an
‘important question’ within the meaning of Article 18 of the Charter” and “persuade the
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-80Assembly to appoint a committee to consider criteria for UN membership . . . and the
composition of the Security Council and ECOSOC” which would report to the General
Assembly the next year. Rusk stated that the objective was to “head off any consideration
of the representation of China as a credentials question requiring a simple majority vote.”
When the applications of Outer Mongolia and Mauritania came before the General
Assembly, Stevenson was instructed to “abstain or vote for the admission of Outer
Mongolia,” which would assist in the admission of Mauritania. This would ensure the
support of the French African states for Taiwan on the Chinese representation issue.38
Rusk also sent instructions to the American embassy in Taipei that, if Chiang
planned to “go down with ship” rather than compromise on Outer Mongolia, the U.S.
would share no responsibility for his decision “and we shall make it quite clear if
necessary that [the] GRC elected to commit political suicide in UN despite our best
efforts.” Despite President Kennedy’s effort to generate international support to keep the
ROC in the United Nations, Rusk further commented:
It is a sign of increasing isolation [of the] GRC from reality that they persist in
disregarding [the] best advice of their own representatives and best friends abroad.
It is patent absurdity for [the] GRC to conclude that inability [of the] USG to
persuade [an] enlarged and changed membership UN is due to lack of US effort.
If we cannot persuade GRC . . . to meet us on any of several significant matters
whom can we persuade?39
Rusk then urged Drumright to assure ROC officials that, because of their common
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-81interests, the United States would provide them the strongest support possible.40
On September 29, 1961, Secretary of State Rusk met with Foreign Minister Shen
Chang-huan and Ambassador Yeh in New York City to review the Chinese representation
issue. Rusk wanted to make sure Shen and Yeh understood that if the ROC vetoed Outer
Mongolia’s application, they would be voted out of the UN. Shen, while understanding
the situation, stated that if the ROC did not veto Outer Mongolia’s application, it would
pose a domestic problem for Chiang and the KMT and undermine morale and public
support for their government at home.41
To head off any attempt by the ROC to veto Outer Mongolia’s application, Rusk
sent further instructions to Ambassador Drumright in Taipei. Rusk ordered Drumright to
do everything possible to convince Chiang that his policy on Outer Mongolia influenced
his own relations with other countries, which affected the ability of the U.S. to defend
Taiwan in the UN.42 After meeting with Chiang on October 4, 1961, Drumright cabled
the State Department, declaring that “Chiang now realizes precariousness of GRC
position if Outer Mongolia is vetoed.”43 Chiang was prepared to waive the ROC veto of
Outer Mongolia’s application “if a graceful, ‘face-saving’ method can be found . . . But
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-82initiative must appear to come from Chiang and not from overt pressure.”44 The U.S.,
according to Drumright, should appeal to Chiang in terms of free world interests and the
common interests of the ROC and the United States, and make clear that the United
States government had no plans to recognize Outer Mongolia. Drumright recommended
these points be brought out in a warmly worded letter to Chiang, along with a joint appeal
from the group of African countries called the “Brazzaville states” urging Chiang to
waive his veto of Outer Mongolia’s application.45
A memorandum from McGeorge Bundy to President Kennedy suggests the reason
why Chiang changed his mind. According to Bundy, the ROC’s policy of persuading the
“Brazzaville states” to support the admission of Mauritania and deny the admission of
Outer Mongolia failed because, as George Yeh stated, “The Africans were interested in
Mauritania and not at all in our problem” of keeping the ROC in the United Nations.
Also, a week earlier, Dean Rusk had a stern conversation with Ambassador Tsiang in
New York. This conversation apparently “deeply shook the Generalissimo,” because
Rusk bluntly told Tsiang that the ROC’s potential veto of Outer Mongolia’s application
might affect the “basic relationship” between the United States and the ROC.46
But on October 10, 1961, Vice President Ch’eng requested Kennedy to include a
reference in his upcoming press conference to the fact that the United States would, if
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-83necessary, use its veto power in the Security Council to prevent admission of the PRC to
the United Nations and “save the [Nationalist] Chinese Government’s situation.” If
Kennedy did not include such a statement, then the ROC delegation to the UN would veto
Outer Mongolia’s application. It seemed as though the ROC Vice President was telling
Kennedy what to say. Secretary of State Rusk recommended that Kennedy not comply
with Ch’eng’s request because it would undermine the United States plan to establish the
Chinese representation issue as an “important question.”47
In response, Kennedy sent a message through Bundy to Ray Cline. Kennedy
offered to give private assurances that if an American veto would be effective in
preventing Chinese Communist entry into the UN, then the United States would use its
veto. This assurance would have to remain secret because any public disclosure would be
“deeply damaging to the common cause at the UN.” Bundy continued to state to Cline
that Kennedy would use whatever would work, including the veto. Interestingly, Bundy
confessed that Ambassador Drumright was not being kept fully informed of events, and
urged that Drumright not be informed unless Cline believed the Ambassador needed to be
included.48
On October 14, 1961, Chiang Ching-kuo and Cline drafted a proposed
understanding between Presidents Chiang and Kennedy. The United States would vote
for Outer Mongolia’s admission to the UN and President Kennedy would reassure Chiang
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-84that his government was “the only rightful government representing China” with all the
rights to represent China in the UN and that the United States firmly opposed Communist
China’s entry into the United Nations. Meanwhile, Kennedy would privately assure
Chiang “that if at any time a US veto is necessary” to prevent Chinese Communist entry
into the UN, the U.S. would exercise that veto. Finally, the ROC would not veto Outer
Mongolia’s application to join the United Nations. If these terms were acceptable to
Kennedy, then Cline would arrange a meeting with President Chiang “where he will
definitely commit himself to this reversal of position on Outer Mongolia . . . .”49 Upon
receiving Chiang’s response from Cline, President Kennedy instructed Ambassador
Drumright to assure Chiang that the U.S. would use the veto to prevent Chinese
Communist entry into the UN, that the U.S. had always considered the ROC as the only
rightful government representing China in the United Nations, and that the U.S. firmly
opposed Chinese Communist entry into the United Nations.50 On December 15, 1961, the
“important question” resolution passed the General Assembly 61-34 with seven
abstentions.51
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-85Despite the diplomatic progress made between the United States and the ROC on
the Chinese representation issue in the UN, Komer still had his doubts as to its ultimate
success. He argued that the ROC’s position on the world stage had already been
“seriously eroded” and would become weaker with each succeeding session of the UN.
Komer suggested that the Kennedy administration distance itself from Chiang’s regime
without allowing the Nationalists to commit diplomatic suicide. The United States
should gradually change its China policy to allow Communist China to enter the United
Nations. Komer contended that “we can’t avoid the fact that a Two Chinas policy is
fundamentally in our interest [and the GRC’s], not that of Peiping.” As long as the
inevitable were postponed, Komer claimed, the harder it would be to get “two Chinas”
accepted. The “important question/study committee” approach was a step in the right
direction, but making private assurances and concessions to Chiang would “rob us of the
necessary flexibility” to handle future problems.52 For the moment, though, the ROC’s
seat in the UN was safe.
Through 1962 and 1963, the sense of crisis over the representation issue subsided.
The Republic of China maintained its seat in the United Nations despite attempts by
Communist Bloc nations, especially Albania, to replace it with the People’s Republic of
China. The paucity of official correspondence in Foreign Relations of the United States
and in John F. Kennedy’s Presidential Papers concerning the issue in 1962 and 1963
suggests that the membership debate was temporarily shelved, probably because of the
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-86“important question” tactic’s success.

Chiang, the Taiwan Strait, Return to the Mainland, and Vietnam
With the UN representation issue temporarily resolved, American policymakers
became increasingly preoccupied with Chiang’s oft-repeated statements and schemes to
“retake the mainland.” Chiang insisted on a Mainland return policy because his
Nationalist government could not abandon its raison d’être. The Nationalists considered
themselves the legitimate government of all China.53 Chiang never gave up on returning
to the Mainland, and he still held two major islands in the Taiwan Strait, Quemoy and
Matsu, both of which had been subjected to periodic shelling by the PRC throughout the
1950s.
Chiang’s moment of opportunity to attack and retake the Mainland seemed to
arise in the early 1960s as the Mainland suffered through one of the worst famines in
recorded history caused by Mao’s Great Leap Forward. Mao’s program promised to put
China on an equal footing with the Americans and the Soviets through rapid
industrialization and agricultural collectivization.54 Chinese peasants constructed
homemade furnaces to make steel, experimented with close planting, deep ploughing and
heavy fertilization to increase the food supply, constructed reservoirs and dams for
irrigation, and birthed more children. But while farmers melted their metal tools in a
pathetic attempt to increase the nation’s steel supply, most of 1958's crop rotted in the
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-87fields or was harvested and exported to repay loans from the Soviets. Meanwhile, nature
wreaked havoc on the Mainland as typhoons flooded southern China while droughts and
pests blighted the Chinese countryside. Between 1958 and 1961, the national famine
caused forty to eighty million deaths.55
In the wake of the Great Leap Forward’s failure, relations between the PRC and
the Soviet Union deteriorated. Mao criticized Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev for not
assisting the Communist Chinese during the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the 1959
border dispute with India. In April 1960, Mao declared the Chinese independent of the
Soviet Union. As a result, Khrushchev recalled 1,400 scientists and engineers from the
PRC that summer. The Soviet recall led to a drastic reduction in Mainland industrial
production, disruptions in the national transportation system, and the transfer of workers
to famine-affected areas.56 By 1961, the Mainland Communist regime was in trouble as
the effects of famine spread throughout the country. Chiang saw his chance to return
home in triumph.57
Chiang’s dream of invading the Mainland from the Offshore Islands, however,
was completely unrealistic. First, the United States had only committed to defend Taiwan
and the Pescadore Islands, not the Offshore Islands of Quemoy and Matsu, in the Mutual
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-88Defense Treaty of 1954.58 Second, the Offshore Islands were too close to the Mainland
and too small from which to launch an invasion, although they could be used to dispatch
small raiding parties and conduct intelligence operations. Chiang’s intentions toward the
Mainland generated much concern and discussion in Washington, however, because
many in the White House and State Department believed that he was a “loose cannon”
who had to be reined in. Any attempt to oust him might only create a more unstable
situation than already existed in East Asia.
Throughout 1961, some Kennedy administration officials grew concerned that
Chiang would, indeed, attack Mainland China. George C. McGhee, Chairman of the
State Department’s Policy Planning Committee, warned Secretary of State Dean Rusk
that continued American support of the ROC’s Mainland ambitions “would endanger
both . . . Taiwan and the U.S. itself.”59 Likewise, in May 1961, Deputy Undersecretary of
State for Political Affairs, U. Alexis Johnson, cautioned Assistant Secretary of State
Chester Bowles that the crisis in the Taiwan Strait continued to be a “real danger to peace
in the area” and “could well involve us in hostilities not of our own choosing and
making.” Johnson privately suggested that the most practical means of bringing peace in
the Taiwan Strait was to get the Nationalists to evacuate the Offshore Islands, but noted
that this idea was unrealistic because it would force the Taiwanese to renounce their
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-89claim on the Mainland.60 Bowles strongly opposed a Taiwanese invasion of the
Mainland. In his view, the idea that Chiang was the legitimate ruler of all China was only
a myth and his plans to invade the Mainland would provoke the PRC to take defensive
actions. The United States, Bowles argued, should discourage the ROC from launching a
Mainland attack while pledging to defend Taiwan in the case of an attack from the PRC.
This policy would allow American military assistance to Taiwan to decrease, and the
savings could be invested in the ROC economy to stimulate growth.61
Like McGhee and Johnson, Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council
criticized ROC intentions to attack Mainland China. In late July 1961, Komer concluded
that as Taiwan’s international position eroded, Chiang would take “an unyielding
attitude” to guarantee his government’s claim as the sole government of the Mainland, the
Offshore Islands and Taiwan. If Chiang were “painted into a corner,” he would take
advantage of the economic crisis facing the People’s Republic of China “as a last chance
to ‘return to the mainland.’” To rein in Chiang, Komer suggested that Kennedy
encourage Chiang to evacuate the Offshore Islands. If Chiang persisted in his saberrattling, Komer concluded that the U.S. could agree, “as a safety valve,” to small-scale
drops of Taiwanese soldiers for purposes of intelligence gathering because the ROC
could not conduct these missions without American logistical support. If Chiang were to
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-90ask the United States formally to assist a full-scale invasion of the Mainland, however,
Komer suggested that Kennedy not approve “unless the situation there deteriorates to the
point where we mutually agree it has good prospect of success.”62
Komer probably used a June 1961 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 43-61)
entitled “Prospects for the GRC [Government of the Republic of China]” as the basis of
his analysis. It predicted that Chiang would continue to “agitate the question of taking
probing actions against the mainland in order to capitalize on the economic distress and
other sources of discontent” in the People’s Republic of China. The United States,
therefore, should respond with caution because any major change in policy toward
Taiwan, like forcing the evacuation of the Offshore Islands, would create profound
bitterness and inflict a psychological shock on the Nationalists. The analysis warned that
Chiang’s government could split into two factions, one willing to accept accommodation
with the Chinese Communists and another favoring war with the Mainland regime.63
As predicted in NIE 43-61, in July 1961, Chiang Kai-shek suggested to President
Kennedy that the time was ripe for the ROC to launch an invasion of Mainland China.
Chiang contended that, due to famine and natural disasters there, anti-communist groups
were forming across the Mainland. In Chiang’s view, the PRC had become “the most
vulnerable link in International Communism.” Chiang then suggested to Kennedy that
both the United States and the ROC “give positive support to the Chinese people,” and to
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-91contribute to the cause of human freedom, the United States and Taiwan “should together
work out a coordinated plan to remove the Communist menace in East Asia and mainland
China.”64
The deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia complicated American efforts to
check Chiang’s military ambitions. In 1961, the conflict in Vietnam was not high on the
Kennedy administration’s priority list. It became readily apparent, though, that the
United States would have to increase its involvement to preserve the Republic of Vietnam
(South Vietnam) and keep the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem in power. For his
part, Chiang hoped to use the Vietnam War as a means to become more involved in
Southeast Asia and, in the long run, as another front in his civil war against Mao and the
Mainland communist regime. Differing views within the Kennedy administration added
to the complications. While high-ranking American policymakers in the State
Department hoped to thwart Chiang’s desires to mobilize irregular troops in Southeast
Asia, officials in the Department of Defense sought to use the ROC in the ever widening
crisis in South Vietnam.
In October 1961, William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of Defense, indicated that
President Diem of the Republic of Vietnam favored utilizing ROC troops in combat roles
in South Vietnam against the National Liberation Front, or the Viet Cong. Diem,
according to Bundy’s memorandum, believed that Chinese Nationalist troops could be
brought into South Vietnam, naturalized as Vietnamese citizens, “and used profitably in
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-92the Delta area, where there is already a large number of ethnic Chinese.” Even though
Diem understood that the State Department had turned this idea down, he continued to
press the issue.65 By December 1961, President Kennedy’s chief military advisor, retired
General Maxwell Taylor, also suggested using Chinese Nationalist special forces in
Vietnam. According to Taylor, Diem wanted to obtain between 3,000 and 5,000 ROC
soldiers “for the purpose of assisting in training of the Civil Defense Force.”66
Some State Department officials viewed the role of ROC troops in Vietnam
differently and dismissed the idea that ROC troops should play any role in South
Vietnam. Deputy Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson warned
that the presence of Nationalist Chinese troops on the Asian mainland would open a
“Pandora’s Box” because anti-Chinese prejudice was strong throughout Southeast Asia.
Moreover, introducing ROC combat troops in Vietnam would draw Chinese Communist
intervention and substantially change the Vietnamese situation and American policy
objectives.67
Meanwhile, the Nationalist Chinese had suggested the creation of a regional anticommunist alliance against the PRC. President Kennedy met with ROC Vice President
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-93Ch’en Ch’eng on July 31, 1961 to discuss organizing a common intelligence and military
pool for the United States and its Asian allies. Ch’en wished to create greater unity
between American and Asian forces, arguing that the Communists planned to attack the
weakest link in the region and eventually create a bloc of countries opposed to United
States interests in Southeast Asia. After a discussion of problems in Laos and Vietnam,
Ch’en proposed that the ROC and the United States create a plan to share responsibility
in Asia. According to Ch’en, free world “unity and organization is the way to counter
Communist organization and unity.”68
Incidentally, an October State Department Policy Planning Council report on
Asian policy recommended that the United States recognize that the general conflict
underway in Southeast Asia, instigated by the Communist Bloc, threatened the national
independence of states in the region. The report called on the United States to take the
appropriate international action to ensure the independence of the states on Communist
China’s periphery.69 Such action, though, would cost millions. Two months later, the
Military Assistance Steering Group in the State Department concurred with the Policy
Planning Council and insisted that the United States “maximize western and pro-western
strength in and around Vietnam and the U.S. position on the China issue.” The group
estimated that ensuring Taiwan’s security would cost the United States around one billion
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-94dollars per year between 1962 and 1967.70 By the end of 1961, it became apparent that
defending Taiwan, building the island’s economic security, and increasing American
military involvement in South Vietnam was becoming an expensive proposition.

The Committee of One Million and Congressional and Public Opinion
In 1961, the Committee of One Million (COOM) grew increasingly concerned
over changes in United States-China policy. Marvin Liebman and his supporters believed
that the Kennedy administration had sent mixed signals concerning the American
relationship with Communist China. As a result, they continued to pressure the federal
government to keep the PRC out of the United Nations and to maintain recognition of the
ROC as the sole government of China. The COOM hoped the upsurge of support they
experienced in the 1950s would continue into the 1960s, but changes in the China Bloc’s
leadership and the Committee’s difficulty in securing financial support began to weigh
heavy on the COOM’s mission.
The Kennedy administration’s early appointments caused tremendous anxiety for
the Committee of One Million. While Kennedy planned to continue President
Eisenhower’s containment policy toward the PRC and support for the Republic of China,
he also contemplated a closer working relationship with the PRC because of its imminent
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-95construction of a nuclear bomb.71 His appointment of advocates of a “two Chinas” policy
to high ranking diplomatic posts led Liebman and other anti-communists to interpret
Kennedy’s actions as moving toward a “two Chinas” policy, possibly resulting in
Communist China’s entry into the UN and eventual American diplomatic recognition.72
In their view, Kennedy seemed to be threatening the status quo. The COOM’s Steering
Committee therefore embarked on a new petition drive and letter-writing campaign, and
exerted pressure on legislators to express the will of Congress against American and UN
recognition of the Mainland regime.
By the beginning of 1961, though, some of the most vocal supporters of the
COOM had left Congress. The retirements of William Knowland, Alexander Smith and
John Vorys in 1958, and later of Walter Judd in 1962, left a gigantic void that the
Committee of One Million had to fill. But no single member of Congress took the lead to
advocate for the ROC in the 1960s. Nevertheless, Liebman still had a few congressional
allies who served on the COOM’s Steering Committee, such as Senator Thomas Dodd
(D-Connecticut) and Senator Jacob Javits (R-New York), and congressional opinion had
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-96not yet changed significantly. On July 28, 1961, the Senate unanimously (76-0) adopted
Senate Concurrent Resolution 34, opposing the admission of the People’s Republic of
China into the United Nations and opposing American recognition of Communist China.
On August 31, the House of Representatives also passed the resolution by a 395-0 rollcall vote.73 Even though this resolution was a tremendous success for the COOM, no
congressman would attempt this type of resolution again.
Financial problems also hampered the Committee’s lobbying efforts. The
Committee of One Million needed a steady income to remain in business and influence
policy toward China. The Steering Committee hoped that sufficient donations would
cover the costs of copying and mailing letters and petitions, publishing pamphlets and
booklets, producing short filmstrips, meeting office expenses, and covering Liebman’s
representation fees. Realizing that current donations would not cover these expenses,
Liebman had to find new sources of income. The Committee raised funds through sales
of its mailing list of 11,000 contributors to other organizations.74 Other income came
from sales of pamphlets, booklets, and filmstrips. The Committee’s largest source of
income, however, came from individual donations. On average, the Committee raised
$55-60,000 per year from nearly 10,000 contributors across the country. Each year
between 1959 and 1969, the Committee sponsored a letter and petition campaign that
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-97solicited names, addresses, and money. In this same period, however, public
contributions to the Committee of One Million actually fell from $69,688.54 to
$46,515.00, a 33.25 percent decrease.75 While some campaigns did produce higher-thanaverage income, the costs of fund-raising increased from 33.0 percent to 78.8 percent of
the total funds raised.76 Liebman encountered great difficulty both raising and saving
money. For example, in the fiscal year ending March 31, 1962, the Committee reported
$85,502.17 in public contributions and film royalties, but spent $81,653.99 on committee
projects and administrative expenses. This left the Committee with $3,848.18 in the
bank.77 In some years, Liebman had only hundreds of dollars in the bank.
Some of Liebman’s supporters accused the COOM of being more anti-communist
Chinese than being pro-Taiwan. In an August 1961 letter, Gilbert Jonas made several
recommendations as to how to approach the “two Chinas” problem. He recommended
that Liebman should focus on the ROC’s economic and social achievements, because “the
American public rarely supports political alternatives for negative reasons over an
extended period of time.” If the Committee would take a more positive approach in
promoting the ROC’s successes rather than the PRC’s failures, “Free China can develop
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-98an even more effective body of American support representing a fuller cross-section of
American opinion and power. Such an undertaking would seek to develop and support an
image of Free China as a strong, reliable ally.”78
In fact, the Committee of One Million could not successfully relay its anticommunist Chinese message to the country as it planned. The individuals recruited to
work on petition drives and solicit potential donors faced problems. Some lacked the
background knowledge to explain the situation in China. Others who wished to
participate simply lacked the funds to donate. One individual who passed around
petitions for the Committee explained to Walter Judd that, “I find that more than three
people out of four are unwilling to sign it [the petition] because they tell me I can’t
explain to their satisfaction why Red China as a world power should be kept out of the
United Nations.”79 This example helps to explain the limits of the COOM’s
pamphleteering campaigns.
The Committee of One Million also faced criticism from the press. The magazine
Nation noted the tremendous gap between the Committee of One Million’s claimed and
actual support. Urban Whitaker, a professor of international relations at San Francisco
State College, wrote an article that questioned the organization’s membership numbers.
Whitaker commented that in 1961 the COOM had only 6,000 contributing members, but
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-99printed some 25,000 to 35,000 copies of its literature and brochures for distribution.80
While Whitaker doubted the COOM’s membership figures, Harry W. Ernst, a staff writer
for the Charleston Gazette of West Virginia, exposed discrepancies among members of
Congress listed as supporting the COOM. On one handout concerning American
abandonment of the United Nations should Communist China join, the COOM claimed
support from fifty-five Senators and 295 Representatives. But when Ernst’s publisher,
W. E. Chilton III, wrote to fifty of the Congressional endorsers listed, only twenty-five
responded. Among the twenty-five respondents, only three claimed the United States
should leave the United Nations, while the “overwhelming majority of the Congressional
endorsers who replied to The Gazette’s inquiry revealed that they disagreed with the
radical statement which the Committee of One Million had circulated across the country”
in their name.81
Despite the lack of a clearly defined China Bloc, the most ardent supporters of the
status quo in United States-Taiwan policy were some of the most senior representatives
and senators on Capitol Hill. Their collective argument was that the island of Taiwan
was a strategic base of operations against the spread of international communism during
the Cold War. The United States, therefore, was obligated to send as much financial and
military support to the ROC as necessary to prevent Taiwan from falling into the hands of
Communist China. Others, recognizing the millions of dollars the United States had
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-100already pumped into the Taiwanese economy since the 1950s, viewed the island and its
government as friendly and open to American business interests. Although some
criticized the amount of aid the island received, there was no groundswell of public
support behind significant changes in China policy.
Among congressional leaders who expressed their support for Taiwan in terms of
its strategic value, Senator Albert Gore, Sr., (D-Tennessee), was one of the earliest and
most ardent supporters of Chiang Kai-shek’s regime. Senator Gore’s correspondence
reflected his support for the status quo. In a 1962 letter to a Knoxville businessman, Gore
argued that the United States should keep its commitment to Chiang Kai-shek and assist
in the defense of Quemoy and Matsu in the event of an attack by the PRC.82
While some legislators chose to support the status quo in terms of containing the
spread of Chinese communism, other legislators focused on the promotion of American
business interests. One such legislator interested in business ties with the Republic of
China was Senator John G. Tower (R-Texas). He believed that American businessmen
could make great profits through strong ties with the ROC. With the help of Senator
Tower, Dallas-based Hunt Oil Company negotiated with the Nationalist Chinese
government for permission to drill for oil off the Taiwanese coast. To ensure the
negotiations’ success, Senator Tower wrote several ROC leaders (Ch’en Ch’eng, C. T.
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-101Yang, C. T. Yen and George Yeh), advising them “that the Hunt family . . . are well and
favorably known to me as among the outstanding business families in our country. . . . I
can, likewise, advise you that the Hunt Oil Company . . . are successful and experienced,
financially sound, and have a reputation for complete integrity.” In response, C. K. Yen
commented to Senator Tower that “your advice will add to our knowledge of [the
company’s] status and reputation.”83
Congressional support for Chiang and the ROC, however, was by no means
unanimous. Senator Allen J. Ellender (D-Louisiana) criticized the ROC and the amount
of American aid given to the controversial Taiwanese government. Ellender traveled to
Taiwan in 1961, and later in 1968, as part of various “fact-finding” missions. A fiscal
conservative, he distrusted the State Department and used these trips to check upon the
State Department.84 On these trips, Ellender received first-hand information as to the
successes and failures of the American aid program in the ROC. The senator planned to
investigate how American money, in the form of military and non-military aid, was being
spent and how this aid improved the Taiwanese economy.
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-102In 1961, Ellender criticized American spending on Taiwan. He noted in his
November 1961 trip journal that the United States provided $30 million in grants to open
several fertilizer plants and $40 million to improve Taiwan’s railroad system. He
particularly objected to the latter, stating that “Under no circumstances should we put up
another cent, either by way of grants or loans, unless the railroad becomes self-sustaining
and the rates are high enough to amortize the cost over a long period.” Ellender’s call for
efficiency also stretched to American control over Taiwanese civilian air operations,
where the senator found out that the United States financed such operations. Noting that
one particular airport was self-sustaining, Ellender wondered “why we should continue to
pay any of the expenses incident to its operation. If someone is needed, then I say let the
local government pay for technicians.” Ellender concluded that “with all the technical
assistance given by us to the people of the Island, individual initiative should be fostered
to the end that a prosperous middle class can be created.”85
Letters to the editor of the New York Times throughout the 1960s also questioned
the nature of the American-Taiwanese relationship. One letter, published on the day of
President Kennedy’s inauguration, criticized American isolation of the PRC. James P.
Warburg, a well-published critic of American Cold War policy, argued that because
“Chiang Kai-shek stands no chance of reconquering the mainland”86 and because both
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-103Mainland China and the ROC on Taiwan reject the “two Chinas solution,” selfdetermination for the Taiwanese people would be the only recourse to maintain the peace.
If the United States supported this solution, then “the United States would no longer be in
danger of isolation and humiliating diplomatic defeat.”87
A May 1961 letter by Ernest T. Nash of Woodland, CA, also called for the United
States to drop its support of Chiang Kai-shek in favor of self-determination for Taiwan.
The author criticized American policy, because it put Chiang in a situation of either
drawing the United States into a war with the PRC or turning his guns on the United
States for not supporting his regime. According to the author, it was possible for the
Taiwanese to be rid of the Kuomintang’s rule, deny Taiwan to the Communists, and
abandon militancy in favor of neutrality for Taiwan.88

Conclusion
President John F. Kennedy did not publicly support changes in China policy. But
by the end of 1961, Kennedy had appointed a staff of China experts to important foreign
policy advisory positions in both the National Security Council Staff and the State
Department who believed that the Eisenhower-Dulles policy of containing and isolating
Communist China was unrealistic. They quietly promoted a new policy whereby the
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-104United States could work toward improving relations with the PRC while maintaining its
alliance with the ROC. Chiang Kai-shek, though, believed that the United States had
begun to abandon his island bastion. He sought out his friends and supporters within the
U.S. governmental bureaucracy, especially within the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Department of Defense, to present his views and to encourage the Kennedy
administration to preserve the status quo. The Committee of One Million, despite its
financial problems, also relayed Chiang’s sentiments and pressured Congress and the
administration for continued support. Taiwan thus retained its seat in the United Nations,
but forced Kennedy to acknowledge privately that the U.S. would use its veto to prevent
Chinese Communist entry into the UN. A nearly unanimous vote by Congress opposing
admission of Communist China into the UN also did not make matters easy for the
Kennedy administration. But while Chiang hoped to use this momentum to persuade the
United States to support his quest to retake the Mainland and to increase his involvement
in Southeast Asia, Kennedy’s staffers proposed ideas that would check Chiang’s
ambitions.

CHAPTER IV
THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION
AND CHINA POLICY, 1962-63
In 1962 and 1963, United States policy toward the Republic of China (ROC)
faced tough challenges. Throughout 1962, the Kennedy administration received requests
to increase military assistance from ROC President Chiang Kai-shek. Meanwhile,
discussion of a proposed “two Chinas” policy emerged within the State Department and
Congress. Policymakers, legislators and the American public split along lines similar to
the Chinese UN representation crisis of 1961. While Chiang’s supporters in Congress
attempted to convince Kennedy to provide assistance and support an invasion, others
favored delaying and restraining Chiang. Meanwhile, some State Department officials
supported a more accommodating relationship with the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) by the end of 1963.

Keeping Chiang on a “Tight Leash,” 1962-63
Some American analysts predicted that Chiang would use the deteriorating
situation on the mainland as a reason to launch an attack. Robert W. Komer believed that
the Taiwan Strait crisis would pose a problem for the United States in 1962. Komer
based his views on Chiang’s New Year’s Day address of 1962 in which he publicly
-105-

-106proclaimed that the ROC was ready to launch a major assault on the mainland to assist
uprisings against the PRC and that the United States would support his actions.1
In January 1962, Robert Komer predicted that Chiang Kai-shek would take
advantage of the instability on the Mainland and send his army into southeastern China to
overthrow the Communists. After all, the Mainland continued to suffer from the effects
of famine caused by Mao’s Great Leap Forward, and the rift between the PRC and the
Soviet Union deepened by early 1962. This could very well be Chiang’s best opportunity.
But since the ROC lacked the necessary resources for a full-scale attack, Chiang would
demand American assistance and, thus, draw the United States into a war with
Communist China and, possibly, the Soviet Union as well. Such a war, Komer warned,
would require “substantial US air cover, air and sea lift, and logistical support.”2 Even
small scale probing operations, intended to determine the true strength of PRC forces and
support in southern China, would lead to further escalation.3 Since a Taiwanese offensive
threatened war between the U.S. and the PRC, Komer suggested that the United States
stall any proposed ROC invasion of the Mainland. To keep the peace, Komer argued,
Chiang had to be kept on a “tight leash” and the U.S. had to dissuade him from attacking
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-107the PRC.4
Chiang outlined his plan of invasion during a February 1962 meeting in Taipei
with CIA official Ray Cline and National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy, in which
he insisted that this action would have a tremendous effect on the free world. He further
pressed President Kennedy to take immediate action to rescue the Mainland from Chinese
Communist enslavement.5 Chiang later asserted to U.S. Ambassador Everett F.
Drumright that “any delay may allow Communists to retrieve [the] situation.”6
Drumright urged Chiang to take into consideration world opinion and American
responsibilities, because Americans would be cautious about opening a new front in the
Cold War. After his talk with Chiang, Drumright warned the State Department that
Chiang was determined to order a mainland invasion that year. To prevent a war, the
United States had to channel Chiang’s actions “in directions we deem appropriate.”7
Chiang Ching-kuo, Minister without Portfolio and Deputy Secretary General of
the National Defense Council, also attempted to persuade American policymakers on the
pertinency of invading the PRC. In a March 1962 meeting with Roger Hilsman, Director

4

Ibid.

5

Telegram from William P. Bundy to Robert S. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy,
February 24, 1962, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Northeast Asia,
Laos, Microfiche Supplement (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997),
Document 35, Fiche 4 of 18, hereafter cited as FRUS 1961-63 Microfiche.
6

Telegram from Everett F. Drumright to Department of State, March 6, 1962,
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Volume 22, Northeast Asia
(Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1996),189-90, hereafter cited as
FRUS 1961-63.
7

Ibid.

-108of Intelligence and Research in the State Department, Chiang Ching-kuo declared that the
Chinese Communists were responsible for all the Americans’ problems in Vietnam,
South Korea, and Laos. As the PRC threatened both ROC and American interests,
Defense Minister Chiang proposed the United States provide Taiwan airplanes to drop
several two hundred-man Taiwanese teams of paratroopers onto the Mainland. These
paratroopers, according to the general, could overcome larger local defense forces and
successfully resist PRC forces in southern China. A hesitant Hilsman compared the
Defense Minister’s proposal with earlier American problems in Cuba, noting that the
Mainland Chinese were discontented, but would not risk their lives unless they were very
sure of success.8
Kennedy, concerned that a Taiwanese invasion of the mainland would force a
major shift in American policy, sent Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
W. Averell Harriman to Taiwan to clarify the American position. Fearing a Bay of Pigs
type fiasco in Asia, Kennedy asked Harriman to learn as much as he could from President
Chiang about his precise plans and estimates. Kennedy also asked Harriman to warn
Chiang that his request for dropping teams of two hundred soldiers into southern China
with American air support “would be a major shift in policy for us and would have to be
supported by compelling evidence.”9
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-109Harriman and Ralph Clough, Deputy Chief of Mission in the American Embassy
in Taipei, reminded President Chiang that, if he intended to invade the PRC, he had to
consult the United States according to the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954. Chiang
insisted that “he would not do anything behind [Kennedy’s] back nor anything
detrimental or harmful to US.” The Taiwanese president then asked for direct American
intervention in the first stage of his plan, American air drops of ROC paratroopers into
southern China. Chiang pleaded with Harriman and Clough that his plan would definitely
succeed, but Clough asked Chiang to remain patient and continue consultations with
American officials. Chiang argued he was not personally impatient, but his people and
his armed forces were impatient; he then ominously warned that if actions were not taken
against the PRC soon, “things might begin to happen not according to plan.”10
Cline believed that President Kennedy had few available options to calm the
situation between the ROC and the PRC. He argued that it was important to delay
Chiang’s plan, meanwhile Kennedy had only two courses of action and both would result
in disruption and war. First, he could flatly refuse Chiang’s request, which would lead to
a destabilization of the Taiwanese government, military, bureaucracy and society, and
could possibly lead to “desperation” attacks by the ROC against the PRC’s southern
coast. Chiang might even resign as President of the ROC, causing tremendous
disruptions on Taiwan and in United States-ROC relations.11 Alternatively, Kennedy
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-110could agree to provide aircraft to support one ROC operation of fifty to one hundred men
against the PRC. The six to twelve months of preparation time could then be used to
keep in close contact with the ROC regarding the project’s preparation and, “if deemed
necessary, to make plans for dealing with successors to Chiang Kai-shek if we
subsequently were to decide that we should discontinue our support of his plans.”12
Although American options were limited, a March 1962 intelligence estimate
predicted that any ROC invasion of the Mainland would lead to disaster. Special
National Intelligence Estimate (SNIE) 13-3-62, entitled “Probable Consequences of
Chinese Nationalist Military Operations on the Chinese Mainland,” concluded that the
Communists would retain control of the Mainland in the wake of a ROC invasion. The
intelligence analysts concluded that if the ROC deployed special forces on the Mainland,
they would receive little or no support from the Chinese and “they would almost certainly
be destroyed in a short time.”13 The report predicted that such an invasion could only be
successful with American assistance. An American refusal to assist the ROC would
strain U.S.-ROC relations, and Taiwanese leaders would probably invade the Mainland
anyway. Regardless of American support, the estimate predicted that both Communist
China and the Soviet Union “would launch major propaganda and political campaigns
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-111against the GRC and the US,”14 and that the PRC would retaliate with military action in
the Taiwan Strait.
Chairman Mao Zedong and the key leaders of the Communist party reacted firmly
to Chiang’s invasion overtures. Taking Chiang’s rhetoric seriously, Mao ordered
increased combat readiness in the southeastern coastal provinces.15 In addition to
increasing military preparedness, the PRC used its Warsaw channel to express its strong
indignation at Chiang’s plans to the United States government. American and Mainland
Chinese diplomats had met unofficially in Warsaw on an irregular basis to discuss
matters of mutual concern since the late 1950s. After hearing their concerns, U.S.
delegates privately reassured the Chinese Communists that the United States would not
support Chiang’s invasion plans.16
As Chiang continued his verbal threats of a Mainland invasion and the Taiwanese
press declared military action against the PRC imminent, Ralph Clough warned Averell
Harriman that the movement to retake the Mainland was gaining momentum. He
recommended that American officials stop encouraging ROC military preparations
without overtly opposing Taiwan’s unilateral proposals and objectives. This, according
to Clough, would be a very difficult balancing act. The United States had to satisfy
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-112Chiang that it fully supported his cause without allowing him to launch a Mainland
assault.17
In March 1962, Kennedy decided to send American aircraft to Taiwan, but refused
to participate directly in Chiang’s plans. The President wanted to show Chiang his
support, but did not want to promote active participation, thereby maintaining American
flexibility. Despite Komer’s advice to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy proposed
that the U.S. send Taiwan two C-123 aircraft to be flown by Chinese crews trained in the
United States. The C-123s could be used to haul cargo and as many as sixty-one fullyequipped troops. These planes had previously been used in Vietnam to airlift South
Vietnamese units around the country and to launch Vietnamese combat parachute
assaults.18 Kennedy then asked Ray Cline to make it clear to Chiang “that no
commitment was being made other than to prepare the planes and be willing to consider
their use in the light of the intelligence available in October.”19 Kennedy also asked Cline
to persuade ROC government officials to drop public discussion of plans for invading the
mainland.20 Kennedy spelled out American policy in a separate memo to Cline and
expressed his hope that events on the Mainland would assist a PRC turn toward freedom.

17

Telegram from Ralph Clough to W. Averell Harriman, March 30, 1962, FRUS
1961-63, 202-03.
18

Tony Holmes, Jane’s Historic Military Aircraft (London: Harper Collins
Publishers, 1998), 304; M. J. Armitage and R. A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age,
Second Edition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1985), 90; Ray L. Bowers, “USAF
Airlift and the Airmobility Idea in Vietnam,” Air University Review 26 (1974): 8.
19

Memorandum for the Record, March 31, 1962, FRUS 1961-63, 204-05.

20

Ibid.

-113Kennedy warned President Chiang against an immediate invasion. Rather, the United
States and Taiwan should continue to “conduct jointly further investigation of conditions
on the Mainland [to determine the feasibility of any military actions, specifically using
probing teams jointly trained, equipped and supervised by the U.S. and the ROC].”21
Although the United States had prepared two C-123s for Chinese use and pledged to train
Chinese crews to drop teams of two hundred paratroopers onto the mainland, the United
States had made no final decision to proceed with preparing this capability. In addition,
the United States would publicly deny any such joint consultation, and the ROC should
cease official public discourse and publication of news articles concerning mainland
invasion plans.22
Throughout early April 1962, Cline met regularly with President Chiang and
Chiang Ching-kuo. In those meetings, Cline convinced Chiang and his son to postpone
the target date for an initial air drop from June until October 1, 1962, but President
Chiang wanted Kennedy’s reassurance that he would fully support the ROC’s plans,
especially regarding the drop date and mutual study of plans for military operations.23
On hearing of Chiang’s position, McGeorge Bundy warned Cline that the U.S. position
“must be that it stands on what is outlined . . . We cannot safely get ourselves in the
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-114position of negotiating on this.”24
Meanwhile, Ralph Clough discussed with ROC Foreign Minister Shen Changhuan a Taiwanese press report playing up an imminent Taiwanese invasion of the
Mainland. Clough complained to Shen that the U.S. government was aware of an
independent press story by Taiwanese journalist Lien Ho-pao, quoting Ambassador
Tsiang Ting-fu, that Presidents Kennedy and Chiang were seriously considering attacking
Mainland China. Shen reassured Clough that his government had nothing to do with the
story, and noted that the government press had been much more careful in discussing any
possible invasion. He also claimed he had taken steps earlier to make sure that the press
did not sensationalize the invasion issue, and thereby stir up public opinion. But even in
Taiwan, claimed Shen, such a story could not be ignored by the press.25
On returning from his meetings with President Chiang, Ray Cline delivered
Chiang’s response to President Kennedy’s position. According to Chiang, Communist
Chinese internal stability was beginning to break down, as evidenced by the large number
of starving Mainland refugees fleeing into Hong Kong. This exodus was proof that the
Mainland Communists had lost support and were ripe to be overthrown. Cline further
commented that “it is essential for it [ROC] to plan and prepare for both clandestine and
military actions to support anti-Communist resistance forces on the Mainland.”26 Chiang
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-115was willing to take sole responsibility for any attack, but he proposed that operations
should be decided upon jointly between the United States and Taiwan. On Chiang’s
behalf, Cline further stated that Taiwan was “obliged to take certain prudent military
preparedness measures to be ready to intervene in case the situation deteriorates to the
point where the U.S. agrees that action is in the Free World interest.”27 Cline also
conveyed that Chiang was under intense pressure from top ranks in the ROC military to
take action against the mainland in the near future. Chiang had promised not to take
action until after October 1, 1962, when, as he hoped to explain to his generals, the U.S.
would deliver more equipment. Chiang, therefore, asked for sixteen B-57 bombers and
twenty to twenty-five landing ship tanks (LSTs) for amphibious forces. Provision of
these items, Cline relayed, “would convince people actual preparations were being made
and would permit further delays to be weathered more gracefully.”28
While Cline relayed Chiang’s initial invasion plans, Averell Harriman debated
Taiwanese military finances with Kiang Yi-seng, Minister of the ROC to the United
States. Harriman complained that large increases in military spending had caused
inflation and might result in a harmful diversion of investment resources from Taiwan’s
economy. While Kiang stated that he had received no official news on this spending for
war preparation, he promised to get back to Harriman with his findings. Harriman
demanded an end to such high military spending through immediate discussions between
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-116American and ROC officials.29 The CIA later determined that Taiwan had built facilities
to store 65,000 tons of petroleum products. Nearly NT$650,000,000 had been spent on
war preparations since July 1960. But between then and April 27, 1962, the ROC had
spent a total of NT$800,000,000 on war preparations.30
In May 1962, as tensions mounted between the United States and Taiwan over
Chiang’s preparations to attack the mainland, President Kennedy appointed a new
ambassador to the ROC, retired U.S. Admiral Alan G. Kirk. A long-time friend of the
Kennedy family, Kirk had been Ambassador Joseph P. Kennedy’s naval attaché at the
U.S. embassy in London in the late 1930s.31 Upon his appointment, Kirk commented that
Chiang intended to drag the United States into his invasion plans. Kennedy agreed, but
the President wanted more intelligence on the mainland situation before sending
Taiwan’s requested materials.32 Kennedy then dispatched Kirk to Taipei to speak
candidly to Chiang and warn him not to attack the PRC.33
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-117While Kennedy and Kirk sought more intelligence on which to base a decision,
Roger Hilsman worried that the mainland regime had already mobilized its forces across
from the Offshore Islands. In June 1962, he reported to Secretary Rusk that the
Communist Chinese had “probably” moved their forces to deter a ROC attack and were
positioning themselves “for a sudden, all-out military effort to take either or both Quemoy
and Matsu.” If the Chinese Communists attacked, Hilsman concluded that “a direct
confrontation of U.S. and Chinese Nationalist interests seems very likely.”34 The U.S.
would face tremendous pressure from Chiang, his friends in Southeast Asia, and from
within the United States to assist in defending the islands.35
By the summer of 1962, therefore, the Kennedy administration was somewhat
divided over the wisdom of U.S. military support for Chiang. Some analysts questioned
whether the defense of Taiwan and the Offshore Islands was worth risking American
lives. Averell Harriman requested a report determining whether or not the United States
should continue to restrain Chiang and how far the U.S. should go to defend Taiwan.36
The next day, Roger Hilsman warned that a decision not to defend Taiwan might risk
increased pressure from the PRC to seize Quemoy and Matsu, which would cause a major
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-118rift in U.S.-ROC relations.37 The Offshore Islands Working Group in the State
Department’s Office of East Asian Affairs agreed with Hilsman. The group, composed of
delegates from the departments of State and Defense, the CIA and the White House,
proposed that the United States take a much larger role in assisting the ROC in the event
of a Chinese Communist attack, which could be done by obtaining intelligence,
consulting with American allies, and providing “appropriate logistic material support to
Taiwan only.” In addition, deploying air and naval units to Taiwan would assist the ROC
in repelling any attack, including launching non-nuclear attacks against the Mainland.38
When Ambassador Kirk arrived in Taipei in early July 1962 to meet with
President Chiang Kai-shek and Minister without Portfolio Chiang Ching-kuo, he
cautioned them about how important it was for it to seem that aggression was coming
from the Chinese Communists. President Chiang assured Kirk that the ROC would not
initiate Chinese hostilities for the sake of Quemoy and Matsu, but he warned that the
Communists might attack one of the smaller islands to see if and how the U.S. would
react. Kirk reiterated President Kennedy’s position that the U.S. would not send more
military assistance for offensive operations until it could obtain more complete
intelligence about the situation in the PRC. However, he did indicate that the two C-123s
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-119would be ready in October for the ROC to use.39 Chiang inquired about American press
reports that the United States had assured the PRC in informal talks at Warsaw that the
U.S. would not assist the ROC in its quest to retake the Mainland. Kirk misleadingly
replied that this was not correct. After receiving this reassurance, Chiang expressed his
confidence in full U.S. compliance with its commitments to the ROC, and stated that he
would not take any unilateral action without consulting with the United States.40
Ambassador Kirk concluded from his meeting that President Chiang and his son
were attempting to determine the real intentions of the United States. In a report to the
State Department, Kirk questioned whether the United States should provide bombers
and landing craft to the ROC, or whether granting them to Chiang’s government would
display American trust in the ROC and indicate the U.S. desire to help Chiang recover the
Mainland. Kirk stated that the cool American response to the ROC request for such
weapons was being taken by ROC officials as an indication of unwillingness to help.
Nevertheless, Kirk advised the State Department to delay such deliveries because the
types of material requested were obviously of an offensive nature and “its release to the
[ROC] cannot be concealed.”41
Ambassador Kirk understood that the United States had to walk a fine line
between refusing to commit itself to an ROC Mainland invasion and foreclosing any
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-120future possibility of a ROC role on the Mainland. Therefore, in August 1962, Kirk
proposed that the United States provide Chiang material on the condition that the U.S.
oversee Taiwanese military planning. Kirk also thought that ROC officials needed to
increase their intelligence-gathering and undertake, with American support, a contingency
study of their ability to attack the Mainland in the event of a Communist attack on the
Offshore Islands or in support of an uprising on the Mainland. If the ROC agreed to these
terms, Kirk recommended that the U.S. could move two C-123s to Taiwan for use with
reduced crews. This minimal military aid would allow the Kennedy administration to
back away from the previously approved 200-man drops because of the limited capacity
of the C-123s. Harriman agreed with Kirk’s proposal, which essentially ensured that
Chiang Kai-shek would not be able to launch an assault against Communist China with a
large number of paratroopers.42
Meanwhile, some ROC officials sought to plan an amphibious assault across the
Taiwan Strait.43 In late August, ROC officials requested an export license for two
hundred rubber rafts from the United States. Upon learning this, Ambassador Kirk
determined that they “doubtless” intended these boats, along with other equipment
supplied under the American Military Assistance Program (MAP), for an “eventual attack
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-121on mainland.”44 As the boats would not significantly affect ROC capabilities for
unilateral action, and as they could easily be obtained from Japan or elsewhere, Kirk saw
no point in refusing the export license. Rather than antagonizing ROC officials and
creating the impression that the United States did not trust the ROC to keep its word, the
Ambassador recommended granting the license request.45
Ambassador Kirk hoped that his September 6, 1962 meeting with Chiang Kaishek would settle issues concerning airborne and amphibious assaults against the
Mainland. Kirk notified Chiang that the U.S. would send two C-123s to Taiwan when
they were ready and the crews trained. However, after Chiang thanked Kirk for the
aircraft, the Ambassador further informed Chiang that President Kennedy refused to
provide Chiang with the bombers and landing craft because “they would certainly appear
aggressive in character.”46 Through the discussion, Kirk learned that Chiang wanted to
go further and airdrop larger teams to seize cities and rally the people to the Nationalist
cause. When Chiang asked what the American response would be if large-scale rebellion
broke out on the Mainland, Kirk remained non-committal, but assured him that President
Kennedy and his advisors would have to examine the situation closely before making any
decisions.47 Chiang then warned Kirk that if the Kennedy administration prevented the
ROC from going ahead with these airdrop plans, he would have great difficulty
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-122maintaining the confidence of President Chiang and his army.48
The efforts of Kirk, Harriman, and others seemed to pay dividends. By the
beginning of October, American officials in Taiwan noted a decrease in invasion rhetoric
coming from the Taiwanese government and press. Ralph Clough observed that the ROC
drive to attack the Mainland, though not abandoned, had been forced into “low gear.”
Conversations between U.S. and Taiwanese officials concerning a possible
“counterattack” no longer expressed urgency. There were also no new reports of “forceddraft” activities, which indicated that military training was returning to normal.49
Nevertheless, the ROC continued to launch small-scale intelligence gathering
operations against the Mainland. These operations, which had begun during the Korean
War, had sunk a number of PRC vessels and had attempted to land Nationalist soldiers to
obtain and relay intelligence.50 A December 1962 report by the Central Intelligence
Agency noted that the ROC was using fishing boats as “motherships” to land infiltration

48

Ibid. Delivery of the C-123s remained in dispute until February 1963. United
States and ROC officials argued over control and ownership of the aircraft and how the
aircraft were to be used. President Kennedy proposed to send the aircraft to Taiwan but
keep them under U.S. control and ownership with ROC crews. The aircraft were to be
used in South Vietnam and in mainland operations only with agreement of both ROC and
U.S. officials. According to Ralph Clough, Kennedy’s proposal appeared to have been
well-received by President Chiang and his son. See note, Letter from John F. Kennedy to
Chiang Kai-shek, February 15, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 347; Memorandum from Ralph
Clough to W. Averell Harriman, March 2, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 352.
49

Airgram from Ralph Clough to Department of State, October 12, 1962, Box 25a,
China, Cables, 9/5/62-10/15/62, NSF, JFKL.
50

Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Uncertain Friendships: Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the
United States, 1945-1992 (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1994), 64; Interview with
Arthur Hummel, in Tucker, China Confidential, 210-11.

-123teams on the Mainland.51 According to the report, the ROC’s Intelligence Bureau of the
Ministry of National Defense (IBMND) stated that Chinese Communist forces had
intercepted and sunk one such fishing boat and captured its crew. The report suggested
that the PRC had increased its vigilance against infiltration along its coast.52
The adverse press reaction from Mainland China and elsewhere led Ambassador
Kirk to complain to Taiwan’s Foreign Minister Shen that the United States was being
criticized in the world press because of Chinese Nationalist activity in the Taiwan Strait.
Shen admitted that “with some regret Chinats [Chinese Nationalists] had fallen into
trap.”53 Kirk stated emphatically that the U.S. would not do anything that might lead to
accusations of aggression against the mainland, and accused the ROC of “penetrating the
mainland with guerrillas, agents, etc. in preparation for ‘counter offensive.’”54
One analyst grew concerned that these continued attempts by the ROC to launch
small-scale operations would result in drawing the United States further into its plans for
a full-scale invasion. Thomas L. Hughes of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence
and Research reported that a total of nine small ROC intelligence-gathering teams had
been captured by the Chinese Communists throughout 1962. As a result, Hughes
concluded that the ROC would seek greater American assistance for larger operations,
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-124perhaps with a view to landing one or more 200-man teams on the Mainland. He
predicted that the ROC would probably also request additional American equipment,
including aircraft.55
As Chiang Kai-shek continued his unilateral intelligence-gathering operations,
Ambassador Kirk returned to the United States in early February 1963 to consult with
President Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy. Kirk observed that Chiang and other ROC
officials were once again exhibiting symptoms of “spring fever,” publicly stating that the
time to retake the Mainland “was ripe, now or never.”56 Kirk further reported that Chiang
was building landing craft, training soldiers in a new airborne division, and, while
professing he would never violate the terms of the Mutual Defense Treaty, his military
preparations continued.57 In his final, March 29, memorandum to President Kennedy,
Kirk stated that the United States faced great decisions concerning Taiwan, especially
whether or not “the retention of the island of Taiwan in friendly hands is vital to the
interests of the United States,” and “how and when are we going to make it clear to
President Chiang that a feeble attempt to assault the Mainland . . . cannot and will not be
tolerated.”58 American military and economic assistance had been designed for defense
purposes only. The ROC Air Force and Navy did not have the power to conduct a large-
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-125scale invasion. Kirk warned that Chiang Kai-shek could not be given any opportunity to
“circumvent his Treaty with the United States.”59 He also suggested that public
statements be made to Chiang and the ROC government “that we will defend Taiwan but
we will not countenance aggression initiated by the Chinese Government now on
Taiwan.”60 These proved to be Kirk’s final words on China policy. Due to illness, Kirk
stepped down as Ambassador to the ROC, returned to the United States, and died several
months later.
The Kennedy administration continued to urge restraint on Chiang Kai-shek. In
an April 11 letter, President Kennedy reminded him that the U.S. did not have “sufficient
information to make firm judgements on vital questions such as the will and ability of the
Chinese people to rise up successfully against their Communist masters.” Additionally,
Kennedy contended that there was no way the United States could be absolved of any
involvement if and when the ROC invaded the Mainland unilaterally. The United States
Government, concluded the president, had to exercise caution with regard to the ROC
program of action against the PRC while continuing to work closely with members of the
ROC’s government to check Communist expansion in Asia. The United States, Kennedy
concluded, “cannot acquiesce in military action against the China mainland.”61
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-126The following month, after meeting with Foreign Minister Shen, Ralph Clough
cabled the State Department that the mainland recovery program of the ROC seemed to
be stagnant. President Chiang had not yet raised the question of invasion with the new
ambassador, retired Admiral Jerauld Wright. Although the ROC was better prepared for
amphibious operations than a year ago, there were no reports of Chiang setting readiness
deadlines. Similarly, the Taiwanese press had not commented on a possible invasion for
months. Paramilitary operations had been limited to small-scale probes, and, according to
Clough, each of these ventures had been unsuccessful, despite Taiwanese press claims to
the contrary. According to Clough, the failure of the ROC’s guerrilla probes, the
difficulties associated with amphibious operations, and the failure to convince American
policy makers that the time was right for mainland operations had effectively slowed the
ROC’s drive to launch a large-scale invasion of the Mainland.62
By September, however, evidence of continuing invasion preparations began to
trickle in. In that month, the ROC sent President Kennedy an aide-mémoire concerning
the on-going small-scale intelligence raids designed to convince Kennedy to “render
positive support to our [ROC] infiltration operations.”63 The memo proposed infiltration
operations against the mainland to turn the anti-communist sentiments of the people into
a “raging fire of anti-Communist actions and to merge these actions into a unified

62

Airgram from Ralph Clough to Department of State, September 3, 1963, FRUS
1961-63 Microfiche, Document 63.
63

“Aide Memoire to His Excellency President J. F. Kennedy Regarding the GRC’s
Basic Viewpoint on Counter-Offensive,” n.d., FRUS 1961-63 Microfiche, Document 65.

-127resistance revolutionary movement.”64 Following the creation of such a movement, the
ROC proposed either to open a military assault against the mainland or infiltrate the
PRC’s southern provinces to coordinate resistance and instigate a counter-offensive
against the PRC. According to the memo, “the proper thing . . . to do is, of course, to
adopt the first course of action at once,”65 but the ROC was prepared to follow the second
option in consultation with the United States. The memo warned that if the ROC
postponed actions and if the U.S. did not assist, the ROC government would lose its
citizens’ allegiance and the island would fall to the communists, irreparably harming
American security and interests.66
On September 11, 1963, President Kennedy met with Chiang Ching-kuo in the
White House. In what was probably a heated exchange, Chiang, on behalf of his father,
stated that “the United States and the [ROC] should get together and take advantage of
the present situation.”67 He requested five C-130 aircraft, in addition to the C-123's
requested earlier, and landing craft to conduct raids against the mainland coast and hoped
this support would create greater disruption on the mainland and would provide the
assistance needed “to seize one or more of the provinces south of the Yangtze [River]
when the time is ripe.” Kennedy, mindful of the Bay of Pigs disaster, concluded that the
United States “did not wish to become involved in military operations where our role

64

Ibid.

65

Ibid.

66

Ibid.

67

Memorandum of Conversation, September 11, 1963, FRUS 1961-63, 386-92.

-128would inevitably become known and which would end in failure.”68 There was just not
enough hard intelligence to commit American resources to Chiang’s dream. The
President concluded that U.S. “policy should be determined by reality and not by our
hopes or optimism.”69 Nonetheless, the U.S. would continue to study ROC proposals for
additional assistance and “would work closely with [ROC] officials to develop detailed
intelligence so that any action would fit the actual situation.”70

Walt W. Rostow’s “Basic National Security Policy”
While the Kennedy administration attempted to prevent the crisis in the Taiwan
Strait from becoming an all-out war between the PRC and the ROC, State Department
staffers in the Policy Planning Council initiated a plan to moderate the American policy
toward the communist world, including the PRC. Walt W. Rostow, the newly appointed
Director of the State Department’s Policy Planning Council, authored this report entitled
“Basic National Security Policy.” Rostow had long been a supporter of President
Kennedy and had played an active role in his presidential campaign as a foreign policy
consultant and as a speech writer.
The report suggested that the United States and the Soviet Union could negotiate
agreements over areas of mutual interest. The Soviet Union would not “deliberately take
actions which would bring about a general nuclear war,” a war that no one could win.

68

Ibid.

69

Ibid.

70

Ibid.

-129Both the United States and the Soviet Union would be destroyed. The United States and
its allies, therefore, would have “to develop a fuller range of military capabilities, capable
of covering as much as feasible of the free community, if they are to create a stable
overall military environment.”71
Rostow and the Policy Planning Council also hoped that this threat of mutual
destruction from a nuclear war would modify U.S. relations with Communist China. The
report proposed to use both the “carrot” and the “stick” toward the Chinese Communists.
While the United States would use force to deter Chinese Communist aggression, the
United States would not initiate such aggression itself. The report also stated:
Concurrently, we should leave ajar possibilities for expanding commercial,
cultural and other contacts with Communist China, by making clear that the bar to
the entrance of Communist China into more normal relations with the U.S. is its
basic unwillingness to modify its present aggressive policies.72
But while the United States worked toward normalization of relations with the PRC,
Rostow stated that the U.S. should continue to work with the ROC. The United States
should “make plain our enduring commitment to sustain and defend a free government on
Taiwan,” but the ROC’s insistence on defense of the Offshore Islands threatened longterm U.S. interests.73 Therefore, the United States should use its leverage to encourage
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-130Taiwan either to “withdraw its forces from the [Offshore] islands or to regard the islands
as outposts to be garrisoned . . . if and when this can be done without damage to our
position in the Far East.”74 Although Rostow did not specifically call for a “two Chinas”
policy, the report very clearly stated that the United States should maintain relations with
both the PRC and the ROC. Rostow could not openly advocate “two Chinas,” but he
could certainly test the waters of public opinion.
Rostow hoped that a national publicity campaign would promote this newly
proposed policy to the rest of the country, but the report was “leaked” to the conservative
Chicago Tribune and several other newspapers and news magazines before its official
approval.75 Rostow and others might even have hoped to use this “leak” to test the waters
of public opinion toward possible changes in China policy. Criticizing Rostow’s
initiative on the floor of the House of Representatives, Paul B. Dague (R-Pennsylvania)
argued that “two Chinas” was “unrealistic and illogical.”76 Later, on June 26, 1962,
Rostow and Undersecretary of State George Ball testified before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. When asked specific questions about “Basic National Security
Policy,” Ball instructed Rostow to claim “executive privilege” and not answer the
questions. According to Ball, the controversial paper was a working draft and had not yet
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-131been approved by President Kennedy.
Committee reaction to Rostow’s and Ball’s testimony split along party lines.
Senate Minority Leader Everett Dirksen (R-Illinois) asked Ball, “When do we see the
document?” Ball replied that the President would consider sending the document to
Capitol Hill if the committee made a formal request. Leaving the hearing, Senator
Dirksen commented that this hearing was only “round one.” “All we got were views and
opinions . . . There are spaces still to be filled . . . I still have concern about our foreign
policy.”77 Dirksen also demanded that the committee take up the issue with Secretary of
State Dean Rusk. On the other hand, committee chairman J. William Fulbright (DArkansas) said the hearing was “one of the most interesting and informative hearings
we’ve ever had.” Fulbright had no objection to calling Rusk to testify on the report, but
he insisted that the committee did not have the right to demand access to a working paper
from the president.78
Understandably, Rostow’s initiative provoked grave concern in the ROC. When
T. F. Tsiang, ROC Ambassador to the United States, met with Dean Rusk in early July
1962 to discuss the Chinese Communist military buildup, he noted that opinion in Taiwan
had become alarmed by Rostow’s report and his “two Chinas” suggestion.79 This would
inevitably mean, according to Tsiang, U.S. recognition of the PRC, the PRC’s admittance

77

“Rostow Balks Senate Policy Quiz,” Chicago Tribune, June 27, 1962, Section 1,

1:2, 2:7.
78

79

Ibid.

Telegram from Dean Rusk to the Embassy in the Republic of China, July 7,
1962, FRUS 1961-63, 291-92.

-132to the UN, and American neutralization of Taiwan. All of this was deemed unacceptable.
Rusk replied that he hoped the report would not be misleading or confusing and he would
consider Tsiang’s concerns, but he reassured him that “he did not want to give [the]
impression, however, that there would be any major change in our publicly stated
position.”80
At the same time, some congressional voices registered their dissent regarding
current U.S. policy toward Chiang and the ROC. Some argued that American financial
and military support for Taiwan was ineffective, others criticized Taiwan’s domestic
repression, and others supported the proposed “two Chinas” policy as a logical long-term
solution in the region. One of the most vocal of these critics of American policy toward
Taiwan was Senator Wayne L. Morse (D-Oregon). Morse and a coterie of Democratic
senators believed that the Kennedy administration should alter its foreign policy to
support reform-oriented leaders overseas, even if this meant losing control of some
strategic places on the globe.81 In July 1963, Morse argued for reducing American aid to
Taiwan. He stated that the Taiwanese Army had “more generals, who are receiving big,
fat pay, than the total number of generals in all of our Military Establishment. Talk about
featherbedding.” Morse contended that the large amount of money spent on Taiwan had
been wasted and further aid should be stopped because the island was already protected
by the Taiwan Strait and the United States’ Seventh Fleet. Morse also questioned the
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-133legitimacy of the Kuomintang’s rule in Taiwan. He argued that the people of Taiwan
“did not ask Chiang Kai-shek to take over; he was not their choice.”82 In his view, the
Taiwanese should have the chance “to decide whether they want to continue to be
governed by the Chiang Kai-shek regime.”83 Morse later raised questions concerning the
effectiveness of American aid, arguing that Taiwan already had an 80 percent literacy rate
and a high rate of industrial capacity before Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang
established their authority there.84
Meanwhile, other legislators continued to toe the well-established anti-communist
line in favor of maintaining the status quo in U.S.-ROC relations and opposing any form
of “two Chinas” policy out of distaste for Communist China. Representative Frank J.
Horton (R-New York) typified this view. In August 1963, Horton spoke out against the
PRC’s entry into the United Nations and any United States trade relations with
Communist China. “In the interest of national security and national honor,” stated
Horton, “we cannot abandon Quemoy and Matsu and sacrifice the lives of thousands of
free Chinese soldiers and the civilian population of these islands.”85
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-134The New Republic, a liberal editorial magazine, joined this debate over the “two
Chinas” issue in September 1963. Printed in the wake of Chiang Ching-kuo’s eleven-day
official state visit to the United States, the editorial described America’s policy toward
Taiwan as “ambiguous.” While the Kennedy administration supported two Germanies
and two Vietnams, it failed to support two Chinas. This was the fault of Chiang’s
dictatorial regime, the editorial claimed, ruling an island “police state” with a government
bankrolled by United States funding. 86
Clearly, Rostow’s initiative did not receive a groundswell of support, nor did it
immediately result in a change in China policy, but the report remains significant for
several reasons. Although the Kennedy administration never formally approved the
report, “Basic National Security Policy” acknowledged a shift in thinking at some levels
in the State Department. Possible changes in China policy, including a more
accommodating relationship with the PRC, were at least being discussed within the State
Department bureaucracy. This report did not bode well for the ROC, which claimed to be
the government of all China and continually labeled the Beijing regime illegitimate.
Nonetheless, this report would influence future public statements of foreign policy with
the communist world and might have influenced other State Department staffers to
further challenge the established policies of containment and isolation of the PRC.
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-135The Hilsman Speech
Bureaucratic changes in the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs further contributed to
the elevation of Mainland Chinese affairs on its agenda. Until 1962, a single China desk
had handled affairs concerning both the Taipei and Beijing regimes. To bring Mainland
Chinese affairs to the forefront, the Bureau in mid-1962 established two separate desks,
which included a Mainland China affairs desk and a Republic of China affairs desk. This
arrangement opened the door for the consideration of new policy ideas toward the PRC
and allowed them to filter higher up the State Department bureaucracy. By late
November 1963, the new Mainland China desk had been elevated, renamed the Office of
Asian Communist Affairs, and was separated from the Office of East Asian Affairs,
which handled matters concerning Japan, Korea and Taiwan. The Office of Asian
Communist Affairs could now freely access and influence policymaking.87 Within the
new Office of Asian Communist Affairs, staffers now had a degree of freedom to explore
new opportunities toward the PRC without running afoul of the more staunchly anticommunist China hands in the Office of East Asian Affairs.
These organizational changes soon began to bear fruit. The Kennedy
administration had initially considered Communist China an expansionist state that
threatened regional security in East Asia and had to be contained.88 A small group of
State Department staffers, including Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far
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-136Eastern Affairs, James C. Thomson, Jr., Special Assistant in the Bureau of Far Eastern
Affairs, Lindsey Grant of Mainland China Affairs, and Allen S. Whiting, Director of the
Office of Research for Far Eastern Affairs, contended that it was time to propose a more
realistic China policy. Believing that the remnants of the China Bloc and the China
Lobby would not mount much of a counterattack, they wrote a speech that outlined a
firm, flexible, and dispassionate policy toward Communist China. While the U.S. would
continue to support its allies firmly, in particular the Republic of China, and their
determination to halt communist aggression, the U.S. would also be willing to negotiate
with the Communist Chinese to analyze and discuss mutual problems and seek solutions
in their common interests. Once completed, the speech was sent to the White House and
to senior officials at State and Defense for approval. Notably, the speech cleared the
White House and the State Department without having been read by new President
Lyndon B. Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State Harriman, or Secretary Rusk, who
refused to go over the speech despite Hilsman’s request.89
Roger Hilsman delivered the televised speech at the Commonwealth Club in San
Francisco, California, on December 13, 1963. Hilsman stated that, in the past, “personal
betrayal” and “misapprehension of reality” had guided American policy toward China.90
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-137Instead, Hilsman echoed Rostow’s suggestions in “Basic National Security Policy” and
called for a China policy that sought to “keep the door open to the possibility of change
and not to slam it shut against any developments which might advance our national good,
serve the free world, and benefit the people of China.”91 He believed that the Chinese
Communists, like the Soviets, might be amenable toward reaching “limited agreements
which can bring some reduction” of danger between the United States and the PRC:
We believe that policies of strength and firmness, accompanied by a constant
readiness to negotiate – policies long and effectively pursued with the Soviet
Union – will best promote the changes which must take place on the China
mainland before we can hope to achieve long-sought conditions of peace, security,
and progress in this half of the globe.92
Although the ambassadorial-level talks between American and Chinese Communist
diplomats in Warsaw, Poland, had helped thaw relations somewhat, Hilsman called for
increased communication between the United States and mainland China. He concluded
that the United States:
. . . will not sow the dragon’s seed of hate which may bear bitter fruit in future
generations of China’s millions. But neither will we betray our interests and those
of our allies to appease the ambitions of Communist China’s leaders.93
Hilsman’s speech was the first public statement by a high-ranking State
Department official, suggesting that the United States wished to reach an accommodation
with the PRC if the PRC modified its hostility toward the United States. This did not
mean, however, that the U.S. would abandon the ROC. Hilsman clearly stated that the
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-138U.S. would continue to block Communist Chinese attempts to “commit aggression on its
free-world neighbors.”94
Public reaction to Hilsman’s speech into early 1964, as gauged by the New York
Times, suggested that attitudes toward the PRC might have softened and the time might
have been ripe for a reconsideration of China policy, but there was still no general public
movement for a change in China policy. A January 1964 Times editorial commented that,
despite the PRC’s problems in their domestic and foreign policy (specifically with the
Soviet Union), “the West must deal with two Chinas – one whose capital is in Peking and
the other on Taiwan.”95 A month later, Columnist C. L. Sulzberger stated that American
China policy needed to “distinguish between the effort to isolate Communist China and
the effort to prevent Communism as such, whether sponsored by Peking or by Moscow,
from spreading elsewhere in Asia.” Currently, American policy failed to “underscore the
distinction between the reality of protection from what was always unreality, the idea that
Chiang would overthrow Mao.”96 By May 1964, another Times editorial claimed that if
the ROC held a plebiscite for independence, and, if the ROC’s citizens voted in favor of
independence and the Peking regime approved, this “would bring into being a ‘ChinaTaiwan’ variant of the long-proposed ‘two Chinas’ solution.” Given that the PRC would
“ultimately . . . be admitted to the United Nations and accepted generally as the
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-139government of China,” a Taiwan independent of Beijing would be “the best solution for
which the West can hope.”97
One editorial column and one magazine article published in the New York Times
also criticized aspects of American policy toward the Republic of China. A full-length
article published in New York Times Magazine in March 1964 featured Chiang Kai-shek
and the Kuomintang. Written by Tillman Durdin, who had spent three months observing
the Kuomintang government in 1963, the article described Chiang and the Kuomintang as
Mainland refugees who squelched domestic dissent to maintain their rule and pressured
the United States government to expand the Vietnam War into North Vietnam with the
ROC’s assistance so that Chiang could retake the Mainland. Durdin stated that, despite
Kuomintang claims of economic prosperity and military strength, “the manifestations of
equanimity and business-as-usual belie new weakness and uncertainties in the Nationalist
position that characteristically are minimized by Nationalist leaders in public and may not
even be fully acknowledged in private.” Such weaknesses and uncertainties included
American and allied approaches to the PRC and shifting priorities in the White House
and State Department.98
Despite the New York Times’ criticism of U.S. policy toward China, academics
supportive of the ROC government lodged their complaints about “two Chinas” in letters
to the editor. Li Tieh-tseng, Professor of History and Government at the University of

97

“Self-Determination for Taiwan,” Editorial, New York Times, May 19, 1964,

36:2.
98

Tillman Durdin, “Chiang Still Dreams His Dream,” New York Times Magazine,
March 22, 1964, 18, 111-12.

-140Hartford, wrote a letter to the Times that condemned any future changes in policy toward
the ROC. Li argued that American “recognition of the Nationalist Government in Taiwan
as “the only legitimate government of China cannot be reconciled with a two-China
position.” Any “two Chinas” solution would only serve to strengthen the American
relationship with Western Europe. Rather, the United States needed an “agonizing
reappraisal” of its relationship with the ROC and, in the end, should “help the
Generalissimo to realize his claim over the mainland China.”99 Another such letter from
Stanley K. Hornbeck, formerly director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and special
assistant to the Secretary of State during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration,
contended that any “two Chinas” policy would eventually cause the ROC to be ethnically,
socially, politically, and economically “annexed” by the PRC.100

Conclusion
By the end of 1963, American officials grew increasingly frustrated with President
Chiang Kai-shek and the status of China policy. Despite the Kennedy administration’s
military support, Chiang continued to press for American military assistance to secure his
dream of retaking the Mainland. Chiang used his American supporters, such as Everett
Drumright and Ray Cline, to deliver requests on his behalf. But when administration
officials checked Chiang’s proposals and thereby delayed any invasion hopes, the
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-141embattled ROC President changed tactics, probably believing that launching small-scale
intelligence raids against the mainland would prompt U.S. policymakers to change their
minds. This action only aggravated Kennedy and possibly forced the hands of several
State Department officials, such as Walt Rostow and Roger Hilsman, who had been
considering alternatives to China policy. The American public, however, was not yet
ready for sweeping changes in China policy, as evidenced by the fact that Rostow’s and
Hilsman’s proposals did not receive a broad base of legislative or public support.

CHAPTER V
THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
AND CHINA POLICY, 1964-65
Vice President Lyndon B. Johnson became President of the United States after
John F. Kennedy’s tragic assassination in November 1963. The new president, who had
limited foreign policy experience prior to occupying the White House, inherited a China
policy which seemed to be in transition. Meanwhile, Johnson escalated the Vietnam War
and, by the end of 1965, the war became a major American conflagration. Chiang Kaishek saw an opportunity to use the Vietnam War as a means to further his dream of
returning to the Mainland. Once again, Chiang contacted his supporters in the U.S.
government to present his views. Even his wife, May-lin Soong (Madame Chiang Kaishek), visited the United States to rally support. At the same time, the Johnson
administration experienced increasing difficulty sustaining international support for
maintaining the ROC’s seat in the United Nations. When it became apparent to some
U.S. policymakers that Chiang’s dream threatened to draw the United States into a larger
war with the PRC, a dual policy of containment emerged which proposed to contain both
communist aggression and Chiang’s ambitions.

-142-

-143Johnson Administration and the ROC in Indochina, 1964-65
Chiang Kai-shek soon presented the new American president with a potentially
dangerous request regarding Indochina. In early 1964, Chiang requested that the ROC be
allowed to assist the United States and South Vietnam in their fight against communism.
President Johnson then turned to Robert W. Komer of the National Security Council staff
for advice. Komer warned Johnson that Chiang had previously wished to create a defense
pact between the ROC, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and South Vietnam, step up action
against the Mainland Chinese, and send combat troops to Vietnam. Komer worried that
any serious American setbacks in Southeast Asia could cause Chiang and his Nationalist
government to be overthrown in two years. Komer shared Secretary of State Dean Rusk’s
apprehensions about escalating ROC involvement in the region and doubted that any
alliance between South Vietnam and the ROC, or any Nationalist troop commitment to
the conflict in Vietnam, would be worth the risk of massive Chinese Communist
intervention in Southeast Asia. Therefore, Komer advised Johnson that whenever Chiang
requested that ROC troops be allowed to fight in Vietnam, American diplomats should
politely tell Chiang that his concerns were serious and were being studied but that they
should make no commitment to the ROC president.
For the moment, Johnson followed Komer’s advice. He reminded Chiang that his
views were much valued and promised timely consultations, but he replied vaguely to
Chiang’s offer to send troops. Johnson tactfully stated:
We recognize that your Government is already making a significant contribution
to assist the valiant people of South Vietnam, and we believe that there may be
additional areas for cooperation between your Government and the Government of

-144the Republic of Vietnam.1
While Johnson did not give his consent for increased ROC assistance to South Vietnam,
he nevertheless left the door open for future activity.
Indeed, Komer fully expected Chiang to try to exploit the war in Vietnam for his
own diplomatic and military goals and he began to draft a contingency plan for President
Johnson. Noting that the conflict in Vietnam could potentially destabilize Southeast
Asia, Komer warned that “almost every leader in Asia . . . is watching clearly how the
Johnson team tackles its first major foreign test.” He was especially concerned about
Thailand, the Philippines, the ROK, and Nationalist China, whose leaders, Komer
claimed, were “all nervous as cats.”2 Despite Johnson’s efforts to placate Chiang, Komer
worried that Chiang would continue publicly to pledge increased involvement in
Southeast Asia, especially in Vietnam. In a March 16 memorandum to Johnson, Komer
predicted that Chiang would keep calling for a stronger anti-communist posture in
Southeast Asia, including a military alliance between the ROC, the ROK and South
Vietnam. Komer also predicted that Chiang would encourage sending Nationalist
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-145Chinese and ROK combat troops into Vietnam to help the Americans. Komer warned the
president that it was important to continue to “fob off” Chiang because his ideas had
serious drawbacks, threatened regional peace and endangered American goals in
Vietnam.3 In summary, Komer concluded that Chiang Kai-shek and the ROC should be
“held back” from making substantial contributions to South Vietnam, thereby containing
any threat of widening the Vietnam War into a larger Southeast Asian conflict.
Not all administration officials shared Komer’s views. By 1964, Director of
Central Intelligence John McCone advocated including ROC combat forces in military
operations in South Vietnam. In early 1964, McCone traveled to South Vietnam to learn
about and observe the political and military weaknesses within the Army of the Republic
of Vietnam (ARVN) and the South Vietnamese government. McCone concluded that the
United States should allow the deployment of “two or three” Chinese Nationalist
divisions into the southern tip of the Mekong River Delta to assist American forces.
Given that the Viet Cong had increased its strength in the delta region, McCone worried
that American efforts were “too little, too late.”4
As anticipated, at the end of March 1964, Chiang unveiled his latest ideas for
ROC involvement in Vietnam. The ROC president proposed that mutual security
arrangements between the ROC, the ROK, and the government of South Vietnam include
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-146South Korean uniformed forces in South Vietnam. On March 21, 1964, U.S.
Ambassador to the ROC Jerauld Wright informed Secretary Rusk that Chiang would
approve the use of ROK troops in Vietnam and would later urge the use of ROC troops.5
Three days later, Chiang insisted that the Republic of China, the ROK, and South
Vietnam “should ally [them]selves in political action to utilize [the] opportunity to fight
Communists” and cut supply and communication lines to North Vietnam from China’s
southern provinces. Chiang further insinuated that if he were a Pentagon staff officer, he
would order ROC guerrilla operations along North Vietnam’s border area with southern
China. Chiang promised that these irregular troops would not harm American interests
and would not precipitate a global war. Three years earlier, Chiang had proposed a
guerrilla warfare plan, whereby ROC irregular soldiers based in northern Burma would
fight the North Vietnamese, but he had withdrawn the plan under strong pressure from the
State Department.6
When Ambassador Wright failed to quell Chiang’s plans, Secretary Rusk traveled
to Taiwan in mid-April 1964 to meet with Chiang personally. Rusk told Chiang that he
had no final opinion concerning Chiang’s proposed alliance of anti-communist Far
Eastern nations, but he did not see what the Chinese Nationalists, the South Koreans and
the South Vietnamese could do without the United States because they could act together
militarily only in the event of war with Communist China and only if the United States
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-147provided significant assistance. Additionally, the South Vietnamese could not
substantially contribute to such an alliance because of their ongoing war with North
Vietnam and the Viet Cong. The chief question, according to Rusk, was how much could
this proposed alliance help Vietnam. Chiang insisted that it would strengthen confidence
among the people of the three parties. He noted that the South Koreans had already
responded enthusiastically to the idea, but he had not yet proposed it to the South
Vietnamese. Rusk, heeding Komer’s advice, replied vaguely to Chiang that his
suggestions needed further study. 7 Later, on the South Vietnamese leg of his Far Eastern
tour, Secretary of State Rusk further clarified his policy toward a Southeast Asian anticommunist alliance and declared in this report that the United States “did not encourage
an alliance and believed particularly that the issue of Southeast Asia should not get mixed
with the enormous issue of the basic Chinese conflict.”8
Meanwhile, the United States became increasingly involved in the war in
Vietnam. In August 1964, the Gulf of Tonkin incident and subsequent congressional
passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution slowly pushed the United States into a major
military conflict. The resolution authorized Johnson, without time limit, “to take all
necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and
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-148to prevent further aggression.”9 Indeed, the Vietnam War became “the central
preoccupation of United States foreign policy after 1964.”10 As a result, the Johnson
administration focused more attention on events related to Vietnam.
Shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin incident, the recurring problem of ROC irregular
troops in Burma flared up again. In early September 1964, Rusk cabled Ambassador
Wright and stated the United States had probably done enough to make its position clear
to the ROC concerning Taiwanese irregular soldiers in the northern Thailand-Burma-Laos
border area. The Burmese Foreign Office, however, continued to be concerned over
reports of “‘legitimate KMT [Kuomintang Party]’ activities in the border area under
direction of GRC [Government of the Republic of China] officials in Thailand.” This
issue, warned Rusk, continued to be an issue of concern for the United States and had to
be addressed at the highest levels with the ROC. Rusk stated that the United States
would “do everything possible [to] assure that [the] GRC does not undertake excessive or
indiscreet actions, as they have in [the] past, which could needlessly complicate our
problems” in Southeast Asia. Rusk concluded that the ROC “has a natural tendency to go
beyond what we consider [the] limits of prudence and to be less candid with us in doing
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-149so.”11
In November 1964, President Chiang again suggested to President Johnson that
the ROC should play a greater role in Southeast Asia. Komer and National Security
Advisor McGeorge Bundy believed that Chiang intended both to remind President
Johnson of the ROC’s regional concerns and to encourage the new president to re-think
China policy.12 Chiang warned Johnson that the Chinese Communists represented the
greatest menace to peace in Asia. They had already turned most of Southeast Asia into a
battlefield, he claimed, and would fight until all of Southeast Asia, especially Taiwan,
came under their domination. Chiang proposed, however, that only Asian people should
fight and defeat the Communists, with the United States providing tactical and technical
training and logistic support. In the conflict in Vietnam, Chiang warned, the Chinese
Communists intended to draw the United States into a protracted war, where Communist
guerrillas would “counter American military aid and [. . .] mire the United States in an
inconclusive war. . . . Without committing their own armed forces, the Chinese
Communists will have won the war.”13 After establishing their puppet regime in
Vietnam, the Chinese Communists would act against Laos and Cambodia, then Thailand
and Malaysia. Chiang further warned that:
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-150unless the United States assumes the role of leadership and makes victory its
primary goal, the anti-communist forces in Asia . . . will become easy prey to
Communist infiltration and subversion, and rapid deterioration ending in the
supreme tragedy of defeat and destruction will be inevitable.14
Ultimately, any American plan to end the Vietnam war quickly, according to Chiang,
should include Asians fighting for themselves to overthrow the Chinese Communists.15
This position encountered some support from certain members of Congress.
Senator John C. Stennis (D-Mississippi) received a letter from a constituent suggesting
that the United States allow Chiang the opportunity to attack the Communist Chinese.
The constituent wrote that “Asians should be permitted to fight for their own freedoms,
and Free China should not be stopped from helping Americans fight as was done in
Formosa.” Stennis replied that “there is certainly a lot to be said for this course of action,
but many seem to feel that his [Chiang’s] value as a potential threat to Red China is far
greater than in any success he could accomplish in an outright invasion, unless, of course,
the United States fully committed itself to assist him with troops, weapons, ships, and
planes.”16 Stennis advocated that the ROC’s military forces be used to help stop the
spread of Communism in Asia. In the February 20, 1965, edition of the Washington
Report, Stennis’s newsletter to his constituents, the Mississippian stated that: “We must
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-151seek new ways to provide South Vietnam with the military capability to defend that
country . . . Why not utilize the manpower of Chiang Kai-shek and other Asians whose
stake in the cause of freedom is at least as great as our own?”17
By November 1964, Robert W. Komer suggested that American escalation of the
Vietnam War could be part of a larger “get tough” policy toward the Chinese
Communists. Komer suggested to McGeorge Bundy that “increased [American]
pressure in Vietnam” would permit greater flexibility on the Chinese representation issue.
A tougher American stance in Vietnam and fear that the United States would step up its
activities in Indochina, according to Komer, “can hardly be taken as a sign of undue
weakness to be flexible on Chirep [Chinese UN representation].” The United States
could look as though it were being tough on the Chinese Communists, who were believed
to be behind all the troubles in Vietnam, while it sought a means to include the PRC in
the UN. Komer believed that keeping the PRC out of the UN was not the best way to
protect Taiwan. He suggested that the United States “stem the rapid erosion of Taiwan’s
international position by getting it internationally recognized that China is a divided
country [like Germany, Korea, and Vietnam].”18 Komer’s memo was significant because
it highlighted the link between American escalation in Vietnam and China policy.
In December 1964, McGeorge Bundy met with ROC Ambassador T. F. Tsiang to
discuss the situation in Vietnam. Bundy informed Tsiang that the United States would
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-152step up military activity in South Vietnam and would probably increase retaliatory
pressure against North Vietnam some time in the future. If North Vietnamese support to
the Viet Cong were cut off, Bundy believed that the conflict could be controlled within
six months to two years. Probably thinking that time was of the essence if the ROC were
to involve themselves in Vietnam, Tsiang inquired about regional assistance to the South
Vietnamese. Taking as his reference Philippine assistance to South Vietnam, Tsiang
questioned whether the United States had changed its policy against ROC combat troops
in Vietnam, to which Bundy replied in the negative. But, as Komer and Rusk had
recommended earlier, Bundy suggested to Tsiang that American and Nationalist Chinese
policymakers might wish to discuss this question further after a thorough review of
needs.19
Tsiang probably was not satisfied with Bundy’s response. A month later, he met
with Secretary Rusk concerning the American effort in Vietnam. When he asked Rusk
about the main problem Americans faced in Vietnam, Rusk replied that the lack of unity
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-153within the South Vietnamese government was “complicating our efforts to get more
international support for Viet-Nam.” Not wanting to give Tsiang an opening to request
the deployment of ROC ground troops or any increased overt ROC involvement, Rusk
quickly stated that some of the South Vietnamese leaders had had second thoughts and
were suspending their personal problems for the sake of the unity of their country. 20
At the end of 1964, the State Department studied the effects of using ROC forces
outside their territorial boundaries. Josiah W. Bennett, a staffer in the Office of East
Asian Affairs in the State Department, argued that a proposed deployment of an ROC
engineering unit to South Vietnam “would provoke Chinese Communist retaliation.”
Even the presence of uniformed ROC troops not involved in combat or military
operations “would provide the Chinese Communists with a ready made pretext should
they decide to intervene more directly in Viet-Nam themselves.” In addition, sending
either uniformed or non-uniformed ROC troops to Vietnam “would detract from the
image we have attempted to build of a peaceful Taiwan,” and would considerably harm
the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations. Bennett concluded that Taiwan
should expand the technical and economic assistance it already provided to Vietnam, but
doubted that this would satisfy Chiang’s desire to become more actively involved in the
Vietnam conflict.21 Meanwhile, Norman W. Getsinger of the ROC Desk in the State

20

Memorandum of Conversation, January 6, 1965, Box 238, China Memos Vol.
III, NSF, LBJL.
21

Memorandum from Josiah W. Bennett to Marshall Green, December 18, 1964,
Box 2, Defense Affairs, Armed Forces, 1964, Record Group 59, General Records of the
Department of State, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Office of East Asian Affairs, Central
Files, 1947-1964, National Archives II, College Park, MD, hereafter cited as RG59,

-154Department also believed that sending this Nationalist Chinese engineering unit to
Vietnam would probably “not mean the export of the Chinese civil war to Vietnam, but it
could be used as a pretext for some kind of Chicom intervention if they were seeking
one.” Getsinger further warned that propaganda from Beijing “against the increased GRC
presence [in Vietnam] is bound to make our allies nervous.”22
Regardless of Bennett’s and Getsinger’s concerns, a February 1965 State
Department report suggested that Republic of China military forces could be successfully
utilized outside Taiwan. Only one or two divisions could be spared for South Vietnam or
Laos, however, without harming the ROC’s ability to defend itself. Even then, the report
envisaged using these troops in non-combat roles. Should the administration decide to
use ROC troops in some type of international force in Vietnam:
Chinese Nationalist combat ground troops could be included without undue risk
of provoking Chinese Communist military action. Their location would be
sufficiently removed from Mainland China so that they could scarcely be regarded
as provocative or creating any danger to the security of the Communist regime.
Any Nationalist contingent, the report recommended, should be small in number and,
presumably, under American command and control “so that there would not be any
serious temptation to the GRC to seize the opportunity to mount embarrassing initiatives
or involve us in conflicts which do not serve our interests.” The report further
recommended that:
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-155it might even be worthwhile to use Chinese Nationalist forces in South Vietnam
and/or the Laos Panhandle to provoke the entry of Chinese Communist volunteers
or open forces in North Vietnam. This would then make it manifest that Hanoi
has become increasingly under the control of Peiping. This kind of approach,
however, raises the risk level.23
Despite the division of opinion that existed in the State Department concerning
ROC policy and the war in Vietnam, President Johnson ultimately became convinced that
it would be unwise for the ROC to become directly involved in Vietnam for a variety of
reasons. The United States, most of all, did not “want to risk export of the Chinese civil
war to Southeast Asia or give Peiping a pretext for stronger military actions” supporting
the Hanoi regime.24
Johnson also realized that the PRC might well intervene more openly in Vietnam
if the Nationalist Chinese sent combat troops. Journalist and “China-watcher” Edgar
Snow, in a report entitled “If China Intervenes in North Vietnam,” argued that the war in
Vietnam would “snowball into a regional, large-scale war” involving Communist and
Nationalist China, Vietnam, Thailand and Korea. Snow also predicted that President
Chiang, without American support, would launch an attack against Mainland China.25
Snow’s report foreshadowed a much larger Southeast Asian war if Communist China
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-156increased its intervention in North Vietnam. Such thinking persuaded President Johnson
that it was imperative to ensure that the ROC did not provoke Communist China into
intervening further. In short, as with the Chinese representation debates and both the
Taiwan Strait and Mainland invasion crises, Chiang had to be reined in.
As President Johnson ordered the first American combat troops into South
Vietnam in 1965, the debate over the war’s cost further complicated United States
relations with the ROC. Senator John C. Stennis (D-Mississippi) and Representative
Lucius Mendel Rivers (D-South Carolina) predicted that the war in Vietnam would cost
nearly $10 billion for the fiscal year ending June 1966. Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara later estimated the war would cost between $15 and $21 billion per year out
of a $71 billion Pentagon budget.26 In fact, by the end of 1967, the war’s cost was more
than $2 billion per month.27 Feeling pressured to find money to fund the military venture
in Vietnam, some State Department officials suggested that military and non-military aid
programs to the ROC and others be reduced, but they met dissent. Norman W. Getsinger
of the ROC Desk in the State Department warned that a proposed reduction in the fiscal
year 1965 Military Assistance Program “would be a heavy blow in a current series of
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-157blows to GRC confidence in US support”28 and “would seriously weaken our ability to
influence the actions of the GRC and at the same time contribute to current pressures
upon internal stability in Taiwan.”29 Getsinger feared Chiang would, as he had in 1962,
take resources from the civilian economy and “attempt desperate military and diplomatic
initiatives that could precipitate armed conflict with the Chinese Communists.”30
Indeed, in March 1965, President Chiang complained to Ambassador Wright that
he was not satisfied with his share of the Military Assistance Program. He could not
understand “why items already appropriated for and programmed have not been
delivered” and demanded that the ROC “should receive highest priority in military aid
next after South Vietnam.” Chiang believed that the U.S. Military Aid Program was
critical to his country and the United States Government had not given the ROC “enough
priority in delivery of military priority items and urged Wright send this message to
Washington.” Wright commented that Chiang had not been kept up to date by his aides
on the details of programs and deliveries, despite the fact that the Military Assistance
Advisory Group (MAAG) had made all pertinent information available to the ROC.31
President Chiang next directed his discontent toward President Johnson’s March
25 statement on Vietnam. Johnson asserted that while “the United States still seeks no
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-158wider war . . . I am ready to go anywhere at any time, and meet with anyone whenever
there is promise of progress toward an honorable peace.”32 Two weeks later, Chiang
complained that Johnson’s statement offered “unconditional discussions” to the North
Vietnamese and indicated a weakening of the U.S. position. Ambassador Wright, who
met with Chiang later that day, tried to convince Chiang that the speech did not indicate
any change in American policy or softening of American attitudes toward the Communist
Chinese and the North Vietnamese. After his meeting, Wright believed that Chiang, as
he had done many times in the past, had deliberately exaggerated his doubts to stall any
possible change in American policy.33
On April 23, 1965, the American Ambassador to South Vietnam, Henry Cabot
Lodge, Jr., and Ambassador Wright met with President Chiang Kai-shek to allay his
apparent fears concerning changes in American policy toward the ROC during the course
of American fighting in Vietnam. Lodge assured Chiang of American appreciation for
ROC assistance to the United States in Vietnam, such as the stationing of American
aircraft on Taiwan and ROC aid to Vietnam. Lodge reminded Chiang that the problem in
Vietnam was a “problem of vital concern to Southeast Asia” and the world. Chiang
retorted that American action in Vietnam had done nothing to halt Chinese Communist
involvement in North Vietnam, which included both “volunteers” and trained officers.
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-159When Lodge replied that “no Communist Chinese officer had ever been captured nor the
body of one found,” Chiang said he knew for a fact that PRC officers were involved in
Vietnam and were taking great care not to be captured. As it was difficult to tell the
difference between Chinese bodies and those of deceased North Vietnamese soldiers, and
as the PRC troops had adopted North Vietnamese names and uniforms, the PRC could
invisibly involve itself in South Vietnam. Chiang held to his view that the Chinese
Communists were engaged in an indirect, protracted war with the United States through
the North Vietnamese proxy. Chiang mistakenly believed that the PRC so controlled the
North Vietnamese government that if Ho Chi Minh stopped fighting, it would mean his
downfall. According to Chiang, Ho could not stop fighting if he wanted to – he had no
“freedom of action.”34 Chiang also reminded Lodge that “the terrain, climate, political
conditions and psychology of the [Asian] people were such that it might be possible for
an inferior force to win in Asia.” Chiang concluded that the American commitment to
fight Communism in Asia “would not lead to a satisfactory solution or to a decisive
victory in Asia.” Rather, the United States should remain in the background and provide
material and moral support as free Asians fought the Communists themselves. He
reiterated “that only troops of the Republic of China could rally the people on the Chinese
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-160mainland.”35
By May 1965, there was some concern within the State Department that Chinese
Nationalists might try to involve themselves in the Vietnam War by attacking either PRCheld Hainan Island or the southwestern provinces of Mainland China. Marshall Green,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, met with ROC Minister of
Defense Chiang Ching-kuo on May 7, 1965. In this meeting, Chiang stated that
American bombing of North Vietnam was not a long-run solution to ending the conflict
in South Vietnam. Rather, returning to an old ROC idea, Defense Minister Chiang
suggested that “it would be best to airdrop GRC troops in Southwest China in order to
carry on harassing and other diversionary activities.”36 Ambassador Jerauld Wright,
however, downplayed the State Department’s concerns. He believed the ROC had no
capability for taking independent action against Hainan Island except for covert air drop
or sea infiltration of small teams, which could not be done without American assistance.
Without significant air cover, such an attack on Hainan would be impossible. In addition,
no ROC official had approached Wright with such a plan for action.37 Nonetheless,
Wright believed that President Chiang was quite concerned about the situation in
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-161Vietnam and also “hopeful it may lead to opportunities for his forces to participate in
some way.”38 Chiang was frustrated with Nationalist China’s secondary role in Vietnam
and with the PRC’s continued development of nuclear weapons. He remained
determined to return to the Mainland.
Skepticism about the possible military contribution of ROC forces to the Vietnam
conflict was shared by some members of Congress. Senator Wayne Morse (D-Oregon),
who earlier had been one of two senators to vote against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in
August 1964, opposed the possible use of Taiwanese troops in the war. Senator Morse
argued that it would be unwise to allow such a development. “If they get into war,”
stated Morse, “a large number of those American troops will be trampled to death as
Chiang Kai-shek’s forces retreat and run for cover.” Morse’s concern was based on the
traditional enmity of the Vietnamese and the Chinese. “South Vietnam and the other
countries of southeast Asia, but particularly South Vietnam, have fought the Chinese for a
thousand years.” Morse concluded by stating that he was “at a loss to understand how it
can be seriously proposed that we try to make use of Chiang Kai-shek’s forces to join us
in fighting the undeclared war in South Vietnam.”39
To assuage President Chiang’s concerns, Lyndon B. Johnson wrote him on July
26, 1965, that the United States would increase its armed forces in South Vietnam to
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-162nearly 80,000 personnel in the hope that this large force would open the way to a
negotiated settlement. Johnson also pledged to Chiang that the United States would do
what it could to end “external interference in South Vietnam so that the people of that
country can determine their own future.” Johnson acknowledged that the ROC had
provided assistance to the South Vietnamese government, then asked that Chiang:
give most earnest consideration to increasing that assistance in ways which will
give a clear signal to the world – and perhaps to Hanoi – of the solidarity of
international support for resistance to aggression in Viet-Nam and for a peaceful
settlement in Viet-Nam.40
The next day, Ralph Clough, Deputy Chief of Mission in the U.S. Embassy in Taipei, met
with Chiang to follow up on Johnson’s letter. The ROC, stated Chiang, would respond to
the American request “by increasing its assistance to Vietnam as much as possible,” but
insisted that the “Vietnamese problem can never be resolved within the borders of
Vietnam.” Clough also made sure Chiang understood that Johnson’s request for
“assistance” meant only “technical and economic aid.”41 Chiang replied that his
government was ready “to render every possible support to the United States’ effort to
preserve freedom against the Communist menace in Vietnam,” but reiterated that the
Chinese Communists had instigated the war “in their pursual [sic] of annexing IndoChina and communizing entire Asia.”42
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-163Indeed, by 1965, Chiang’s government already made significant non-combat
contributions to the war effort in South Vietnam. The Republic of China had furnished
small amounts of agricultural aid to South Vietnam since 1958 and had enlarged its
assistance program in 1964. By 1965, ROC aid to South Vietnam included an 81-man
agricultural demonstration team, nine electric power technicians and a 10,000 kilowatt
power substation, a ten-man medical team, technical training for about 400 Vietnamese,
twenty-six pre-fabricated aluminum warehouses, 500,000 school books, and various
agricultural equipment, seed, fertilizer, and veterinary equipment. In terms of military
assistance, by 1965 the ROC had provided South Vietnam a twenty-one-man
psychological warfare team, a sixteen-man surgical team and two radio propaganda
experts.43
Nevertheless, Chiang still sought an opportunity in Vietnam to expand his
ongoing war with Mainland China and called on his friend Ray Cline for advice. On
August 3, 1965, Chiang told Cline that the Chinese Communists and the North
Vietnamese were about to engage the United States in a long war of attrition the U.S.
could not win. In that event, Chiang told Cline that he was ready to provide troops to
Vietnam if the United States wanted them and proposed a Nationalist landing on the
south China coast “to cut Peking’s supply lines to Vietnam and to begin the reconquest of
the mainland.” Such a move, in Chiang’s opinion, had to be made immediately or not at

43

Stanley R. Larsen and James L. Collins, Jr., Allied Participation in Vietnam
(Washington: Department of the Army, 1975), 117; “GRC Assistance to Viet-Nam,”
Background Paper, Visit of Chinese Minister of Defense Chiang Ching-kuo, Washington,
September 21-28, 1965, Box 238, China Memos Vol. IV, NSF, LBJL.

-164all and required American assistance and planning. Cline commented to Washington that
Chiang was more emotional than the situation warranted, probably because he feared
Chiang’s control on Taiwan would weaken if he did not actively counter the Communist
Chinese threat.44
Frustrated by the repeated refusal of the Americans to take up his offer of direct
ROC military involvement in Vietnam, Chiang appealed directly to Premier Nguyen Cao
Ky of South Vietnam. Venturing outside the boundaries of American policy, Chiang
invited Ky to Taipei to propose the use of ROC troops against the Viet Cong. The State
Department grew concerned. Ralph N. Clough noted that “Washington was not
overjoyed at the prospect” of Ky’s visit to Taipei. As a result, the State Department
instructed the embassies in Taipei and Saigon to notify both Chiang and Ky that the
United States was concerned about the military implications of the visit.45
Clough took immediate steps and scheduled a meeting with the new ROC Foreign
Minister Shen Chang-huan concerning the forthcoming Chiang-Ky meeting. Clough
informed Shen that the U.S. government was concerned that Ky’s visit to Taipei might
reopen the prospect of a military contribution to Vietnam or a military alliance. Shen
reassured Clough that his government intended to play up the “economic aspect” of the
visit. Clough, however, saw one problem. Shen had only been on the job a week and
probably did not understand President Chiang’s views on Vietnam and the details of the
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-165Ky visit. Clough believed Shen’s statements represented the foreign ministry’s thinking
on the handling of the Ky visit. Expecting that a possible ROC military contribution to
South Vietnam and closer cooperation among Asian anti-communist countries would be
discussed, Clough did not anticipate any formal agreement.46 Three days later, Clough
met with Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo and mentioned the United States’ strong
desire that the military implications of Premier Ky’s visit not be played up. Chiang
assured Clough that his government “would stay in line with US policy during the
visit.”47
During his August 1965 visit to Taipei, Ky discussed with President Chiang
increased ROC economic and technical assistance to South Vietnam’s war effort. Ky and
Chiang considered jointly establishing model agricultural villages and expanding ROC
assistance in several public works projects. The ROC also proposed increasing its
military assistance to South Vietnam by sending additional landing ships to assist the
South Vietnamese in maintaining coastal communication. Also, ROC officials indicated
they would be willing to send troops to Vietnam if asked, but would not do so without
consulting the United States because the introduction of ROC troops into Vietnam might
expand the war into a larger Southeast Asian war.48 At the end of the conference, Ky and
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-166Chiang released a statement suggesting the ROC would increase its aid to South Vietnam:
The Government of the Republic of China has decided to increase the volume of
technical and material assistance which is now being given to the Republic of
Viet-Nam for the development of its economy, and is prepared to respond to other
requests for assistance from the Vietnamese Government as China’s contribution
to the struggle against the common enemy. 49
Meanwhile, a few voices in Congress advocated using ROC troops in Vietnam.
On August 19, 1965, Representative Robert N. C. Nix (D-Pennsylvania) argued that the
United States should encourage each American ally on the PRC’s periphery to step-up
their efforts against international communism. He especially pointed out the Republic of
China, whose military, Nix claimed, “could be mobilized quickly and efficiently to
counter any threat when and if they are needed.”50
The following month, ROC Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo planned to visit
the United States and requested a meeting with President Johnson. So as to ensure that a
rift between the United States and the Nationalist Chinese would not exist over the KyChiang meeting, Ralph N. Clough believed it “highly desirable” that President Johnson
meet with Defense Minister Chiang because it was the only way that President Chiang
could be reassured that his views would receive top level consideration within the United
States government. Chiang, according to Clough, had been increasingly concerned about
the lack of consultation on American policy toward Vietnam policy. In preparation for
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-167the Defense Minister’s visit, Clough asked that President Johnson outline possible future
operations and policy with respect to Vietnam and express gratification at the amount of
technical assistance that Taiwan had provided to South Vietnam. This would help give
ROC government officials the feeling of being consulted. But if the Defense Minister
recommended ROC combat forces in Vietnam, Johnson should emphatically state “that
major GRC assaults could not be successful at [the] present time.”51
Meanwhile, the U.S. embassy staff in Taipei reported that Chiang was considering
supplying military aid other than combat troops to South Vietnam. On September 14,
1965, Hummel stated that the ROC would agree in principle, if requested by the United
States or by South Vietnam, to make available a “limited number [of] military personnel
available to work as covert non-uniformed teams.” Additionally, the ROC would make
available a small number of non-uniformed aircraft crews to airlift supplies to isolated
areas, as had been suggested by Premier Ky. Hummel also stated the ROC government
was considering supplying to the South Vietnamese Taiwan-manufactured mechanized
landing craft (LCM) to ship supplies along the Vietnamese coast, as well as a limited
number of non-uniformed crews to man the vessels.52
When Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo visited the United States for high-level
consultations, he again broached the subject of direct ROC military involvement in
Vietnam. He first met with Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, who expressed
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-168South Vietnam’s gratitude for promised increases in Taiwanese economic and technical
aid. Defense Minister Chiang then abruptly changed the subject of their conversation.
Arguing that the Chinese Communists would soon take military action against the United
States and Taiwan, Defense Minister Chiang pledged that ROC forces were “‘available’
to support free world interests in Asia.”53
The next day, the Defense Minister met with President Johnson, who reassured
him that the current United States military buildup would allay the present danger and
avoid provoking a larger war in the Far East. Chiang claimed that his government also
wished to avoid a larger Asian war, but the question was how “to reduce or, if possible, to
destroy Chinese Communist power without a general war.” Chiang argued that the
Chinese Communists would not intervene “massively” in Vietnam, and would instead
create turmoil through “revolutionary warfare” around the world, which would drain
American strength and could have more dangerous implications than the large U.S.
intervention in Vietnam. Johnson, however, followed his advisors’ recommendations and
refused to countenance ROC military involvement in Vietnam.54
Despite Johnson’s stated position, Ray Cline endorsed Chiang Kai-shek’s
arguments for ROC military participation in the conflict. Cline, who had recently been
promoted to Deputy Director for Intelligence in the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),
argued in a December 1965 memorandum to CIA Director John McCone that “if the
Chinese Communists are forcing us into a war of attrition on the ground in Southeast
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-169Asia, we should feel free to use Chinese Nationalist troops against them.” According to
Cline, the Nationalist Chinese military had long argued for an assault on the South China
coast that would threaten supply lines to North Vietnam. They were also willing to
deploy a considerable number of ground forces in South Vietnam if asked to do so by the
United States. He recommended that the Johnson administration seriously consider
creating a plan to land Chinese Nationalist forces in South China “when and if Chinese
Communist military commitments of troops to North Vietnam pass the 50,000 mark or
result in Chinese Communist combat troop contacts with US forces in South Vietnam.”
He believed that if such a scheme were leaked to the press, it would alarm and deter the
Chinese Communists. Cline said that “this is probably the greatest deterrent [short of US
nuclear attack] we can bring to bear to keep Communist China from intervening directly
and massively in Vietnam.” Cline also proposed that the U.S. and South Vietnam accept
a 10,000 man Special Forces unit from the ROC “to engage in search-and-destroy
operations in the highlands area of South Vietnam.”55
While Cline advocated increased ROC involvement in South Vietnam to his CIA
superiors, President Chiang courted the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In
December 1965, General Earle G. Wheeler met with President Chiang in Taipei and
disclosed that the United States would not invade North Vietnam for political reasons.
Chiang angrily remarked that such a strategy made no military sense. The Chinese
55
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-170Communists, Chiang insisted, were the real enemy “and must not be left untouched if
there is to be a lasting settlement in Vietnam.” Chiang claimed there were already
Chinese forces in Vietnam and that the United States was fighting the Chinese
Communists by proxy. Wheeler replied that he knew there were Chinese railroad
engineers in North Vietnam and probably some anti-aircraft units, and that electronic
intercepts revealed the presence in Vietnam of four PRC infantry regiments. Chiang was
convinced that no peace could be achieved in Vietnam unless American problems were
settled with Communist China, meaning the military destruction of the PRC. The only
way to reach a settlement with the PRC, according to Chiang, was to use regional troops,
especially ROC troops, to a much greater extent. He contended that ROC troops should
be allowed to seize and hold the five southwest provinces of China and assured Wheeler
that no U.S. ground forces would be needed. Chiang concluded that: “If you were to use
one-half the power you are using in South Vietnam and help put GRC troops on the
mainland, you could solve your Southeast Asian problems.” After their meeting, General
Wheeler commented to Rusk that Chiang “probably recognizes that the Vietnamese War
provides him with his last opportunity to return to mainland China with any hope of
establishing and maintaining himself there.” Wheeler believed it would be in the best
interests of the United States to keep Chiang frequently and fully informed on various
problems in Asia, as per Johnson’s and Rusk’s policy, but “any invasion [of Mainland
China] supported by United States forces is out of the question.”56
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-171Operation Vanguard and Chinese Representation
While Chiang sought to use America’s escalating involvement in the Vietnam
War to push for his long-standing ambition of returning to the Mainland, he
simultaneously waged a running diplomatic battle to keep the PRC out of the United
Nations and to preserve the ROC’s privileged status on the Security Council. In the
course of 1964-65, however, the ROC position in the UN became increasingly precarious.
In January 1964, French President Charles de Gaulle recognized the People’s Republic of
China, immediately raising concerns that newly-independent French African states might
follow suit and shift the balance in the UN decisively against the ROC’s exclusive
possession of the China seat. George C. Denney, Jr., of the Intelligence and Research
Division of the Department of State, reported that both the PRC and the ROC were
competing for “all or nothing.”57 Shortly after, a CIA intelligence memorandum claimed
that France’s recognition of Communist China and Chiang’s concern over Taiwan’s
internal stability suggested “that he [Chiang] may ignore US tactical suggestions
regarding the UN representation problem.” Such unilateral action might lead to French
African nations aligning themselves with France in the UN and recognizing the PRC.58
Both Taiwan and the PRC engaged in economic diplomacy to further their
respective positions in the UN. The ROC focused its energies on Operation Vanguard, a
technical assistance program begun in 1961 “to cultivate friendly relations with African
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-172countries and to retain their support for the GRC’s position in the UN.”59 The State
Department’s Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs described the aid program as “generally
successful and popular” with those African governments that received this assistance.60
Meanwhile, the PRC initiated a similar program to compete with the ROC for African
support. This development caused some anxiety in the State Department.
By September 1964, State Department officials grew concerned that the Chinese
Communists would undermine the ROC’s aid program, and warned that “the Chinese
Communists are mounting a subtle, persistent offensive, particularly in Africa, with a
view to improving their international position at the expense of the GRC.”61 David Dean
of the Office of Asian Communist Affairs worried that the rival Chinese aid programs in
Africa would lead to “a fruitless and potentially dangerous game of aid blackmail.” Dean
warned Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Marshall Green that:
We presumably do not wish to match each and every Chinese Communist aid
offer in Africa as a means of blocking recognition. If we, hoping for short-run
gains, try to buy off governments which have or have indicated a willingness to
accept aid, and then, at a later date, we do not respond again to the ChiCom effort,
we will have clearly shown that our hasty initiatives at this time were nothing but
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-173attempted bribes. The long-range implications of this fact broadly realized and
accepted throughout Africa, are obviously extremely damaging. 62
Secretary of State Rusk disagreed with Dean. In a memorandum to David E. Bell,
Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), Rusk stated
that PRC gains in Africa were a matter of serious concern and threatened to undermine
“our position on Chinese representation in the next General Assembly, where the shift of
a few votes may bring about a resolution to seat the Chinese Communists.” Rusk further
commented that economic assistance would play a vital role in keeping the ROC in the
United Nations. Rusk suggested that policies on economic assistance be reviewed for
those African countries, mainly French-speaking, which were the most vulnerable to the
Chinese Communists, and to examine other methods to increase or make more effective
aid to African countries which supported American policy regarding Chinese
representation.63
Other Johnson administration officials also became concerned about African aid
and its implications for the Chinese representation issue. William P. Bundy, Assistant
Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, warned Rusk that the Chinese
Communists were making great inroads in their African relations. Bundy stated that
nations such as the Congo, Senegal, the Central African Republic, Dahomey and
Cameroon were wavering in support of the ROC and were interested in opening
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-174diplomatic relations with the PRC. The PRC’s diplomatic successes in Africa, therefore,
required the United States to reassess its plan to keep the ROC in the United Nations
either by simple majority vote, or, if that failed, by the “important question” tactic,
requiring a two-thirds vote. Agreeing with most of the American ambassadors in Africa,
Bundy contended that economic aid would be a vital “element in determining the African
attitude toward international policy questions in which we are interested.”64
Despite the diplomatic problems created by Operation Vanguard, some State
Department officials, in particular Dean Rusk, supported American funding for the
ROC’s aid program. ROC officials requested American financial assistance for
Operation Vanguard in October 1964. Tsiang Ting-fu, ROC Ambassador to the United
States, requested $10 million a year for the next five years for Operation Vanguard from
G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs.65 Williams
suggested that the details of the ROC’s proposed plan be examined by the State
Department, the Agency for International Development and the ROC embassy staff.
Later that month, Tsiang met with Rusk and, once again, requested American assistance
for Operation Vanguard. Secretary Rusk contended that Operation Vanguard could be
expanded with increased American aid. These increases would generate additional local
currency to cover the expanded program in Africa. In essence, Rusk proposed that
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-175American funding of Operation Vanguard be dramatically increased.66
American confidence in Operation Vanguard, though, was accompanied by
continued pleas by the ROC for funding assistance. In a meeting in early January 1965
between United States and ROC diplomats, Secretary Rusk and Marshall Green, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, commented that the erosion of support among
African nations for Taiwan’s seat in the United Nations “seems to have been checked”
due to the efforts in Africa of the ROC government.67 Nonetheless, ROC officials
renewed their request for American financial assistance for Operation Vanguard seven
months later. Stephen B. Ives of the State Department’s Office of East Asia Affairs
reported that he “was pressed very hard by the GRC on U.S. support of Vanguard” during
his July 1965 visit to Taipei. Both the Minister of Economic Affairs, K. T. Li, and H. K.
Yang, the Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, argued that Taiwan needed U.S. funding for
Operation Vanguard, including $10 million for commitments in Africa for Fiscal Year
1966. According to Ives, the list was either padded or included projects that could not be
funded without increased American aid. Ives recommended that the State Department
reassess American commitments to Operation Vanguard with a view to either increasing
American funding or urging the Taiwanese to increase their own funding.68
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-176The Taiwanese request for additional American funds for Operation Vanguard
faced tremendous opposition among a number of American officials. Norman W.
Getsinger, Officer in Charge of ROC Affairs in the State Department, argued that “the
need for funds is not as great as indicated by the GRC . . . since the GRC seems to have
plenty funds to meet all present requirements.” In addition, Congress refused to allow
additional funds to be programmed into the ROC’s aid budget for Fiscal Year 1965,
especially increased funding for Public Law 480 programs, because Taiwan’s economy
was not in a state of “serious economic deterioration.” Any further assistance, according
to Getsinger, would require strong justification and, probably, cabinet approval.69
Taiwan’s economy, as Getsinger suggested, had expanded in the 1960s. By the
mid-1960s, the ROC’s economy had become the fastest growing in the world. The
country’s Gross National Product (GNP), the total market value of all goods and services
produced in the country, increased annually 9.7 percent between 1960 and 1970. In the
same time period, per capita income increased annually 6.6 percent. Taiwan’s economy
also became more industrialized, while its standard of living improved dramatically. In
the view of Senator Hiram L. Fong (R-Hawaii), “Taiwan stands as a shining example,”
having evolved with the help of $1.425 million in aid over sixteen years from the USAID,
“from an under-developed island into a thriving agricultural-industrial economy.” As a
result, the United States formally withdrew its non-military aid to the ROC in 1965.70
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-177Nevertheless, ROC officials continued to lobby the Johnson administration to
fund Operation Vanguard. In August 1965, ROC Ambassador Chow Shu-kai, in a
meeting with USAID Administrator Bell and others, reminded everyone that Operation
Vanguard’s goals were primarily political, not economic. Chow complained to Bell that
Taiwan needed funding to finance sugar mills being constructed in Niger and Upper
Volta, but because such funding was not considered “technical cooperation” by USAID,
these projects were “not eligible for financing.” Bell recommended that the ROC seek
such funds via loans from the Export-Import Bank. Chow countered that because Niger
and Upper Volta had balance of payments problems, their governments sought grant aid.
Chow, therefore, wanted a less rigid interpretation of “technical cooperation” because all
of Taiwan’s African aid recipients had balance of payments problems. According to
Chow, Operation Vanguard made friends for both the ROC and the United States.71
At the end of 1965, despite the uncertainty concerning American financial
assistance, the ROC advised USAID and State Department officials that it would expand
Operation Vanguard in Africa to preserve Nationalist Chinese representation in the
United Nations. Yang Hsi-kun, ROC Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs, stated that the
ROC would be able to cover the first year or two of the program, but American assistance
would eventually be needed to fund the project’s expansion into Latin America and
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-178Southeast Asia. Rutherford M. Poats, Assistant Director of the USAID, expressed his
pleasure that the ROC intended to expand its aid program, especially as some of Taiwan’s
plans fit with American aid plans. He also stated that the United States preferred Taiwan
to use increased funding for further development of its own country, however, and the
cost of expanding Operation Vanguard would have to be met by the Taiwanese economy.
Though Poats agreed with Taiwan’s request for increased aid funding, “it would have to
make economic sense for AID or Treasury to recommend it.”72
Perhaps one reason why ROC officials pleaded with the United States for
assistance in funding was that, by the end of 1965, Operation Vanguard’s initial success
began to decline. In September 1965, French President Charles de Gaulle announced that
leaders from the Congo, Dahomey, the Central African Republic, and Senegal would
support the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. In addition, France
pressured Mauritania, Chad and the Cameroon to support the PRC’s admission. The
remainder of the French-speaking African states, however, remained opposed to
Communist China’s admission.73 Also, as the United States became more militarily and
financially involved in Vietnam, the Johnson administration could no longer guarantee
international support for the PRC’s continued exclusion from the UN. State Department
analyst Joseph J. Sisco warned Secretary Rusk that “Despite their [the PRC’s] derisive
statements about the United States, we must anticipate a strong effort to seat the Chinese
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-179Communists on their own terms at the Twentieth Session of the U.N. General Assembly,
convening on September 21.” Supporters of the PRC would need the votes of only
several states that had not yet recognized Communist China in order to replace Taiwan in
the UN. Sisco was chiefly worried that some variant of a “two Chinas” approach would
be introduced, despite the PRC’s rejection of such a solution.74

Madame Chiang’s 1965 Trip to the United States
As American involvement in Vietnam escalated and the position of the Republic
of China in the United Nations deteriorated, Madame Chiang Kai-shek attempted to rally
conservative congressmen and the China Lobby’s base of popular support. In 1965,
Madame Chiang saw an opportunity to reinforce American support for the ROC through
an extended informal visit to the U.S. She had visited the United States many times since
World War II, but this visit sought to rally the remnants of the China Lobby and other
interest groups who had supported her husband’s government in the past. During her
tour, which spanned from August to December 1965, she gave a number of talks pleading
her country’s case for increased American support in, what she considered, the greater
war against communism in Asia.75
Ralph Clough at the U.S. embassy in Taipei became suspicious about the timing
of Madame Chiang’s trip. Although Clough had no evidence that Madame Chiang
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-180intended to conduct ROC business, he speculated that her trip planned to test the climate
of American opinion regarding the Republic of China and “may in fact be an element in
recently heightened efforts by President Chiang to convince US that only solution to
Vietnam problem is to support GRC in action against China mainland.” Clough warned
that President Chiang probably believed that “a visit by Madame Chiang to US at this
time and calls by her on various personalities friendly to GRC will help create favorable
atmosphere for proposals which Chiang Ching-kuo will carry to Washington” later in the
month.76
Although she claimed her visit was “unofficial,” Madame Chiang made it clear
she would speak her mind. During a press conference after her plane landed at LaGuardia
Airport in New York, she called for the immediate destruction of Chinese Communist
atomic facilities, claiming that the PRC’s possession of the atomic bomb “jeopardizes the
position of every nation in the world.”77
On September 14, Madame Chiang visited with President and Lady Bird Johnson
at the White House. The ROC’s first lady immediately pressed her concerns about the
Vietnam War. She explained to President Johnson that her husband strongly supported
U.S. policy in Vietnam. Apart from this exchange, however, there was very little
discussion of policy during her White House visit. Instead, Madame Chiang and Mrs.
Johnson reminisced over tea about their prior meeting in May 1961 when then-Vice
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-181President Johnson had led a state visit to Taiwan.78
Madame Chiang also expressed her concerns about American support of the ROC
during a September 22 luncheon with a number of U.S. Senators. Without specifically
mentioning the ROC or requesting increased aid, she mentioned that she had seen a
charcoal drawing of a soldier in a newspaper with a caption below that stated: “Nowhere
Does Freedom Come Cheap.” She then asked the senators if there were any exceptions in
all history to the statement “Nowhere Does Freedom Come Cheap.” The ROC’s first
lady concluded by stating that: “The stark reality is that neither wanting to wish it away,
nor resorting to escapism, nor casuistry, nor groveling cowardice can buy freedom
cheaply. How poignantly sad, but true, are these words: From nowhere, but nowhere
does freedom come cheap.”79
Madame Chiang’s visit, however, probably had little effect on American
sentiment toward the ROC. Apart from a few well-publicized visits to New York and
Washington, her statements were hardly reported in the American press. Few news items
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-182appeared in either the New York Times or the Washington Post, two of the most important
newspapers of record in the United States. Those few entries that did make it into the
newspaper were relegated to the society page. She gave most of her talks to groups, like
the National Federation of Business and Professional Women and Wellesley College (her
alma mater), that were already sympathetic to her views.80 In other words, Madame
Chiang spent most of her time preaching to the converted rather than garnering new
supporters who could potentially pressure Congress and the White House to continue the
containment and isolation of the PRC and to provide increased aid to the ROC.
Indeed, Senator Stephen M. Young (D-Ohio) seized upon Madame Chiang’s visit
to deliver a series of speeches on the Senate floor criticizing the ROC, its leadership, and
American policy toward Taiwan. Angered over Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s 1965 tour of
the United States and her fund-raising appeal, Young contended that the United States
“should long since have stopped pouring American dollars into this rathole.”81 Such
money, the senator claimed, supposedly went to support Chiang’s army of 600,000, but
Young had “grave doubts” whether they were well-trained, “top notch” soldiers.82
Senator Young was not the only senator publicly to challenge the status of U.S.
relations with the ROC. Before Madame Chiang’s visit, in April 1965, Senator George
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-183McGovern (D-South Dakota) had argued that:
. . . it would be both in our own national interest and in the interest of
international understanding for us to explore carefully the possibility of new
initiatives. It seems increasingly clear that there is much to be gained in the long
run by at least limited contacts with [Communist] China. 83
On the floor of the U.S. Senate in May 1965, McGovern stated that “one day we must
undertake the patient – and no doubt frustrating – effort to establish international,
economic, and cultural ties with China.”84
Not only did Madame Chiang’s visit fail to rally solid congressional support for
the ROC, but she also was unable to prevent several senior American policymakers from
revisiting the “two Chinas” issue. Arthur J. Goldberg, who had replaced the recently
deceased Adlai Stevenson as U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, became
increasingly concerned that a simple majority vote on the Chinese representation issue
could be lost, although the United States could still avert the two-thirds majority needed
to settle the “important question.” His fears became reality in the fall of 1965 when the
annually-proposed Albanian resolution achieved a tie vote in the General Assembly.
Goldberg complained to Rusk that “serious political defeat might be involved in loss of
majority support on Chirep” and “could have repercussions in Far East and greatly
magnify our difficulties next year.” Goldberg recommended, along the lines of a
Canadian and Italian proposal, to send the Chinese representation issue to a study
committee “to examine the desirability and means of achieving universality of
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-184membership and representation consistent with the purposes and principles of the
charter.” Although the resolution was broad in scope, Goldberg intended that the
proposed committee focus solely on Chinese representation.85
William Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, also agreed
that some change in tactics toward the Chinese representation issue was needed. Rather
than a study committee, Bundy favored some form of two China arrangement that would
not necessarily exclude the PRC from the UN, but would protect the ROC’s membership.
Bundy believed that President Chiang would have to be consulted and persuaded to
accept such a new strategy by a high-level emissary, and the United States would also
have to consult with the British, the Japanese, and other friendly governments.86

Conclusion
By the end of 1965, United States relations with the Republic of China had
changed dramatically from the time that John F. Kennedy had taken the Oath of Office in
January 1961. As the American war effort in South Vietnam intensified, the ROC’s
position in the United Nations eroded. While French African states joined the UN and
supported Communist China’s efforts for membership, Operation Vanguard failed to
generate the widespread good will and support in Africa that ROC officials sought. This
failure led to a tie vote in the UN General Assembly in late 1965 on the Albanian
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-185resolution and to William P. Bundy’s consideration of a “two Chinas” representation
formula. Meanwhile, Chiang pressed U.S. policymakers for a larger ROC role in the
Vietnam war effort, hoping that he could use the conflict as a means to retake the
Mainland. The Johnson administration, fearing a larger conflict involving the
Communist Chinese, denied Chiang an increased military role in Vietnam. Even
Madame Chiang’s visit failed to exert much pressure on the Johnson administration to
bow to Chiang’s wishes. A dual policy of Chinese containment, therefore, began to
emerge by the end of 1965, both to contain communism’s spread in Southeast Asia, and
to contain Chiang Kai-shek’s ambition to overthrow and replace the PRC. Additionally,
some State Department staffers continued to insist on a moderated policy toward the
PRC. These factors would prove troublesome for the future of U.S.-ROC relations into
the latter years of the Johnson administration.

CHAPTER VI
THE JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION
AND CHINA POLICY, 1966-68
Between 1966 and 1968, it became increasingly difficult for the United States to
maintain the status quo regarding relations with the Republic of China (ROC). Although
the United States managed to keep the ROC in the United Nations (UN), several
American allies continued to promote UN membership for the People’s Republic of
China (PRC). Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress initiated investigations into U.S.-China
policy and concluded that the establishment of relations with the Communist Chinese was
inevitable. But as American involvement in the Vietnam War exploded, Taiwan became
an important supply depot, airlift staging area, and rest and relaxation (R&R) destination.
The Vietnam War put additional stress on the U.S. relationship with the ROC as
President Chiang Kai-shek continually insisted on using the war in Vietnam to advocate a
larger military role in Southeast Asia and to overthrow the Mainland regime. By the end
of 1968, State Department and National Security Council officials opined that Chiang and
the Nationalists had become a barrier to normalizing relations with the People’s Republic
of China, therefore setting the stage for President Richard M. Nixon’s initiatives toward
the PRC in the early 1970s.

-186-

-187Chinese Representation at the United Nations, 1966
By early 1966, the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations was
again becoming a source of concern for American policymakers. In an April 1966 report,
State Department analyst Thomas Hovet, Jr., concluded that “despite the objections of the
U.S., there is every likelihood that the PRC may be seated in the U.N.” sometime
between 1967 and 1970. Although the Americans had done everything to make sure the
ROC remained in the United Nations, a shift of only four votes could negate the twothirds majority protecting the “important question” vote. If the UN were to admit the
PRC, according to Hovet, it would endorse the PRC’s “right to exert control over Taiwan
and the Pescadores as an integral part of China,” an action that, according to the 1954
Mutual Defense Treaty between the U.S. and Taiwan, would force the U.S. to protect
Taiwan. If the U.S. failed to live up to its treaty obligation to the ROC, “there would be .
. . serious implications for U.S. allies in the Pacific and the whole U.S. structure of
mutual security treaties.” Hovet recommended that the U.S. agree to seating the PRC and
ousting the ROC if the United Nations “would declare [and take steps to implement] the
neutralization of Taiwan and the Pescadores for ten years.” Hovet recommended this
policy change because it would protect American interests and the security of Taiwan.1
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, was also concerned
about Chinese representation in the UN. In April 1966, Goldberg warned President
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-188Johnson that a majority in the General Assembly might vote going against seating the
Republic of China in the upcoming fall, and that the United States would lose a twothirds vote on the “important question” tactic. To counter this possibility, Goldberg
suggested that the United States adopt a “successor state” strategy, whereby the General
Assembly could recognize both the ROC and the PRC. The United States, however,
could not openly propose such an idea. Goldberg recommended that the Canadians
introduce a “successor state” resolution and requested authorization to discuss the issue
with Canadian Prime Minister Lester Pearson and Minister for External Affairs (Foreign
Minister) Paul Martin, who had gone on record supporting a “two Chinas” solution. If
the Canadians decided to propose this resolution, the State Department would inform the
ROC that it would defend the Nationalist seat in the UN, but would not oppose a seat for
Communist China. The United States would not express immediate opposition to the
resolution. Rather, the American delegation would wait and publicly support the
Canadian resolution later.2
Two days later, Walter W. Rostow, Senior Policy Advisor to President Johnson,
informed the president that Ambassador Goldberg’s plan was premature. Rostow argued
that the United States had “a solemn, secret commitment to Taiwan” and should “use our
Security Council veto to keep the ChiComs [Chinese Communists] out.” Rostow was
also concerned with the possible implications of such a precedent for Vietnam. If the
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-189ROC could be removed from the UN, South Vietnam could likewise be removed.3
Nonetheless, some Taiwanese officials suspected the United States would soon
change its Chinese representation position. Chow Shu-kai, T. F. Tsiang’s successor as
ROC Ambassador to the United States, remarked that many newspapers in Taiwan were
growing critical of U.S. policy toward the ROC “and reflected lurking suspicion
something dreadful might happen in US-GRC relations.” Chow suggested that the
Taiwanese were growing distrustful of American efforts to ensure their national
existence. William P. Bundy, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, assured
Chow that the United States would do what it could “to keep down speculation of policy
change and would use every available opportunity to make our real position clear.” Chow
complained that the Americans over-emphasized their guarantee to maintain Taiwan’s
national integrity, and did not stress the PRC’s belligerency as a disqualifying factor for
UN membership.4
By mid-May 1966, Secretary Rusk weighed in with his thoughts on Chinese
representation. Rusk, in consultation with Ambassador Goldberg, advised President
Johnson that the course of action with the fewest risks involved a “two Chinas” approach.
This tactic proposed to shift the debate from keeping the ROC in the UN to excluding the
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-190PRC from UN membership. A “two Chinas” plan would have to be introduced at the UN
by a third party and not be opposed by the United States. While the ROC had a right to
representation in the United Nations, the PRC could also be admitted to the UN. Steps,
though, would be taken to preserve the ROC’s seat on the Security Council. Should
Communist China be admitted and seated alongside the ROC, the question of China’s
Security Council seat could be suspended until the PRC took its General Assembly seat
and the UN completed a study on permanent membership of the Security Council. The
ROC, however, would have to be convinced that the new American tactics would avoid
total defeat and “assure them continuing representation in the United Nations.” If Taiwan
accepted the proposal, the PRC still might not take its seat in the UN because it objected
to a “two Chinas” solution. Walter P. McConaughy, Jr., the newly appointed U.S.
Ambassador to Taiwan, would have to convince Taiwanese leaders “that the best way to
continue to exclude Red China would be for the Republic of China to hold on to its seat
in the Assembly” and not walk out if the PRC were admitted. Meanwhile, Ambassador
Goldberg and Assistant Secretary of State for International Organizations Joseph J. Sisco
would meet with Canadian officials to “unleash” the Canadians on the “two Chinas”
solution. The Canadians, though, could not be allowed to make any move, nor could
Congress be consulted about this plan, without full discussion with Taipei.5 After reading
Rusk’s memo, Walt Rostow commented to President Johnson that the proposal was
“something of a landmark” that “recommends to you [President Johnson] that we begin to
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-191shift off our present policy toward Communist China in the UN.” Johnson later approved
Rusk’s suggestion and authorized him to proceed.6
Meanwhile, Ambassador Goldberg privately discussed the Chinese representation
issue with Canadian Prime Minister Pearson, Foreign Minister Martin, and Canadian
Ambassador to the United States A. Edgar Ritchie. Pearson and Martin stated that their
government was under “strong domestic opinion” to make a change in their China policy.
Pearson and Martin, though, assured Goldberg that they would not present a “two
Chinas” proposal without consultation with the United States. Goldberg promised he
would talk with them later about Chinese representation after American officials
discussed their plan with Chiang7
On June 30, 1966, Ambassador McConaughy met with Chiang Kai-shek at the
president’s residence in Taipei to discuss the various reasons why current tactics might no
longer work to keep the ROC in the United Nations. Chiang quickly scotched the idea of
dual representation. If both the ROC and the Chinese Communists were seated in the
UN, according to Chiang, it would amount to a coalition situation that would cause the
Taiwanese delegates to withdraw from the UN. Chiang further warned McConaughy that
“as long as GRC [Government of the Republic of China] exists, it will seek the
destruction of Chicoms as a usurper regime: It is better to go down to defeat fighting than
to compromise a principle so deeply rooted in basic tradition and morality of Chinese

6

Memorandum from Walt Rostow to President Johnson, May 17, 1966, FRUS
1964-68, 303-04.
7

Telegram from Arthur J. Goldberg to Department of State, May 17, 1966, FRUS
1964-68, 304-06.

-192people.” The ROC’s integrity and honor were at stake. If the General Assembly voted to
admit the Chinese Communists, “the GRC would have to walk out.” McConaughy
reiterated that the United States hoped that Taiwan would accept these new tactics given
the erosion of international support for the ROC in the UN. Chiang ended the
conversation by asserting that the UN Charter was clear on ROC membership and that the
U.S. should use procedural tactics, like the “important question” issue, to ensure that the
PRC was not offered membership. If the U.S. wavered, “then [the] attitude[s] of other
countries would weaken, and [the] attitude of GRC would also change.”8
After McConaughy’s failure, Rusk and McGeorge Bundy traveled to Taipei to
convince President Chiang, his son, and Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming to accept the
American assessment that new tactics would be needed to preserve the ROC’s seat in the
United Nations. Foreign Minister Wei maintained that progress was being made wooing
African recipients of Taiwanese aid under Operation Vanguard. According to Wei,
African support for the ROC position had actually increased since the 1965 vote.
Dahomey and the Central African Republic had severed relations with the PRC, while the
Congo (Kinshasa) assured the ROC that their UN ambassador would not disobey orders
as he had done in 1965. Wei stated that the ROC’s friends in Africa “would not desert
them in showdown or make them a scapegoat for dissatisfaction with other US or
Western policies.” Also, any Canadian suggestion of a “two Chinas” plan would take
votes away from the Nationalists. Rusk then warned Wei that while many countries
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-193continued to support the ROC’s efforts, it would not be wise to show inflexibility. If the
ROC felt it had to withdraw from the UN, Rusk concluded that their action would cause a
diplomatic disaster by allowing the Chinese Communists a wide open field in the
international forum.9
Later that month Secretary Rusk made good on his promise to meet with Canadian
officials as soon as the ROC had been apprised of the new American initiative regarding
the Chinese representation issue in the UN. The Secretary privately told Foreign Minister
Martin that “it would be a disaster if the ChiComs displaced the GRC in the GA [General
Assembly].” Additionally, Rusk declared that some Asian leaders favored gathering as
many votes as possible to ensure that the PRC would not be admitted into the UN.
Martin agreed that it was necessary to review the votes, and that this issue was vitally
important to U.S. interests, but the Foreign Minister informed Rusk that over sixty-five
percent of Canadians, according to a recent Gallup Poll, favored Chinese Communist
admission to the United Nations. Martin further surprised Rusk by contending “there
may be a lot” in the Government of Canada who supported Communist China’s
admission, although his government would not support the ROC’s expulsion. A shocked
Rusk stated that Chinese representation was not a vital interest of Canadians and
questioned whether Martin’s government had only attempted to please public opinion in
Canada and in Europe. Closing the meeting, Martin stated “that the state of public
opinion in Canada and elsewhere was a fact that statesmen must take into account” and
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-194that PRC admission to the UN was “bound to happen” anyway.10 A month later, at a
meeting at Chamcook, New Brunswick, President Johnson clarified the new U.S. policy
to Prime Minister Pearson, stating that he wanted to see the Chinese Communists in the
UN “to defend their position before the world,” but he did not want to sell out Chiang and
the ROC government. Pearson had no response.11
The ROC’s poor reaction to a “two Chinas” representation approach in the UN
and the Canadian government’s turnabout on Chinese representation, meant that by
September 1966 Secretary Rusk’s “two Chinas” solution was in jeopardy. Alfred
Jenkins, Robert Komer’s replacement on the National Security Council staff and protégé
of Walt Rostow, warned that the American ability to defeat a resolution to seat the PRC
in Taiwan’s stead was now questionable. In his view, there were only two ways to keep
the ROC in. First, “have a friendly member introduce a resolution . . . which reaffirms
GRC status and also invites the PRC to occupy seats in the General Assembly.” Second,
try to defeat any resolution proposing to replace the ROC with the Communist Chinese,
the very resolution proposed by the Albanian delegation, without introducing an
alternative. Jenkins, however, believed that neither option was attractive or safe. He
recommended that the United States continue public opposition to the Albanian
resolution. If this tactic should fail, then American diplomats should “shift immediately
to a resolution establishing a study group to consider this complex question, and report
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-195back to the Assembly.”12 Jenkins later complained to Walt Rostow that “no paper on
Chirep has even now come officially to rest at any meaningful level in the Department,”
despite the number of talks between U.S. and ROC officials and discussions between
American officials. Jenkins commented that Secretary Rusk now wanted no change,
while Ambassador Goldberg continued to favor a “two Chinas” approach.13
Just two days after Jenkins’s memo to Rostow, Secretary Rusk declared that there
would be “no change in US policy on Chirep at 21st UNGA [United Nations General
Assembly]” and promised maximum opposition to any resolution from Albania that
would expel Taiwan and replace it with Communist China. In addition, the U.S. would
“reaffirm view that any proposal to change representation of China is ‘important
question’ requiring two-thirds majority.” Rusk reasoned that Communist China’s entry
into the United Nations would disrupt and contradict the UN’s mission of peace. By
1966, Mainland China had descended into violence and chaos stirred by Mao’s Cultural
Revolution. Rusk estimated “that a distinct majority would support our position on
‘important question’ formula while prospects for defeating Albanian-type resolution are
about same as last year.”14
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-196Despite Rusk’s public stance against any change in Chinese representation,
Canadian Ambassador Ritchie privately presented his government’s “two Chinas”
proposal to U.S. Undersecretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach. Ritchie said that his
proposal would allow countries to express their point of view while still opposing the
Albanian resolution to seat the PRC. The Canadian proposal “would call upon the
President of the General Assembly to carry out an investigation of the possible basis for
an interim solution.” But as Katzenbach read the text, he noted a provision for Chinese
Communist representation in the Security Council, a provision he believed was not
necessary to fulfill Canada’s plan. Ritchie responded that his proposal was the best
possible approach to preserving Taiwan’s seat in the UN and would not be acceptable to
other governments if it did not provide for PRC representation on the Security Council.15
After hearing from Katzenbach, Rusk moved to block the Canadian proposal. He
asked President Johnson for authorization “to try to persuade the Canadians to alter their
present ‘one China one Taiwan’ proposal to one more acceptable to us, involving a UN
General Assembly Study Committee.” The Canadian Cabinet, Rusk warned, had
consulted with allied governments, such as the Belgians and the Italians, concerning
admitting the PRC and retaining the ROC in the UN. If a vote were taken, the Albanian
resolution supporting PRC admission would gain a simple majority. A study committee,
Rusk told Johnson in a phone conversation the next day, would “complicate” the issue for
a year or two. Without the study committee, the U.S. would not be able to defeat the
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-197Albanian resolution. President Johnson concurred and approved Rusk’s plan.16
Secretary Rusk, on November 9, 1966, wrote Prime Minister Pearson to convince
him to abandon his draft resolution to admit the PRC into the UN. The Secretary of State
criticized the Canadian proposal regarding Chinese representation in the United Nations
on the grounds that it would harm American plans for peace in Vietnam. Citing the
Johnson administration’s desire for peace in East Asia, Rusk urged the Canadian
delegation to the UN to accept the use of previously successful tactics and put aside their
“two Chinas” proposal. According to Rusk, the Canadian proposal would “create
maximum mischief for minimum result,” ending in chaos at the UN. The United States,
concluded Rusk, would have to oppose and defeat the Canadian proposal with the
greatest majority possible.17 William Bundy also criticized the Canadian proposal, stating
it could “adversely affect peace prospects in Viet Nam and create problems for many
allies in Asia.”18
Ambassador Chow was also disturbed by the Canadian proposal. In a meeting
with Rusk, he asked that the United States use its power to stop it. To head off any
accusations of collusion with the Canadians, Rusk admitted to meeting with Ritchie and
Paul Martin, Canadian Ambassador to the UN, several times and discussing Chinese
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-198representation tactics with them. Rusk explained to Chou that he had attempted to
persuade Martin to defer on his plan but had failed. Chow replied that Taiwan would
oppose any study committee proposal, and if the United States continued to support such
an idea, the “result would be a deplorable division between allies.” Since Taiwan’s
leaders were answerable to history, their national honor and dignity were at stake. As a
result, they were opposed to any change. Rusk remained adamant on the study committee
proposal because the United States had “too much at stake” to accept defeat on the
Albanian resolution in the General Assembly. 19
The Italian delegation to the UN further complicated matters. On November 9,
Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fanfani discussed with Ambassador Goldberg a draft
resolution which proposed a study committee similar to what Rusk had conceived, but
which addressed potential PRC membership.20 After learning of the Italian proposal,
ROC Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming explained to Secretary Rusk that any attempt to
bring the Chinese Communists into the UN would give them a credibility that would
undermine the ROC’s existence. If any plan were passed that gave the PRC membership
in the UN, the ROC would have no choice but to walk out. Any reference to Communist
China needed to be removed, especially in the newly proposed Italian plan, in which
“China” was mentioned without reference to the ROC or the PRC. Rusk responded that
“present events on the mainland,” namely the Cultural Revolution, “make this a
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-199particularly bad time for the international community to appear to encourage Chinese
Communist militancy.”21
Ambassador McConaughy, after being called to the ROC Ministry of Foreign
Affairs by Acting Foreign Minister Sampson Shen, was likewise advised that if the Italian
resolution were to pass, the ROC would announce its withdrawal from the United
Nations. This decision, “taken at the highest level,” had been made because the study
committee plan would “question GRC rights as founding members of UN.”
McConaughy warned Shen that such a move was “hasty, ill-advised,” and not based on
close consultation and cooperation. If the ROC were to walk out of the UN,
McConaughy warned Shen, they would abandon the UN to the Chinese Communists.22
That same day, Rusk requested McConaughy to meet with President Chiang concerning
the study committee proposal. Rusk instructed McConaughy to warn that:
Withdrawal from UN would deprive GRC of international understanding and
support on which it must depend in working toward fulfillment of its own basic
policies. It would deal a body blow to effectiveness of UN and make position of
US and GRC allies in Asia vastly more difficult. It would encourage Peking’s
militancy at very time when important decisions with respect to Viet-Nam and
future thrust of Peking’s policies may be in balance. GRC withdrawal from the
UN would in short only help our enemies.23
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-200When Ambassador McConaughy met with President Chiang on November 23,
1966, the president stated that “any study committee resolution implies the existence of
two Chinas.” While he understood that the United States was doing its best to keep the
ROC in the United Nations, American support for a study committee would “shatter the
GRC position.” If a study committee resolution were adopted, according to Chiang, the
Chinese people would believe that the United States had changed its policy to a “two
Chinas” policy and given up on the ROC, something for which the Chinese people would
not stand.
McConaughy insisted that a study group resolution was the most effective way to
defeat the Albanian resolution. Although the United States had been unable to stop the
Canadian resolution, it had prevented other countries, such as Italy, Belgium and Chile,
from going along with the Canadians. He reiterated that the study committee plan before
the UN did not threaten any major interests of the ROC and that Chiang’s government
had to be prepared to accept some “minor annoyances” in order to protect “vital
interests.” Chiang retorted that “‘passive support’ was in fact support.” Chiang further
concluded that it was still “in the realm of possibility . . . for USG to maneuver to defeat
the study committee and thus to reassure the GRC of the friendship and motives of the
US.”24
Canadian involvement in Chinese UN representation reflected just how difficult
the American struggle to help retain the ROC’s seat had become. In a November 25,
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-2011966, meeting with Canadian Foreign Minister Paul Martin, Secretary of State Rusk
noted that some American allies in the Far East believed that Canada “would never have
put forward its proposal without consultation and agreement with the United States,” and
that the Canadian ambassadors to Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the Philippines, Australia
and Thailand should “make clear to their host governments that this was not the case.”
Martin stated he knew the true situation on the matter and would contact Canadian
ambassadors of those countries mentioned to clarify the situation. Rusk told Martin to do
what he believed necessary, but the Canadian move on Chinese representation had been
made without American consultation. As a result, neither the United Kingdom, Australia,
Communist China, nor the Soviet Union supported the Canadian plan. Martin, however,
insisted that what the Canadians had done “was right and that the US would agree to this
in due course.”25
A week later, Shen again summoned Ambassador McConaughy to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to tell him that the ROC had modified its position in the event of the
passage of the Italian resolution. Rather than withdraw from the UN, Shen stated that his
delegation would simply walk out and be absent from the General Assembly for a time.
Shen believed that if his government did nothing, the Chinese people would think that the
ROC was “under the thumb” of the United States. McConaughy stated that the United
States was fearful that hostile elements in the UN would seize on any walkout to use
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-202parliamentary methods to declare the China seat vacant and admit the PRC.26
That same day the vote on Chinese representation took place on the floor of the
General Assembly. David H. Popper, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs, commented that the vote went “even better than we
had anticipated, doubtless in large part to the existence of the study committee alternative
to the Albanian resolution.” The important question resolution carried 66 votes in favor,
48 against, and 7 abstentions, while the Albanian resolution was defeated 46-57-17. The
Italian resolution calling for the study committee was also defeated 34-62-25.27
After December 1966, American diplomatic records indicate that the Johnson
administration did not pay much attention to the Chinese representation issue in the
United Nations. Nonetheless, a vote taken in the UN in November 1967 concerning the
important question, Albanian resolution, and study committee showed similar results.
The U.S. delegation to the United Nations, therefore, had maintained sufficient votes to
defeat any “two Chinas” proposal or any motion to remove the ROC from the UN.28 It
proved increasingly difficult, though, for the Johnson administration to convince its allies
to continue publicly to promote isolation of the PRC while State Department and White
House policymakers pressed forward with notions of “two Chinas” and a less tense
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-203relationship with the PRC.

Congressional Investigations of China Policy, 1966
In early 1966, both houses of Congress initiated investigations of United States
policy toward China. These investigations were sparked by increased U.S. involvement
in the Vietnam War and the fear of many congressmen and senators that a larger war with
Communist China might well develop. The House Foreign Affairs Committee and the
Senate Foreign Relations committee summarily called on China specialists to give
testimony regarding Communist China, its status with the rest of the world, and potential
future relations with the United States.
Witnesses before the House Foreign Affairs Committee between January 25 and
March 17, 1966, concluded that Communist China, while still a threat to American
interests, seemed to have a stable government that could interact with other countries.
Howard L. Boorman of Columbia University testified that despite the PRC’s economic
problems and widespread poverty, “the present political system is stable.” A. Doak
Barnett, professor of government at Columbia, contended that PRC leaders were
determined to work toward major power status, but were “aware of their material and
military limitations, and they have generally attempted to minimize the risk of major
conflict.” Likewise, Roger Hilsman added that the PRC’s new nationalism was
dangerous, but if moved into constructive channels, with U.S. help, “it [the PRC] can be a
fantastically powerful force for good in the world.”29 Finally, Secretary Rusk testified
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-204that the United States would continue a policy of containment toward the PRC.
Containment, though, did not mean isolation. Rusk further explained that “if Peking
abandons its belief that force is the best way to resolve disputes and gives up its violent
strategy of world revolution . . . we would welcome an era of good relations.”30
In its final report, the House Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that the
United States create a realistic foreign policy that would develop peaceful relations with
the PRC while preventing it from aggressive and expansive activity. Mainland China was
quickly developing into a major power. As its government appeared stable and
entrenched, and because “our country’s ability to influence the course of events on the
Asian mainland is essentially limited,” it was important to develop a working relationship
with the Communist Chinese.31
By no means did all congressmen share such a view. While some of his
colleagues were contemplating improved relations with the PRC, Representative Robert
Lee Fulton Sikes (D-Florida) remained solidly behind the ROC. He even argued for the
inclusion of Taiwanese troops in battle against the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong.
He claimed that the ROC was the “most fertile source of immediately available troops.”
Although he worried that the presence of Taiwanese troops might trigger a larger conflict
with the PRC, he was less alarmed than some at such a prospect because the presence of
South Korean forces in Vietnam had not yet caused the Chinese Communists to become
actively involved in the war. It was important, therefore, that ROC forces “be stepped up
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-205in anticipation that possible continued escalation of the war may bring about a
requirement for involvement.”32
The Senate Foreign Relations committee began its investigation of U.S. China
policy in early March. Committee Chairman Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Arkansas),
in his opening remarks, claimed the investigation was intended to be educational in
nature. Like its House counterpart, the Senate Foreign Relations committee learned that
the current policy toward Mainland China was unworkable and that the U.S. had to accept
the PRC as a major power.
The Senate Foreign Relations committee also called some of the foremost
American experts on China to testify on the current and future status of U.S.-China
relations. John K. Fairbank, director of the East Asian Research Center at Harvard
University, claimed that there existed a fundamental misunderstanding of Chinese
political behavior. Containment policy created a situation that isolated the PRC. This
isolation only intensified their aggressive behavior. Mainland China, like other
developing countries, needed cultural and financial exchange. Donald S. Zagoria,
professor of government at Columbia University, also called on the United States “to
achieve a stable and tolerant relationship with China” by working to change the system
from within through open exchange like that mentioned by Fairbank. Hans J.
Morgenthau, director of the Center for the Study of American Foreign Policy at the
University of Chicago, argued that it was the United States, rather than the Communist
32
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-206Chinese, that had been isolated, because the Mainland regime had long enjoyed
diplomatic and commercial relations with other countries. It was simply unrealistic to
think that the United States could contain such a large and culturally dominant country.33
Three witnesses invited by Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper (R-Iowa) argued that
the “containment without isolation” idea proposed by Fairbank, Zagoria and Morgenthau
was impractical. Former Representative Walter H. Judd (R-Minnesota), a longtime
leader of the China Lobby, stated that the most important problem in East Asia was not
Vietnam but Communist China’s “expansionist movement.” Any change in China policy
would cause the weakening or “loss of Taiwan [and] our Pacific island chain of
defenses.” George E. Taylor, professor of Far Eastern History at the University of
Washington, did not believe there was much hope that the Mainland regime would
change without the United States and its containment policy forcing changes upon it.
David Nelson Rowe, professor of Far Eastern affairs at Yale University, concurred.
Rowe argued that there was “no hope of getting them [PRC] to change” through
accommodation with the United States.34
As a result of these Senate hearings, Senator Fulbright joined the growing
criticism of U.S.-Taiwan policy and came to support various changes in United StatesChina policy. On April 5, 1966, he inserted into the Congressional Record a “Statement
on United States China Policy” signed by a number of Asian scholars, among the most
prominent of whom were John K. Fairbank of Harvard University and Mark Selden of
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-207Taipei, Taiwan, calling for changes in U.S. policy toward China. These experts
recommended that the United States maintain relations with the Republic of China, as the
government of Taiwan, while seeking “to convince Peking that . . . the United States . . .
is interested in exploring areas of mutual interest and normalizing relations whenever
possible.” These academics called for the application of a “two Chinas” solution in order
to “move the Chinese [Communists] to a greater acceptance of the principles of
coexistence in the emerging world community.”35 Fairbank elaborated on his views in a
letter to the editor of the New York Times. He suggested that “‘Two Chinas’ [was] a
loaded word popularized by its opponents,” implying that both the PRC and the ROC had
long struggled for unity. A better term to use, according to Fairbank, was “dual
representation,” a term which did not handicap a future unification of China on its own
terms.36
Even some Republicans began to question the existing American-Taiwanese
relationship. In April 1966, members of the Ripon Society, a group of liberal
Republicans, asked: “What is the extent of our commitment” to Taiwan and “how does
this commitment square with our current involvement in Southeast Asia?” The Society
recommended “rethinking a position which considers Taiwan the only ‘legitimate’
government of all China.” In particular, the group advocated “a more flexible trade
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-208policy toward China,” despite an embargo on strategic goods.37
The congressional hearings probably placed some pressure on President Johnson
to make a public statement on China policy. On July 12, 1966, in an address delivered by
telephone to the American Alumni Council at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia,
Johnson stated that the United States and the Peking regime would eventually have to
reconcile their differences if peace in Southeast Asia were to become a reality. In his call
for cooperation with, rather than hostility toward, the PRC, Johnson stated that only
through the free exchange of people and ideas and “through full participation by all
nations in an international community under law” could such a peace take place.38
President Johnson’s speech further reflected the bureaucratic squabbling
concerning China policy. James C. Thomson, Jr., at this time serving with Walter W.
Rostow on the National Security Council, claimed that the speech’s origins, as with the
Hilsman speech three years before, “were disorderly and conspiratorial.” Dissatisfied
with a “boilerplate” speech prepared the day before with input from State and other
agencies, Johnson had asked his trusted speech writer Bill Moyers for a new draft.
Moyers, in turn, asked Thomson to write the address for Johnson to deliver the next
evening. After President Johnson approved the draft, he requested Secretary Rusk’s
comments. Apparently, Rusk made numerous corrections and suggestions on the various
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-209sections of the draft, but failed to comment on the China policy section of the paper.
Thomson later wrote “to this day one does not know if Mr. Rusk suddenly acquiesced,
feeling outflanked; or whether instead he merely, in his hurry, turned over two pages at
once by mistake.”39

The ROC and the Vietnam War
While President Chiang Kai-shek never won American approval for the dispatch
of ROC combat troops to South Vietnam, as the United States escalated the war in
Vietnam, Taiwan became an increasingly important staging area and rest and relaxation
(R&R) site for American forces stationed in South Vietnam. As early as 1965, the
Republic of China had begun to allow the United States to use Taiwan as a staging area.
In April 1965, George Ball, Undersecretary of State, cabled the U.S. Embassy in Taipei
that the United States had deployed five EC-121 early warning aircraft and one squadron
of F-104s to an airbase at Tainan in southwestern Taiwan. Ball stated that ROC officials
“should be told stationing these units [at] Tainan [was] necessitated by situation in VietNam and requirements for US forces in [the] forward area.”40 The ROC approved the
request and also approved stationing of additional ground support units for these aircraft.
But ROC officials, noting an opportunity to become more involved in the war effort, also
suggested that their government be allowed to produce small arms ammunition that was
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-210not being made in the United States. In August 1965, a Department of Defense team
investigated this suggestion and recommended that the United States “meet its
requirements for ammunition from American sources” because gold outflow from Taiwan
would harm its economy.41
Ball probably hoped that this increased Taiwanese role would be kept secret.
Nonetheless, an article in the January 11, 1966, New York Times exposed American
actions on Taiwan to public view. The article claimed that United States military forces
on Taiwan planned to expand their role to include operational support for the war effort
in Vietnam. The United States Air Force 314th Troop Carrier Wing and the 6217th
Support Group would be based at Kungkwan, Nationalist China’s largest air base located
near Taichung in west-central Taiwan. Included in this deployment were three squadrons
of Hercules C-130 aircraft, six support squadrons, and two headquarters units. According
to Lt. Col. D. H. Doughty, Commander of the 6217th Group, the deployment “will give us
a lot more air lift [sic] in the far east. One of these days this will be one of our most
important bases in Asia.” But the base at Kungkwan, according to Doughty, was only to
be used as a secondary supply depot for fast cargo deliveries to South Vietnam.42
In early December 1965, the State Department learned that Defense was
considering building a base for B-52s in either Taiwan, the Philippines, or Thailand for
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-211use against targets in South and North Vietnam. Secretary Rusk recommended that the
base not be constructed on Taiwan. Although the ROC government would not object to
stationing the B-52s, and such a base would be proof of the American willingness to
defend Taiwan, such a move would probably provoke a strong Chinese Communist
reaction. The PRC might claim that the base could be used for offensive operations
against the Mainland, represented American “imperialism,” and proved that the U.S. was
not interested in decreasing tension in the Taiwan Strait.43
Arthur Hummel agreed with Rusk’s initial recommendation not to build an
American B-52 base on Taiwan. On January 19, 1966, Hummel warned that increased
ROC involvement in Vietnam, the American buildup on Taiwan, Premier Ky’s continued
and much publicized visits to Taipei, and the presence of the ROC’s psychological
warfare unit in South Vietnam could cause the PRC to take further action against the
United States. Hummel particularly worried about the proposed deployment of B-52s to
Taiwan because these planes “would not add significantly to present U.S. capabilities for
attacking Communist China, but unfortunately they would be accompanied by
considerable publicity and press speculation of the kind we have had recently on C-130s.”
Given the B-52's offensive nature, Hummel believed the PRC might feel obliged to
react.44
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-212By February 1966, Rusk apparently changed his mind to favor construction of an
air base at Kungkwan that would house not only B-52s but other aircraft needed for the
war effort in Vietnam. Rusk stated that construction of this base would permit greater
flexibility and capability for handling all types of aircraft in the region. Not only did
Rusk remind Hummel of the construction project at Kungkwan which would base C-130
aircraft for use in Taiwan, but he also revealed plans for additional facilities that could
house either, or both, KC-135 tankers and B-52s, although no plans to utilize these
aircraft had yet been made. The funds for construction would come from a Defense
supplemental appropriation request, which would allow for construction to be completed
in December 1966. Additionally, Rusk stated that “there will of course be no publicity
regarding possible contingency use of Kung Kuan by B-52s or KC-135s.”45
Hummel maintained his position against the construction of an American airbase
on Taiwan and took issue with Secretary Rusk’s new line. While the Kungkwan
construction project would fill an urgent need for additional B-52 facilities in the Far
East, news stories might speculate about the bombers’ use, and, in turn, raise questions
about the ROC’s role in the Vietnam War. Hummel complained that this project would
cause the PRC to become more militarily involved, either directly in Vietnam or in the
Taiwan Strait. The Chinese Communists, predicted Hummel, might take action against
the Offshore Islands to divert American attention from Vietnam. The United States and
the ROC might also be linked in the world press as combining forces to provoke the
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-213Chinese Communists. Hummel later added that the Soviets would probably have to
support the PRC by denouncing any American efforts to help the ROC supply the
Offshore Islands. Hummel concluded that stationing B-52s in Taiwan “could cause
Peiping to choose to act against GRC on offshore islands as substitute for running graver
risk of direct confrontation with US in Vietnam.” Despite Hummel’s arguments, the
airbase in question was eventually expanded and renamed Ching Chuan Kang (CCK)
Airbase.46
The Pentagon’s plan to allow Taiwan to become a center for rest and relaxation
(R&R) for American soldiers stationed in Vietnam also encountered controversy.
American service personnel stationed in Vietnam could qualify for R&R after eight
months of service. Eligible personnel, on a “first come, first served” basis, could choose
from up to six destinations, including Taiwan, for seven days of R&R.47 Rest and
relaxation trips to Taiwan by American soldiers began on November 1, 1965. As more
service clubs were constructed at Kungkwan, more servicemen arrived, either for R&R or
for deployment at the air base. In April 1966, Admiral William E. Gentner, Commander
of the U.S.-Taiwan Defense Command, projected that at least 600 soldiers per month
would arrive in Taiwan for R&R, and Lieutenant General James W. Wilson, Commander
of the 13th Air Force, predicted the air base at Kungkwan would house an additional 5,000
servicemen. The American Embassy in Taipei, along with the Governor of Taichung,

46

Telegram from Arthur Hummel to Dean Rusk, February 8, 1966, Box 239,
China Cables Vol. V, NSF, LBJL.
47

Philip Ball, Ghosts and Shadows: A Marine in Vietnam, 1968-1969 (Jefferson,
NC: McFarland and Co., Inc., Publishers, 1998), 153.

-214Kungkwan’s host city, restricted service club establishments within the city, and refused
to allow them near schools. In one incident, Arthur Hummel disapproved a military
proposal to take over the Central Theater Restaurant in Taichung because the governor
contended that “the building’s proximity to several large schools . . . has precluded the
issuance of a cabaret license to the present management.”48
Upon its completion, the newly-constructed CCK Airbase played a significant role
in the Vietnam War. Rather than launching B-52 bombing runs over North Vietnam, the
new air base hosted C-130 aircraft used to airlift supplies to Vietnam, as well as KC-135
tanker aircraft used to re-fuel bombers and fighters in mid-flight and to provide a
continuous radio link in the area of the Gulf of Tonkin. B-52 bombers were only allowed
to land at CCK for emergencies. By 1968, CCK had become an important airlift, refueling and communications post. From CCK air base, KC-135 aircraft flew nearly
32,000 sorties and unloaded 1.6 billion pounds of fuel in over 129,000 refuelings.49
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-215The increasing importance of Taiwan to the American war effort in Vietnam,
however, carried a political price. Some White House and State Department staffers grew
concerned that Chiang might stonewall on American use of Taiwanese facilities as
staging areas for military action in South Vietnam if the United States did not go along
with ROC plans to invade the PRC. James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security
Council Staff commented that “we have long understood that GRC desire for war with
Mainland China and U.S. desire to avoid such a collision run at cross purposes; but we
have usually been able to mute and disguise these differences.” He urged the Johnson
administration to remain firm and united against allowing the ROC to launch a military
attack against the Mainland. Thomson concluded that the United States, for exercising its
best judgement, could at least experience “some foot-dragging by the GRC on expanded
use of Taiwan facilities in connection with the Vietnam war.”50
In fact, if anything, Chiang Kai-shek grew increasingly impatient with what he
viewed as President Johnson’s approach to the Vietnam War. Concerned that Johnson
would seek a negotiated settlement with the communists, Chiang deemed it “essential that
a firm and clear-cut policy should be adhered to” to defeat communism in Vietnam.
“Further vacillation between the policy of winning the war and the policy of negotiating
for peace is not likely to improve the situation.” The Chinese Communists, according to
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-216Chiang, had successfully partitioned Vietnam using this method. Next, the communists
had launched an insurrection in South Vietnam and had created the “National Liberation
Front” to achieve a political settlement should a military settlement fail. If the free world
recognized the “National Liberation Front,” declared Chiang, “all sacrifices in battle and
accomplishments in other fields made by South Vietnam and her allies would have been
in vain, and the free world would have to continue to pay dearly for its serious political
mistakes.”51
As expected, Chiang soon renewed his push for a direct military role in Vietnam.
In March 1966, when Assistant Secretary of State William P. Bundy visited Taipei,
Chiang insisted that the United States could not end the conflict in Vietnam without his
government’s partnership and assistance. To emphasize his point, Chiang proclaimed
that his military “is the one thing that is holding the Chinese Communists back in the
south. Please convey this message. To the Chinese Communists the loss of 100,000 men
is nothing if they could destroy our forces.”52 President Johnson, however, remained
firm. He agreed with Chiang’s notion that the best way to preserve security in East Asia
was firmness against military aggression coupled with economic, social and political
development. But the United States would not permit Chiang to send his military into
Vietnam and directly assist the American forces fighting there. Johnson concluded that
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-217the United States “will persist with unshakeable determination in our commitment to
assist the people of South Vietnam in preserving their right to shape their own future
without external interference.”53
Rebuffed once again by the White House, Chiang and other high-ranking ROC
policymakers searched for another way to convince the United States to allow Nationalist
Chinese combat troops to assist the American military and the ARVN. In April 1966, a
CIA Intelligence Information Cable revealed that Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo
had ordered a study of the implications for the ROC government of a planned democratic
election held in South Vietnam. The report concluded any such election would result in
an American defeat and its withdrawal from South Vietnam. Filling the void, Chinese
Communists would increase their infiltration into Southeast Asia and take military action
against Taiwan. It was, therefore, imperative that the ROC convince the United States to
permit their military a greater role in Vietnam before any such election took place.
Meeting with high-level officials within the Ministry of National Defense concerning this
report, General Chiang contended that if the United States changed its “policy of
confining land military operations in Vietnam to the area south of the 17th parallel” and
permitted ROC combat troops into the war, their military would be better positioned to
attack Mainland China from Vietnam rather than from across the Taiwan Strait.
Apparently, ROC officials had been working on such a plan to attack the Mainland from
Vietnam, tentatively identified as the “Ching-Wu” Plan. General Chiang concluded that
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-218the ROC had to attack the Chinese Communists before the United States lost its hold on
South Vietnam.54
By spring 1966, South Vietnam’s growing instability threatened Chiang’s hope of
expanding the Vietnam War into a larger war against the Communist Chinese. Regional
and religious rivalry between the Roman Catholic political and military leadership in
Saigon and Buddhists in Hue and Danang in the north escalated into a brief civil war.
Buddhists had campaigned nationally to oust the Americans, negotiate a settlement with
the North Vietnamese, and remove Ky and the ARVN from power through free elections.
President Chiang feared a Buddhist victory against the South Vietnamese government
because it might cause the Chinese Communists to step up their infiltration, as predicted
by General Chiang Ching-kuo in April. This meant that Chiang’s military might lose its
chance to attack the PRC from Vietnam. On May 22, 1966, Chiang met with
Ambassador Walter McConaughy and Deputy Chief of Mission Arthur Hummel to
discuss the growing instability in South Vietnam. Chiang believed that the Buddhists
were under Communist influence and pleaded with McConaughy and Hummel to
convince American policy makers to firm up South Vietnamese authority over the
Buddhists.55
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-219Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo had other concerns about the Vietnam War.
He feared that American military assistance to the ROC would cease as the United States
became more militarily involved in South Vietnam. In May 1966, General Chiang
requested the U.S. to reconsider withdrawing eighteen F-104-As and F-104-Bs previously
stationed to assist Taiwan’s defense. Chiang agreed that American redeployment of these
aircraft was not crucial to Taiwan’s defense, but their departure would cause morale
problems for the Chinese Air Force and add to widespread uncertainty in Taiwan about
the future course of American policy. Even some members of the ROC legislature heard
rumors that the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s mission in the Taiwan Strait was to be either reduced
or eliminated. Arthur Hummel, Deputy Chief of Mission at the U.S. Embassy in Taipei,
suggested that one squadron of F-100s could be deployed to the ROC airbase at Tainan in
May or June 1966 to reassure the Taiwanese government, to which Defense Minister
Chiang agreed.56
When Walter McConaughy replaced Jerauld Wright as Ambassador to the ROC
in mid-1966, President Chiang and his son renewed their efforts to secure American
support for an attack on Mainland China. In an audience in May, Chiang and his son
agreed that the American priority should be to win the conflict in South Vietnam, but they
refused to back down on their hopes to overthrow the communist Mainland regime. Only
his regime, claimed President Chiang, could solve the American problem with the
Chinese Communists without becoming bogged down as a foreign invader. Chiang
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-220further declared that if the ROC army should attack the Mainland, the invasion would
actually avoid a direct conflict between the United States and the PRC, whereas such a
conflict that would happen anyway if the war in Vietnam dragged on. But McConaughy
reminded Chiang that there had been no change in the American policy on using force to
overthrow the Chinese Communists. Later, McConaughy privately recommended to
Secretary Rusk that the U.S. should “fend off mainland attack pitch without too flat a
turndown, without running risk of giving ChiComs [Chinese Communists] wrong signal
if they learn of talks, and without lending any unwarranted hopes to GRC leadership that
US attitude may change.”57 Secretary Rusk agreed with McConaughy’s analysis,
assuming that Chiang wanted only to resume consultations and possibly win some form
of American approval for military action against the Mainland. Rusk later warned that
the United States could not engage in joint contingency military planning for an offensive
action against the PRC, but the U.S. could engage in joint planning of Taiwan’s defense
under the terms of the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty.58
Meanwhile, the PRC was in the throes of the Great Proletarian Cultural
Revolution. Between 1966 and 1968, millions of young communists, or Red Guards,
attempted to destroy ancient and Western influence in China.59 Mao Zedong, who had
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-221grown anxious that the Chinese Communist Party had become complacent and
bureaucratic, played a central role in the Cultural Revolution. Additionally, Mao sided
with peasant Red Guards who could not compete with children of party officials for
jobs.60 This led to increased radicalism among the Red Guards and bloody street battles
throughout the Mainland.61 Chiang Kai-shek might have feared the situation on the
Mainland would generate enough anti-Western sentiment to encourage Mao to order a
military attack on the ROC. Taiwan’s leaders, after all, represented the antithesis to the
Red Guards’ sentiments.
Chiang also grew concerned over the PRC’s successful test of a guided missile
with a nuclear warhead in October 1966. He believed that it meant the PRC “would be in
a position within six months either to employ or to threaten use of these weapons
specifically in Vietnam.” In a November 1966 meeting with Chiang and his son, Defense
Minister Chiang Ching-kuo, Ambassador McConaughy contended that any use of nuclear
weapons “would be a madness far beyond any irrationality now discernible on the
mainland, since they must be aware of massive power that we could use in this event.”
Although the Defense Minister made no attempt to tie the missile test with the conflict in
Vietnam, he pleaded with McConaughy and Hummel to allow the ROC to step-up
Chinese Mainland intelligence operations. The American diplomats, as usual, remained
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-222non-committal.62
In December 1966, when Secretary of State Rusk visited Taipei, Chiang reminded
him that he and his government were the Chinese Communists’ chief enemies. He
claimed that the PRC planned to launch a nuclear strike against Taiwan with “ten or
twelve weapons.” Though it can not be determined whether Chiang’s claim was factual,
speculation or misinformation, Chiang claimed that the PRC would probably not expect a
retaliatory strike from the United States “because world opinion would consider that
Peking has a perfect right to bomb a part of its own territory but that, in any event, Peking
would expect to survive any such retaliation and its main enemy on Formosa would be
gone.” Rusk, thinking Chiang would recommend a first strike against Mainland Chinese
nuclear installations, attempted to calm the ROC President and claimed that the situation
he described would not occur. “Such developments,” wrote Rusk as part of his postmeeting comments, “lie in the realm of the insane and irrational.”63
Rusk’s conversation with Chiang led him to believe that Chiang had now changed
focus from launching a Mainland offensive to defending Taiwan. A January 1967 CIA
assessment confirmed this, concluding that President Chiang and his son were “tending
more toward a defensive-oriented strategy in the face of Red Guard chaos on the
mainland.” Furthermore, Chiang had given up on gaining American support for ROC
offensive efforts against the Chinese Communist regime. The assessment further claimed
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-223that Chiang seemed to believe the U.S. lacked a strong commitment to Taiwan’s defense
in the event of a Communist nuclear attack. The CIA, therefore, recommended that the
United States continue reassuring Chiang. Events on the Mainland would continue to
create instability in ROC planning.64
In January 1967, Arthur Hummel reported no overt signs of ROC preparation for
military action against the Mainland. Also, according to Hummel, Nationalist authorities
had not recently requested military assistance, and President Chiang had given no new
orders that action be taken against the Chinese Communists. Hummel warned, though,
that “if the situation on mainland changes markedly, calls for counterattack from certain
old guard KMT [Kuomintang Party] elements could become louder and more frequent.”65
One month later, Ambassador McConaughy also detected no signs of imminent ROC
military or paramilitary moves against Communist China. The Ambassador concluded
that ROC officials might have adopted a “wait-and-see” stance because of their limited
capabilities for unilateral action, and because outside pressures might “retard rather than
accelerate disintegrative trends on the mainland.”66
The respite proved short lived. In March 1967, President Chiang once again
requested American help in retaking the Mainland. In a conversation with UN
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-224Ambassador Goldberg, Chiang “bluntly and strongly” urged the United States to support
ROC military efforts against the PRC. According to Chiang, no settlement in Vietnam
could be reached, nor could the Chinese Communist nuclear menace be removed, nor
could Asian security be established as long as Mao remained in power on the Mainland.
Chiang’s plea, according to Alfred Jenkins of the National Security Council staff, was
unexpected because he had recently emphasized political rather than military measures
against the Mainland.67
A week later, National Security Advisor Walter W. Rostow recommended that
President Johnson reply to Chiang’s demand for support for an invasion of Mainland
China. Rostow suggested that while the United States had long sought peace in the
Taiwan Strait, it was not in Washington’s best interest to expand the Vietnam War
because “the American government and people would oppose action which would give
rise to danger of a wider war with incalculable consequences.” Nonetheless, the United
States would stand by its commitments stipulated in the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty
with the ROC.68 While the United States appreciated President Chiang’s position,
Rostow added: “The course which President Chiang advocated to Ambassador Goldberg
[in a meeting on March 1, 1967] would run counter to the policies we are pursuing in
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-225Viet-Nam.”69
Despite President Chiang’s protestations, a Country Team Assessment from the
U.S. Embassy in Taipei dated May 24, 1967, reported that the disorder on the Mainland
caused by the Cultural Revolution had “not stirred the GRC into more militant activities
against the mainland.” As far as they knew, there were no plans or preparations for any
major military actions against the Mainland, but the ROC continued to launch small-scale
intelligence operations against the coast of southern China, one of which had ended in
disaster on May 6, 1967. According to the assessment, small-scale intelligence
operations had continued sporadically, despite being hazardous and unproductive.70
Chiang also renewed his plan to establish a regional anti-communist military
alliance in Southeast Asia, with or without the approval of the United States. American
intelligence sources confirmed that representatives of the ROC and the government of
Thailand had agreed to “formulate a concrete program of military and intelligence
cooperation targeted against Communist China.” The program’s objective was for ROC
assistance to Thailand to stop “Chinese Communist subversive activities in Southeast
Asia.” It was further hoped that “behind-the-scenes activities” would also “promote the
establishment of official relations between the GRC and Malaysia in order to strengthen
anti-communist forces in Southeast Asia.”71
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-226The Republic of China had been interested in an Asian regional organization of
cooperation since the end of World War II. The ROC was not a member of the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) and had not been asked to contribute combat troops
either to the Korean War or the conflict in Vietnam because of “the reluctance of the US
and other nations to have collective efforts complicated by the participation of one of the
protagonists in the Chinese civil war.” Nonetheless, Nationalist Chinese military leaders
kept close relations with their counterparts in Korea, Thailand, Vietnam and the
Philippines. Throughout the 1960s, the ROC’s interest in regional cooperation
intensified. As discussed above, the ROC had sent economic and technical assistance to
Vietnam and had sent rice culture experts to the Philippines. While American policy
makers were encouraged by such Taiwanese initiatives “for political reasons . . . there
will continue to be severe limits to GRC regional activities in East Asia.”72
Chiang also planned to renew his ties to the remnants of ROC irregular troops still
holed up in the jungles of the Laos-Burma-Thailand border area. In late 1966, the United
States government learned that the ROC planned to strengthen its control over these
troops, but the effort failed because of funding and recruiting difficulties and the inability
to persuade irregular leaders to submit to orders coming from Taipei. In February 1967,
the U.S. embassy staff in Taipei notified ROC policy makers “that increased GRC
involvement with the irregulars would be against our interest and the interests of
Thailand, Burma and Laos and the GRC itself.” A May 1967 briefing paper concluded
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-227that the ROC had not been straightforward about the irregulars in the Burma-Laos border
region and the ROC had not “abandoned its hope to strengthen the irregulars and its
control over them.”73
Chiang also planned to expand direct aid from the ROC to the South Vietnamese
government. In January 1967, ROC delegates at a Sino-Vietnamese Economic
Cooperation Conference proposed to the South Vietnamese government a five-year rice
development plan, including a two-year crash program for the Mekong River Delta. After
studying the proposal, and, after consultation with the U.S. Agency for International
Development, the South Vietnamese Minister of Agriculture requested that no additional
Chinese technicians be sent. When ROC officials demurred, the South Vietnamese
Agriculture Minister declined to pursue the Chinese proposal.74
Meanwhile, William P. Bundy kept pressure on his colleagues at State and
Defense to support a larger military and economic role in Southeast Asia for the ROC. In
a May 1967 memorandum to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Bundy suggested that the
ROC military could be used covertly in South Vietnam if handled very carefully. The
South Vietnamese were certainly sensitive to the presence of third country nationals
within their borders, especially the Chinese. Bundy believed that the best way to assure
ROC officials of increased participation in Viet-Nam “would be trilateral consultations in
Saigon on the Chinese assistance program,” probably at semi-annual meetings of the
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-228Sino-Vietnamese Economic Cooperation Conferences.75
Probably hoping the Johnson administration would accede to Nationalist Chinese
pressure to expand the Vietnamese conflict to include ROC combat troops, ROC Vice
President C. K. Yen met with President Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State William P.
Bundy and Secretary of State Dean Rusk in May 1967. Focusing on Chinese Nationalist
involvement in the Vietnam War, Yen stated that his country would do nothing harmful
to American interests. Concerned about the number of Chinese Communist personnel in
North Vietnam, which he estimated at between 60,000 and 80,000, Yen expressed
Chiang’s belief that the Chinese Communists were using North Vietnam to fight the
Americans by proxy, and that the only way to solve the Vietnamese problem was
“through a changed situation on the mainland.”76
Meanwhile, as Chiang Ching-kuo had feared, by July 1967, some State
Department analysts questioned the wisdom of continued American assistance in the
Taiwan Strait. Josiah Bennett, ROC Country Director in the State Department, asked
Arthur Hummel in the Taipei Embassy to inventory the American presence on the
Offshore Islands. The ensuing report, entitled “U.S. Activities on the Offshore Islands,”
highlighted Military Assistance Planning (MAP) support provided to Taiwanese troops
stationed there. All of the 64,500 Nationalist troops stationed on Quemoy received help
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-229from MAP. Of the 24,800 troops on Matsu, nearly 21,000 received assistance from
MAP. “MAP support was originally not given to GRC forces on Quemoy and Matsu, but
was gradually extended as a result of MAP supported units on Taiwan being rotated to the
islands.” Advising the ROC troops were a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG)
team of one enlisted man and five officers on Quemoy and a MAAG team of one enlisted
man and three officers on Matsu. The report also noted that the ROC had “actively
encouraged a wide range of Americans official and unofficial,” to visit Quemoy “to
enliven U.S. interest in the Offshores and create an identification with them which would
strengthen the sense of U.S. commitment to their defense.”77
When Bennett brought his findings to analysts in the office of the Commander-inChief of Pacific Forces (CINCPAC), their “general consensus was that except for one
small island held by irregular forces [Wu-ch’iu Hsu], the other large islands would be
very difficult and costly for the Communists to take.” They then admitted that the
Chinese Communists “would probably be able to establish air superiority over the islands,
thus putting themselves in a position to interdict resupply operations.” The ROC
defenders would not be able to hold out under such an attack and the ROC would likely
pressure the United States for increased military involvement. Thus, any Chinese
Communist assault on the Offshore Islands would be costly to both Taiwan and the
United States.78 Analysts advising CINCPAC concluded that any further American
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-230assistance to Taiwan on the Offshore Islands would prove futile.
In October 1967, Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo sought other means of
obtaining American military assistance not only to maintain Quemoy and Matsu but also
to launch an invasion of the Mainland. Meeting with Ambassador McConaughy, he
argued that joint intelligence-gathering missions and political action against the PRC
would “stir up changes on mainland and unrest in Communist armed forces which might
accelerate collapse of regime.” McConaughy agreed with Chiang that both the United
States and the ROC should follow Mainland Chinese developments more closely. But
McConaughy went much further and included the Vietnam War in his assessment. The
ROC, the American ambassador declared, should not needlessly provoke the Communist
Chinese because the U.S. feared that such action would escalate the war in Vietnam. If
the PRC intervened directly in Vietnam, the new situation would require a major
reassessment. McConaughy concluded that the United States would not agree to any
action against the Mainland if the Chinese Communists did not intervene in Vietnam.
Defense Minister Chiang responded that he understood this position, which was why he
mentioned only political involvement, not military, because the ROC did not wish to
contradict American policy.79
Secretary Rusk, upon reading McConaughy’s notes on his meeting with Defense
Minister Chiang, agreed that cooperative efforts to gather intelligence on the PRC might
pay dividends. Rusk, though, suggested that McConaughy approach Chiang to confirm
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-231the need for closer consultation and meaningful joint intelligence gathering activities to
obtain a more complete analysis of the Mainland situation. Rusk also urged caution
because he worried that Chiang might have been trying to solicit American support for an
expanded ROC program of “political warfare,” including sabotage, guerrilla drops and
clandestine political activities.80
McConaughy believed he could head off the ROC’s intelligence-gathering
proposal by applying Blue Lion Committee ground-rules to political warfare. The Blue
Lion Committee, made up of staffers from the ROC Ministry of National Defense and
U.S. military advisors from the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command, had been first organized
in October 1963 to study ROC military proposals, to advise on joint planning for a
“return to the mainland” and to approve any invasion plans. In fact, the U.S. had used the
committee to delay any ROC attack on the Mainland. In their meeting on November 7,
1967, McConaughy agreed with General Chiang to improve joint intelligence gathering
and analysis, but he asked the Defense Minister for a clearer definition of “political
warfare.” Chiang defined it as methods designed “to impede Mao’s efforts to form
internal ‘alliances’ that include dissident elements . . . to see that the internal struggles on
the mainland do not stop.” Defense Minister Chiang believed that contact could be made
with new anti-Maoist elements on the southern Chinese coast. From this conversation,
McConaughy concluded that:
it is conceivable that GRC has indeed made new contacts with dissident elements
in the interior of China, but the absence of evidence, and past experience, points
80
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-232against the possibility. In fact it occurs to us here that the embarrassing paucity of
GRC contacts may be [an] additional factor in [the] probable overall GRC
political disinclination to see us involved in GRC-ChiCom contacts.81
McConaughy believed that President Chiang, through his son, wished to determine the
American position on contacting dissident elements on the Mainland. In other words,
General Chiang was on a fishing expedition and was not sincere in establishing closer
cooperation in intelligence planning and operations.82
Alfred Jenkins weighed in on his concerns on President Chiang’s change in
tactics. According to Jenkins, Chiang viewed the Mainland as descending into chaos and
the Beijing regime as disintegrating. But up until the Cultural Revolution, most Mainland
Chinese had supported the revolution because it had unified the country and stabilized the
currency, achieved a strong foreign policy and military with nuclear weapons, and had
promised to improve Chinese living standards. Disenchantment with Mao’s regime had
become widespread and confidence in the communist system had been shaken. But even
if there were to be any change in the Mainland government, concluded Jenkins, it would
remain communist.83
Meanwhile, Chiang Ching-kuo publicly reiterated that the ROC would “in the not
too distant future . . . overthrow the Communist regime.” Ambassador McConaughy
cabled the State Department that “such statements disturb and concern [the] Japanese,
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-233ourselves and other governments,” but the ROC had been making these statements for the
past eighteen years, during which time it had not undertaken military action against the
Mainland. Nonetheless, ROC officials continued to present a national image of “being
actively engaged in hastening [the] downfall of [the] Chinese Communists” because the
ROC “must maintain [its] claim to be [the] government of all China and keep alive, at
least publicly, its goal of mainland recovery, in order to justify its rule on Taiwan and
protect its legitimacy.”84
As Chiang Ching-kuo announced the impending return of the ROC to the
Mainland, the war in Vietnam took a disastrous turn. In February 1968, the Viet Cong
and North Vietnamese Army attacked thirty-six provincial capitals, sixty-four district
towns, and several American military bases, including the American embassy in Saigon.
The Tet Offensive, albeit a military victory, was a tremendous political and public
relations defeat for the United States. Some of the most trusted American journalists, like
Walter Cronkite and Frank McGee, now questioned whether defeating communism in
Vietnam was worth the price.85
The implications of the Tet Offensive soon affected U.S. policy toward the ROC.
In March 1968, columnist Jack Anderson of the Washington Post wrote two articles
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-234criticizing Defense Department plans to cut spending on Taiwan’s military, citing “the
demands of the Vietnam War.” Anderson suggested that the United States might ask
Chiang to abandon his vulnerable Offshore Islands, and warned that these proposed
spending cuts “might tempt the Red Chinese to strike” at Taiwan.86 Reaction from
Congress to Anderson’s columns was swift. Hoping Anderson’s March 20, 1968, column
was in error, Representative Basil Lee Whitener (D-North Carolina) urged “that the
executive branch of our government abandon immediately any discussion of lessening
our cooperation with the free people of China.” Quemoy and Matsu, according to
Whitener, were too important to the defense of Southeast Asia and their abandonment
would be tragic.87 Likewise, Senator J. Strom Thurmond (R-South Carolina) argued that,
due to the unrest on Mainland China and the war in Vietnam, “the last thing the United
States should do is to force a trusted ally to withdraw.”88
In Taiwan, President Chiang expressed great concern over Anderson’s articles.
He argued that they would encourage the Chinese Communists to attack Quemoy and
Matsu, which were strategically linked to Taiwan’s defense. If Quemoy and Matsu were
lost to the Communists, the United States would experience great difficulty defending the
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-235ROC with its naval and air power. If Anderson’s information was correct, such policies
would negatively influence Taiwanese morale, would incite the Chinese Communists to
attack the Offshore Islands, and would give the Mainland regime enough momentum to
attack Taiwan. Chiang thus demanded that the United States publicly declare the islands
to be the undisputed territory of the ROC. Ambassador McConaughy, however, urged
President Chiang not to give too much credence to the articles, and reminded him that
differences of opinion existed in the United States concerning China policy. The
administration and the Congress, however, were “steadfast on basic policy as it stands.”89
Dean Rusk, in his reply to Chiang, stated that the Anderson articles did not
represent the position of the United States Government and had attracted no significant
attention in the United States. Rusk also commented that there were still no indications
that the Chinese Communists intended to provoke an incident in the Taiwan Strait or had
planned similar maneuvers. Angrily, Rusk concluded that if American sacrifices in lives
to keep Taiwan and Southeast Asia free were not enough to satisfy Chiang, then:
I do not see how the achievement of a sense of assurance is possible. Certainly
between such close allies as the United States and the Republic of China there
should be no doubt on this score. The expression of such doubts, in the face of
extraordinary sacrifices we are being called upon to make, would not be received
well by the American people and would give a powerful stimulation to those
voices among us who are urging isolation and withdrawal from our
responsibilities in other parts of the world.90
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-236The war in Vietnam apparently caused President Chiang to doubt the American
commitment to defend Taiwan and the Offshore Islands. Thomas L. Hughes, Director of
Intelligence and Research in the Department of State, concluded that the Tet Offensive in
South Vietnam confirmed Chiang’s conviction that the U.S. policy of limited warfare in
Vietnam could not defeat the Communists. Moreover, the Vietnam War pinched Military
Assistance Programming to Taiwan.91 American military aid to Taiwan decreased from
$91.3 million in fiscal year 1966 to a proposed $25 million in fiscal year 1970.92
Chiang Kai-shek’s doubts about American reliability possibly led him to pursue
unilateral action in Southeast Asia. Ambassador McConaughy warned that the problem
of KMT irregulars in the Burma-Laos border region had once again flared up. The Thai
and Burmese governments had made offers to the irregular troops to fight against
Communist insurgents, which caused the ROC government to take action. McConaughy
revealed that he knew of ROC plans to unify the various irregular groups to form a more
effective anti-communist fighting unit in Burma under ROC command. Initially, only
money and supplies would be sent, but, in time, the ROC would send additional men into
the border area to help the irregulars in some operations. ROC officials, according to
McConaughy, “feel that this plan would offer least political difficulty for the present and
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-237would be flexible enough for future contingency use of the irregulars.”93
By the end of 1968, Chiang still held to the hope that the United States would
permit his military, with American assistance, to launch an attack against the Mainland
regime. Chiang continued to believe that the end result of an anti-communist revolt on
the Mainland would be a restoration of his rule. At the end of the Johnson presidency,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk paid one last visit to President Chiang. In his last
communication with Chiang, Rusk warned that 200 million Americans were not willing
to fight a conventional war with 800 million Mainland Chinese. Chiang misunderstood
Rusk to mean that the Americans might use nuclear weapons rather than fight a
conventional war. “You must never, ever think of using nuclear weapons against China,”
Chiang angrily replied. Rusk realized that Chiang’s “Chineseness” was more important
than being ruler of all China.94

Conflicting Ideas Concerning China Policy, 1967-68
From late 1967 to early 1968, as U.S. military activity in Vietnam increasingly
complicated relations with the ROC, several reports on the future of China policy
percolated through the foreign policy apparatus. Three of these reports, each addressing
how to deal with the PRC-ROC issue in the United Nations, found their way to President
Johnson’s desk in late February 1968. These included a report by Secretary of State Rusk
entitled “Policy Toward Communist China,” a report by Alfred Jenkins entitled
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-238“Thoughts on China,” and an academic specialists’ report entitled “Memorandum on
China Policy.” While the academicians’ report stated that the U.S. should support the
PRC’s entry into the UN if it did so on the same terms as other countries, Secretary
Rusk’s report argued against allowing the PRC into the UN and favored working toward
an acknowledgment that the Peking and Taipei regimes were “two separate states.” Rusk
concluded that “There is nothing that can presently be done directly to solve the problems
of Taiwan. We are committed to its defense but for all practical purposes deal with
Peking and Taipei as if they were separate states.” Jenkins agreed with Secretary Rusk,
stating that “This is certainly no time to bring China into the UN, but I think there is no
danger in it.” Jenkins reasoned, though, that Mao would not accept limited UN
membership.95
A month later, Thomas P. Shoesmith of the State Department’s Office of East
Asian Affairs specifically addressed the ROC problem in a report entitled “U.S. Policy
Toward the Republic of China: A New Perspective.” According to Shoesmith, United
States-Taiwan policy “has increasingly become a source of difficulty and internal
contradiction, as our policy has moved in the direction of attempting to open avenues of
rapprochement between the United States and Communist China.” Taiwan, therefore,
“now constitutes a major obstacle to the development of a far-ranging policy toward
mainland China.” With regard to the Chinese representation issue in the United Nations,
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-239Shoesmith stated “that it will continue to be in our interests to oppose strongly any
decision by the United Nations to admit Communist China and exclude the Republic of
China.” But he predicted by 1973, a majority in the UN might endorse representation for
both the Communist and Nationalist Chinese and “such a change would be compatible
with our long-range interests with respect to Taiwan.” If the United States provided
active support for such a change in the UN, though, it “would seriously prejudice our
ability to exert an influence on the GRC in directions compatible with our long-range
interests and objectives.” Shoesmith also suggested that it might be necessary to amend
the UN Charter to allow the ROC to co-exist with the PRC.96
Shoesmith’s report received widespread support within the administration. Alfred
Jenkins called it “the most thoughtful paper on the vexing Taiwan problem which I have
seen in some time.” Jenkins summarized Shoesmith’s report as an analysis concerning
the “Taiwanization” of American policy toward the ROC, that American China policy
had become too solely focused on protecting Nationalist Chinese interests. Jenkins noted
that Shoesmith advocated that the United States be more tolerant and accepting of
attempts to seat the PRC, “although for the foreseeable future our own policy should not
change.” While Jenkins believed the report to be quite realistic, he contended that:
the ultimate fate of Taiwan will depend not so much on what we do or do not do .
. . although our policy will certainly remain a major factor. Taiwan’s fate will at
least as much depend on what happens on the mainland and what course is taken
on Taiwan–primarily by Chiang Ching-kuo–after the Gimo’s death. Whether
Ching-kuo then opts for a relatively popular base for government or looks to
military support for a “tight little island” will in turn have considerable effect
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-240upon U.S. policy toward Taiwan.97
In a June 20, 1968, memorandum, Jenkins stated that Chiang Kai-shek believed
that “the UN needs the GRC more than the GRC needs the UN.” While the UN could be
weakened if the PRC were allowed entry, the United States “should strongly support the
GRC’s position and oppose Peking’s entry, at least pending a post-Cultural Revolution
reading.” The United States, however, “should not . . . fight the GRC battle as though it
were much more our battle than that of the GRC.” “The costs of making it our battle are
too high and the penalties of failure, if that should come, too severe.” Carrying the battle
for the ROC would leave the U.S. vulnerable to criticism from both world opinion and
the ROC, especially if the United States subsequently failed.98

Conclusion
The ineffectiveness of the Committee for One Million and the China Lobby had
become apparent by the late 1960s. This was evident in Gallup Polls taken between 1961
and 1970, which showed steadily increasing domestic support for admitting the PRC into
the United Nations. On ten occasions, between March 24, 1961, and October 18, 1970,
the Gallup Poll asked Americans: "Do you think Communist China should or should not
be admitted as a member of the United Nations?" In this ten-year period, the percentage
of those wishing to keep the Mainland regime out of the UN dropped fifteen points. On
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-241the other hand, in the same ten-year period, those who wished to see Communist China
admitted to the United Nations increased from twenty percent to thirty-five percent of
respondents, an increase of fifteen percent. Therefore, increasing numbers of Americans
polled favored admission of the People's Republic of China into the UN.99
A similar question asked by Gallup provides more striking results concerning
American opinion toward recognition of the PRC and its admission in the United
Nations. On six occasions between March 24, 1961, and February 20, 1969, the Gallup
Poll asked Americans: "Suppose a majority of the members of the United Nations decide
to admit Communist China to the United Nations. Do you think the United States should
go along with the UN decision or not." A growing number of Americans, from forty-two
percent in 1964 to fifty-six percent in 1969, favored going along with a United Nations
decision to admit Communist China.100
These figures from the Gallup Poll, though, do not indicate that a significant
segment of the United States favored sweeping changes in policy toward China. In fact,
no strong pressure existed among Americans to change China policy radically throughout
the 1950s and 1960s. Only a handful of professors, “China watchers” and liberal
congressmen advocated significant policy changes toward the PRC in the 1960s. It was
not until President Richard M. Nixon’s 1972 trip to China that Americans came to accept
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CHAPTER VII
EPILOGUE: U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE ROC SINCE 1969
Throughout the mid-1960s, Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan continually
insisted on United States help to maintain its legitimacy as the sole government of China.
Republic of China (ROC) officials also pressured the U.S. to allow the Chinese
Nationalists a larger role in the Vietnam War. But by the end of Lyndon B. Johnson’s
presidency in January 1969, the American effort to win over Vietnamese peasants and
halt communism’s spread in Southeast Asia showed signs of failure. Televised military
action in Vietnam brought home realities of death and destruction. Overspending due to
the war in Vietnam and Great Society programs contributed to a national recession that
ended the economic boom of the 1960s and led to calls for spending cuts. As the
influence of the China Lobby and the China Bloc diminished, congressional opinion
shifted somewhat to support changes in China policy. By 1968, American policymakers
in the Department of State had already discussed and accepted policy alternatives and
proposed to alter the diplomatic landscape in East Asia by normalizing relations with the
People’s Republic of China (PRC). When Richard M. Nixon became President of the
United States in 1969, the stage had already been set for change.

-243-

-244Richard M. Nixon and China Policy
President Nixon’s pre-presidential opinions and actions concerning communism
would not have caused one to predict he would seek closer ties to the PRC. Nixon had
earned anti-communist and pro-Nationalist China credentials as a United States
Representative and United States Senator from California from 1947 to 1953, and as
President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s Vice President from 1953 to 1961. But throughout the
1968 presidential campaign, Nixon shied away from discussion of the Cold War, rarely
mentioning the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Rather, Nixon stressed
the Vietnam War, crime, violence and inflation.1
Nixon’s views on containing communism in East Asia were dramatically affected
by the Vietnam War. His 1967 Foreign Affairs article, “Asia After Viet Nam,” provided
some insight to his views on China policy. Nixon argued that the Vietnam War had
distorted American policy in East Asia and left a legacy of domestic and foreign division
and economic chaos. As a result, the United States could no longer afford to act as the
“world policeman.” Future American policy in East Asia, therefore, had to recognize not
only the threat posed by the PRC, but also had to recognize the limits of American power.
Significantly, Nixon no longer favored leaving Communist China outside the diplomatic
mainstream, as had been American policy since the 1950s. The future president proposed
that the United States subtly and peacefully encourage positive relations with the PRC
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-245and further stabilize the region.2 Although the American commitment to Vietnam would
be Nixon’s top priority as president, he made no mention of how these proposed changes
would affect future American relations with the ROC.
Nixon’s choice for National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, had similar ideas
on altering American foreign policy toward China. Kissinger believed it was in the
United States’ best interest to work with both the Soviet Union and the Communist
Chinese. The American relationship with the ROC stemmed from the idea that the
communist regime in Beijing was not a legitimate government.3 The PRC government,
though, could no longer be ignored on the world stage and had to be respected as a major
power representing 800 million people. Essentially, Kissinger privately contended that
the U.S. did not need the ROC as a regional military ally. Additionally, American tactical
nuclear weapons would offset Soviet and Chinese advantages in military manpower.4
This balance of power between the United States, the Soviet Union, and the PRC, would
effectively dismiss the ROC government as an important regional power in East Asia.
Through early 1969, Nixon and Kissinger, the architects of “détente,” charted a
foreign policy course which proposed to move the United States closer to the Chinese
Communists, to thaw American relations with the Soviet Union, and to extricate it from
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-246the Vietnam War. In his first presidential news conference seven days after his
inauguration, Nixon placated the Nationalist Chinese and stated that the United States
would continue its policy of opposing Communist China.5 Nonetheless, Nixon and
Kissinger proposed to reduce tensions with both the Soviet Union and with the PRC
through well-publicized talks. Under détente, Nixon and Kissinger hoped to reach
accommodation with the two major communist powers, promote peaceful coexistence,
and recognize that Soviet and Communist Chinese security interests would not
necessarily conflict with American interests.6 Through this new diplomatic
accommodation, Nixon and Kissinger sought “peace with honor” in Vietnam and a
lasting peace in Southeast Asia, beginning with a negotiated settlement that would
preserve South Vietnam’s independence.7
In July 1969, President Nixon met informally with reporters on Guam and
outlined his foreign policy vision. Nixon declared that the United States would
encourage countries in East Asia to take responsibility for their own defense. The only
exception would be in the event of a threat of an attack from a major power with nuclear
weapons. The “Nixon Doctrine” both established Nixon’s plan of Vietnamization and
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-247signaled an overt change in military and diplomatic relations with the Republic of China.8
Nixon’s changes in American policy toward East Asia directly threatened
Nationalist Chinese survival. Throughout the 1960s, the Nationalist Chinese had sought
to use the Vietnam War to secure continued American military aid, and, to “return to the
mainland” one day through an expanded regional war with the PRC. Détente and efforts
to negotiate an end to the Vietnam War directly threatened the regime of Chiang Kai-shek
for two reasons. First, détente forced the ROC to accept that their strongest ally, the
United States, might extend formal diplomatic relations to their gravest enemy, the PRC.
This, in effect, challenged the ROC’s claim to be the sole legitimate government of all
China and jeopardized its seat in the United Nations General Assembly and on the UN
Security Council. Second, an end to the war in Vietnam would end any hope of Chiang
militarily regaining control over all China for the foreseeable future and thus regaining
the mandate from heaven that he had lost in 1949.
Nixon and Kissinger brought to the table different methods and ideas regarding
China policy. Generally, Nixon and Kissinger formulated foreign policy through the
White House and the National Security Council. This action relegated the State
Department bureaucracy to a secondary role. But State Department officials since the restaffing and reorganization of the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs early on in the Kennedy
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-248administration had long considered various changes in China policy. In May 1969, the
Policy Planning Council staff issued its opinion on the future of United States-Chinese
relations entitled “U.S. Policy Toward Communist China.” The Taiwan problem,
according to the report, was the central obstacle to normalizing relations between the
United States and the PRC and there were only two possible solutions. First, the Beijing
government could back down and allow Taipei to declare its independence. Second,
Taiwan and the Mainland could merge through either warfare or peaceful negotiation.
Any chance of either scenario taking place, however, was remote. Rather, the report
suggested that the Taiwan issue, just like the division of Berlin in Germany between the
east and the west, would last for a long time. Finally, the report suggested that the United
States should help the ROC to become a separate political entity, but should not publicly
proclaim the ROC to be the rightful government of all China. Instead, the United States
should describe the Beijing regime as “a firmly established government” with which the
United States government would deal on Chinese Mainland matters.9
This report by the Policy Planning Council staff also suggested that the Untied
States government’s ability to keep the ROC in the UN, by 1969, had become much more
limited than before. Though the staff was optimistic that improving attitudes among
political leaders on Taiwan and on the Mainland would improve the chances of dual
representation, they thought it was more likely that the voting balance in the General
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-249Assembly would tip against the United States and the ROC. Their report further stated
that the PRC and the ROC could not simultaneously be represented in the UN because
Communist China’s admission would cause the exclusion or withdrawal of the
Nationalist Chinese from the entire United Nations system.10 The staff concluded that, as
a result, a scenario where the Nationalist and Communist Chinese shared dual
representation in the UN would not be a realistic solution to the problem.
According to Winston Lord, who served on President Nixon’s National Security
Council from 1969 to 1973, Nixon and Kissinger wanted to deal openly with Communist
China without destroying the American relationship with Taiwan. They hoped to expand
dialogue between the United States and the PRC, but knowing that the PRC would
demand that the United States recognize Communist China as the sole legitimate
government of all China, they hoped that this issue could be delayed sufficiently for the
United States to maintain a relationship with the Taipei government, effectively
establishing a “two Chinas” policy. 11 Even so, in late 1969, Vice President Spiro Agnew
informed President Chiang Kai-shek that, by December, the U.S. Seventh Fleet would
cease its patrols in the Taiwan Strait. Embassy staffers thereafter began to prepare the
Taiwanese public for possible changes in American policy toward the Republic of China
through monthly press briefings. The news was not received well. Several months after
Agnew’s announcement, the United States Information Agency office in Tainan, a city on
Taiwan’s southwestern coast, was nearly destroyed by a bomb blast. According to Robert
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-250L. Nichols, the embassy’s Public Affairs Officer, the embassy staff strongly suspected
that supporters of the Nationalist regime had orchestrated the attack.12
In an attempt to head off any further diplomatic problems with the Chinese
Nationalists, President Nixon sent veteran diplomat Robert Murphy to speak with ROC
President Chiang Kai-shek in early 1971. The Chinese representation issue was about to
be discussed in the United Nations General Assembly once again, and Nixon wanted to
leave little doubt in Chiang’s mind that he supported Nationalist China’s effort to
maintain its seat. Nixon also wanted to normalize relations with the Communist Chinese,
who sought Nationalist China’s seat in the UN. Nixon, therefore, implored Murphy to
talk with Chiang about accepting a “dual representation” formula, whereby both the PRC
and the ROC would share membership in the United Nations. Murphy told Chiang that
the Nationalists could keep their seat simply by cooperating with the United States and
that the Communist Chinese might refuse to accept the deal. Chiang was willing to go
along with the American plan, but only if the United States refused to sponsor the Beijing
regime’s membership and rallied support for the “Important Question” tactic.13
The United States inched closer to the Communist Chinese and grew more distant
from the Nationalists. In July 1971, Henry Kissinger secretly visited the PRC and
returned with a pledge from the Communist leadership to allow Nixon to make an official
state visit the next year. In his secret talks with Zhou Enlai, Kissinger promised to reduce
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-251the United States’ military presence on Taiwan by two-thirds as part of its withdrawal
from Vietnam.14 Nationalist Chinese diplomats became skeptical about Kissinger’s visit
to Beijing. Without knowing what had been discussed between Kissinger and Zhou,
Secretary of State William Rogers explained to Nationalist Ambassador James C. H.
Shen that the visit was only to increase contacts between the United States and the PRC,
improve relations and promote world peace. Rogers also reassured Shen that the United
States would stand by its treaty obligations with the ROC. Back in Taipei, Deputy
Foreign Minister H. K. Yang protested to U.S. Ambassador Walter McConaughy, who
was embarrassed and surprised by Kissinger’s visit, and called Nixon’s approach to the
PRC “a most unfriendly act.”15

Demise of the Committee of One Million and the
ROC Ouster from the United Nations
Meanwhile, the Committee of One Million had fallen apart by the late 1960s. In
1969, Marvin Liebman left the group when his firm went out of business. Two years
later, the Committee folded, probably because it was no longer needed. At best, the
Committee of One Million was a modest, but ultimately unsuccessful, attempt to keep the
People’s Republic of China out of the United Nations and prevent American diplomatic
recognition. Although its congressional supporters projected bipartisanship, the COOM
reached out to anti-communists and “new conservatives” for its core of support.
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-252Ultimately, the Committee failed to raise enough money to pay for new and efficient
means of mass communication to generate public support and manipulate policy.
Inflation in the United States, exacerbated by high military spending for the Vietnam
War, compounded the Committee’s fund-raising problems. With no money to sell their
message, Liebman and the remnants of the China Lobby were rendered helpless to reach a
larger and more mainstream following. Their failure contributed to the widening of the
public debate over the future of American policy toward the Republic of China.
Liebman, whose techniques “preached to the converted,” utilized what methods he could
afford, but failed to generate a broad base American public opinion in support of Chiang
Kai-shek and the Nationalist Chinese government.
Throughout the 1960s, the American delegation to the United Nations had
continually forged deals and utilized various tactics to keep the ROC in the UN. By
October 1971, these tactics had worn thin among members of the General Assembly, and
many of the new member nations supported the Albanian resolution to accept the PRC
and to expel the Nationalists. George H. W. Bush, United States Ambassador to the
United Nations, argued before the General Assembly that expelling the ROC delegation
was ill advised and would set a dangerous precedent. While he agreed that the
Communist Chinese should be granted membership in the United Nations, he argued that
expulsion of the ROC was an unacceptable price to pay. Bush also stated that if the ROC
were indeed expelled, it was not likely that Chiang and the representatives of the Taipei

-253government would ever be readmitted.16
On October 25, 1971, the United Nations General Assembly voted on two
resolutions concerning Chinese representation in the UN. The first resolution declared
that any proposal to change China’s representative status would be an “important
question,” requiring a two-thirds majority vote. This resolution was defeated 55 to 59
with 15 abstentions. The second resolution, the Albanian resolution, proposed that all
rights of membership be granted to the People’s Republic of China and that the ROC be
expelled from the United Nations. This second resolution passed 76 to 35 with 17
abstentions. After the vote on the Albanian resolution, Ambassador Bush stated that
expelling the ROC was a serious mistake and hoped that the General Assembly had not
established a precedent regarding UN membership. Despite the ROC’s removal from the
UN, Bush further stated that “nothing that has happened here today will in any way affect
the ties which the Untied States has with the Republic of China, which remains an
honored and valuable member of the international community.”17 Secretary of State
William Rogers publicly regretted the United Nations action, declaring this to be an
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-254unfortunate mistake which would adversely affect the UN in the future.18 The Republic
of China was, therefore, expelled from the United Nations in October 1971 and was
replaced in the General Assembly, on the Security Council, and in other UN-related
organizations, with representatives from the PRC.19

U.S.-ROC Relations in Decline, 1972-76
As the United Nations carried on its business without the Republic of China,
American relations with the Nationalists grew increasingly strained when President
Nixon announced plans to evacuate American forces from Vietnam. Coined
“Vietnamization,” Nixon planned to turn over most of the fighting to the South
Vietnamese while American troops withdrew. This meant that the nearly ten thousand
American troops stationed on Taiwan to support U.S. military operations in Vietnam
would likewise soon depart. Meanwhile, Nixon’s state visit to the People’s Republic of
China in early 1972 further contributed to strained relations between the U.S. and the
ROC. Some high-ranking Nationalist diplomats feared that American withdrawal from
Vietnam and from Taiwan signaled the beginning of the end of their country. James
Shen, ROC Ambassador to the United States, saw Nixon’s visit as “an opening wedge to
prod the United States military forces to leave Taiwan as a prelude to the termination of
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-255the Mutual Defense Treaty.”20
Nationalist diplomats were not the only ones concerned about Nixon’s intentions.
Secretary of State William Rogers and other State Department officials, who were
excluded from Nixon’s mission to the PRC, were outraged when Nixon and Kissinger
failed to discuss with Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong American treaty obligations to the
ROC.21 Under the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States pledged to help defend
Taiwan in the event of a Chinese Communist invasion. Rogers believed the Mutual
Defense Treaty acknowledged the separate existence of the ROC as the government of all
China. But according to the Shanghai Communique of February 27, 1972, the PRC
insisted that the Taiwan question was the one issue in the way of normalized relations
with the United States. Opposing any “two Chinas” policy, the PRC considered Taiwan
to be one of its provinces. Hence, Chinese Communist officials considered that any
invasion and takeover of Taiwan was an internal issue, with which no country had the
right to interfere. The United States, therefore, pledged to the PRC that it would slowly
withdraw its remaining forces and military installations from Taiwan.22
By January 1973, as the United States and the North Vietnamese agreed to a
cease-fire and as the South Vietnamese, with continued American military aid, fought for
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-256their very survival, Nationalist Chinese officials proclaimed that South Vietnam had been
betrayed and feared that they would be next. Although the Nixon administration
continually reassured ROC officials that their long-standing alliance would not fall apart,
the American military and diplomatic presence on Taiwan dramatically decreased
between the end of the Vietnam War in 1973 and 1979.23
Meanwhile, in August 1974, the Watergate scandal brought an end to Richard
Nixon’s presidency. Gerald R. Ford, a long-time Republican member of the House of
Representatives from Michigan who had replaced Spiro Agnew as Vice President,
suddenly was thrust into the Oval Office. Ford appointed Henry Kissinger as his
Secretary of State and carried on with Nixon’s foreign policy. He tried to placate the
ROC government on Taiwan. By 1976, Nationalist officials had become sensitive to any
action which would diminish their relationship with the United States. Although Ford
sent Vice President Nelson Rockefeller to President Chiang Kai-shek’s funeral in April
1976 and made public statements referring to the Republic of China as the United States’
“old friend,” Ford further reduced the American military presence on Taiwan by seventy
percent and held strictly to the tenets of the Shanghai Communique of 1972.24
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-257Outside forces help explain the ROC’s anger toward, and the PRC’s eagerness to
work with, the United States. Between 1972 and 1976, Taiwan’s economy grew
exponentially due, in part, to the millions given in American military and economic aid
throughout the 1950s and 1960s.25 As this aid helped stimulate Taiwan’s economy, the
island’s manufacturing output increased along with its foreign trade (especially with the
United States), creating a period of sustained economic growth in the 1970s.26 While
Taiwan’s economy boomed, Mainland China’s economy also started to improve in the
early 1970s. As the Cultural Revolution tempered its radicalism, and as the United States
ended its twenty-one year old trade embargo on Mao’s government, new leadership
introduced policies promoting economic growth.27 As relations between the PRC and the
Soviet Union soured in the late 1950s and deteriorated throughout the 1960s, these new
Communist Chinese officials, such as Zhou Enlai, took advantage of the opportunity to
improve relations with the United States at the expense of America’s relationship with
Taiwan.28 With the end of U.S. support to the Nationalists in sight, in the light of the
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-258American pullout of South Vietnam and détente with the Communist Chinese, ROC
officials understandably grew concerned for their government’s future.

James E. Carter and the End of Formal
United States Relations with the ROC
In November 1976, James E. “Jimmy” Carter, former Democratic Governor of
Georgia, was elected President of the United States. According to Gaddis Smith, Carter
had no overarching foreign policy for Asia, but certainly planned to continue efforts made
by Nixon and Kissinger to normalize relations with the PRC. Like Nixon, Ford and
Kissinger, President Carter did not want to be accused by the ROC of betraying an ally.29
Like his recent predecessors, Carter made further reductions in the American military
presence in the Western Pacific, and ordered a gradual reduction of American forces from
South Korea in March 1977. To many it was evident that the United States had severely
cut back its military presence in East Asia. Chiang Ching-kuo, President of the Executive
Yuan, commented that the American withdrawal from the region would do more damage
than the Communist takeover of South Vietnam.30
After months of intense negotiations, on December 15, 1978, President Carter
announced that the United States and the People’s Republic of China would establish
formal diplomatic relations and exchange ambassadors by March 1, 1979. In January
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-2591979, the United States dropped formal relations with Nationalist China, ended its mutual
defense treaty obligations to the ROC, and withdrew its remaining troops from Taiwan.
Chiang Ching-kuo, who became ROC President in 1978, declared that because the United
States had broken its treaty commitments to the ROC, he would not expect that any free
country in the future could have any confidence that the United States government would
provide support in their time of need.31
Carter’s plan to extend formal relations to Communist China would not be well
received. Because the timing of his announcement was a matter of utmost secrecy,
American diplomats in Taipei had only twelve hours warning to prepare a reaction and
inform ROC officials. In the United States, members of Congress reacted angrily and
demanded Carter maintain some type of relationship with the ROC. In an attempt to
work out an understanding, Carter sent a six-member delegation to Taipei led by Deputy
Secretary of State Warren Christopher. Displeased with Carter’s policy toward the ROC,
ten thousand demonstrators in Taipei attacked Christopher’s motorcade with eggs,
tomatoes, mud and crowbars.32 During the two-day meeting in December 1978, the
Nationalist government demanded a return to formal diplomatic relations and insisted that
the United States continue to supply the ROC with weapons. President Carter refused to
re-establish formal relations, but promised to consider renewed military sales to the
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-260embattled government.33 In December 1978, President Carter sent to Capitol Hill a draft
of a bill that would establish unofficial relations with Taiwan, but did not provide
American military or financial assistance and therefore left Taiwan’s security in doubt.34
According to Harry E. T. Thayer, Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs in the
Department of State, “the administration badly underestimated what the Hill reaction was
going to be to this skeleton of a Taiwan Relations Act. It was not broad enough for the
Congress.”35
Although members of Congress overwhelmingly approved extending diplomatic
relations to the Communist Chinese and ending formal relations with the Nationalist
Chinese, some legislators on the far right did not. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona)
and twenty-five other members of Congress filed a federal lawsuit in early 1979
challenging presidential authority to terminate a defense treaty without the advice and
consent of the United States Senate. Asking that President Carter’s action be declared
“unconstitutional and illegal,” Goldwater testified before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that President Carter had usurped legislative power, a precedent setting act
that would allow any future president to pull the U.S. out of almost every treaty. State
Department officials countered that President Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus R.
Vance, named as defendants in the suit, could act alone to terminate the 1954 defense
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-261treaty with the ROC because the Senate’s duty to give advice and consent was limited to
making treaties and not to ending them. On October 17, 1979, U.S. District Judge Oliver
Gasch ruled in favor of Senator Goldwater, but his decision was overturned a month later
by the U.S. Court of Appeals.36
Some members of Congress moved quickly to ensure continued American defense
commitments to Taiwan. The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 established informal
relations with the Nationalists on Taiwan and declared that the United States would
consider any attempt by the Chinese Communists to take the island by non-peaceful
means a threat to the Western Pacific and to the United States. The president, by law,
was expected to report any threat to Taiwan to Congress. The act also allowed the United
States to continue providing arms to the ROC, but the administration of President Ronald
W. Reagan in 1982 promised to reduce these arms sales.37 Informal diplomatic relations
were to be conducted through the newly-created American Institute in Taiwan, a nonprofit corporation through which the president or any American government agency could
enter into agreements with Taiwan with congressional approval.38
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-262Conclusion
While the Taiwan Relations Act maintained a semblance of the former American
relationship with the ROC, the United States could not protect Nationalist China from
removal from other international organizations. By the end of Carter’s presidency, the
Republic of China had been expelled from the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, and ROC officials could no longer visit U.S. government offices or
schedule official visits to the United States. Even goods imported from Taiwan had to be
labeled “Made in Taiwan” rather than “Made in ROC.”39 The newly-created American
Institute on Taiwan took over government-to-government relations.40 The end of formal
relations between the United States and the Republic of China had finally come.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
Between the end of the Chinese Civil War and the administration of President
John F. Kennedy, the United States pledged to ensure the security and independence of
the Republic of China (ROC). Through close diplomatic relations and with generous
amounts of military and humanitarian aid, American officials hoped that the ROC would
prove to be a strong counterweight against growing communist influence in East Asia.
The Committee of One Million mobilized congressional leadership to support the ROC
and influenced American public sentiment in support of the Nationalists’ plight
throughout the 1950s. In 1958, the United States and the ROC thwarted Chinese
Communist threats to invade and occupy Taiwan through shipments of aid and by
sending the U.S. Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. The Nationalist government on
Taiwan, by the end of the 1950s, seemed to be secure.
At the beginning of the 1960s, American policymakers were at a crossroads with
the ROC. Both the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson publicly
promised to continue support for Chiang Kai-shek’s regime, but some career diplomats
doubted that this relationship could be maintained indefinitely. They proposed measures
that sought to avoid war with Communist China, produce a diplomatic rapprochement
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and seek a “two Chinas” policy. Chiang also
-263-

-264had allies in the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the State
Department he could count on to press his concerns. They and the Nationalists claimed
that the ROC government on Taiwan was the sole, legal government of all China, and
maintained that the United States, as the leader of the “free world,” was responsible for
assisting the ROC in maintaining its legitimacy and sovereignty.
The Chinese representation issue in the United Nations (UN) was a high priority
for American policymakers throughout the 1960s. This issue involved the question of
whether the ROC or the PRC would be the legal representative of China in the United
Nations and who would exercise its veto power in the Security Council. By 1961, the
United States had blocked eastern bloc proposals that sought to remove the ROC in favor
of the PRC. But as the Kennedy and Johnson administrations became more heavily
involved in Vietnam, and as African nations declared independence and joined the UN, it
became increasingly difficult for the United States to assist in directly maintaining the
ROC’s seat. After the United States declared Canadian and Italian plans to keep the ROC
in the UN unsatisfactory in 1966, the Johnson administration blocked their plans and
moved to ensure Chiang would not abandon the seat himself. Ultimately, the United
States could not prevent the ouster of the ROC from the United Nations and its
replacement with the PRC.
Meanwhile, throughout the 1960s, President Chiang had threatened to launch a
military invasion of Mainland China from his bases on Quemoy and Matsu to restore
himself and his government as the legitimate rulers of all China. Using the poor situation
on the Mainland resulting from Mao Zedong’s Great Leap Forward as his pretext, Chiang

-265pressed his contacts in the U.S. government for support. But staffers at State and Defense
realized that such an invasion would do more harm than good. Additionally, such an
invasion was unrealistic because the Offshore Islands were not large enough and were
located too close to the Mainland to support an invasion. The Kennedy and Johnson
administrations expressed support for the ROC’s objective, but diplomatically subdued
Chiang’s hope to “retake the mainland.” As the United States became more involved in
South Vietnam, Chiang worried that President Johnson would pull the U.S. Seventh Fleet
from the Taiwan Strait and abandon his government and stepped up his demand that the
United States help him regain control of the Mainland. Johnson feared that an unchecked
Chiang would cause the Vietnam War to spin out of control and prompt the Chinese
Communists to enter the conflict overtly. Therefore, the United States provided enough
support and advisors to help the ROC in case of an attack coming from the PRC, but not
to help launch an attack on the Mainland.
The ROC president also hoped to play a much larger diplomatic and military role
in Southeast Asia. In the early 1960s, Chiang intended to attack the PRC using thousands
of ROC irregular soldiers, many of whom had retreated into the Burma-Thailand-Laos
border area after the communists took over the Mainland in 1949. After American
officials warned Chiang that these troops were a threat to regional stability, he grudgingly
removed many of them. Meanwhile, as the Vietnam War became more intense, Chiang
insisted that his army be afforded a larger role in Southeast Asia. Specifically, Chiang
wanted to send ROC combat troops to assist the South Vietnamese and the Americans.
After the Johnson administration rebuffed his plan, Chiang met with South Vietnamese

-266leaders to seek a Southeast Asian anti-communist military alliance and further pressed his
case for Nationalist involvement in Vietnam’s war. As more American soldiers were
needed in the war effort, the U.S. renovated Taiwanese air bases and used them as an
airlift facilities. Taiwan also became a popular rest and relaxation destination for
American soldiers in Vietnam. This indirect participation in the Vietnam War failed to
assuage Chiang, who insisted that he be allowed to attack the Mainland communists
before the war in South Vietnam was lost. Once again, the Johnson administration
declined his offer.
The failure of the China Lobby to help Chiang manipulate American policy
toward the ROC also resulted partly from the Vietnam War. In the 1950s, Capitol Hill
supporters of the ROC pressed for Chiang’s defense needs in case of an attack from the
Mainland. Chiang had also hired a public relations firm to garner American public
support for his cause against the regime across the Taiwan Strait. But by the 1960s,
pressure groups like the Committee of One Million could not raise enough money to pay
for new means of generating public support and manipulating policy. This was partly due
to inflation caused by overspending on the Vietnam War, which restricted many
Americans’ discretionary spending. Even Madame Chiang Kai-shek’s 1965 trip to the
United States failed to generate support. Thus, the remnants of the China Lobby had
resorted to “preaching to the converted” and the debate over the future of U.S.-ROC
relations opened wider.
The American military involvement in Vietnam certainly played a role in
influencing American diplomatic, military, congressional, and public opinion toward the

-267ROC. In addition, the changing make-up of the UN made it increasingly difficult for the
United States to protect the ROC’s seat in the United Nations. Meanwhile, American
soldiers, funds, and military equipment that could have been sent to Taiwan were needed
in Vietnam for use in combat against the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army.
The Johnson administration also had to hold Chiang back from creating a larger
Southeast Asian war and from putting American servicemen and the United States in
greater peril. The Vietnam War also created an economic recession that tightened
personal and governmental budgets. Lobby organizations, such as the Committee of One
Million, who depended on financial donations to promote the Nationalists’ cause, could
no longer attempt to manipulate American policy by the end of the 1960s. Faced with the
necessity of budget cuts, legislators, policymakers, and the American public openly
sought alternatives to the policies of war and economic stagnation.
Changes in the State Department also contributed to changes in U.S. China policy
in the 1960s. In 1961, the Kennedy administration re-staffed and reorganized the State
Department, in particular the Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, with individuals who
believed that the policy of containing and isolating the PRC was unrealistic. As these
staffers’ influence increased, policy changed to hold Chiang’s intentions in check and to
end PRC isolation. Congressional investigations into China policy in 1966 also
concluded that it was in the United States’ best interest to end Communist China’s
isolation. President Johnson, in his July 11, 1966, speech, echoed these same sentiments.
By 1969, although President Nixon bypassed the State Department in favor of
establishing policy through the National Security Council, the stage had been set for

-268ending the PRC’s isolation and formal United States diplomatic relations with the ROC.
The American relationship with the Republic of China, in the era of the Vietnam
War, can best be described as a conflict of interest. American and Nationalist Chinese
foreign policy goals clashed when American containment of communism’s spread
threatened Nationalist China’s plans to restore its international legitimacy. The United
States created, maintained and defended a military and diplomatic perimeter around the
Soviet Union and Communist China, which sought to contain communism. The ROC, on
the other hand, insisted it was the legitimate government of all China, and, to prove its
legitimacy, planned to use military means to “retake the mainland.” But as the United
States became more embroiled in Vietnam’s civil war and as the American economy
inched closer to recession, the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson could no
longer guarantee its western Pacific ally the assistance it requested. Consequently, by
1969, the Republic of China no longer enjoyed the unquestioned support of the United
States government and an overwhelming majority of its citizens. Given significant shifts
in public opinion and official thinking in the course of the 1960s, Nixon’s policy of
détente and Carter’s normalization of relations with the PRC and abandonment of the
ROC should not seem so surprising.
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